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ABSTRACT 
 
The international investment law regime has been undergoing significant changes in 
recent years due to the substantial rise of foreign investments made by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the consequential regulatory responses taken by some major 
host states. In this context, this thesis attempts to examine whether and to what 
extent the international investment law regime has evolved to adequately respond to 
the changing realities in international investment, especially the rise of SOEs as a 
new type of investor.  
 
This thesis, therefore, provides a novel and systematic review of the important issues 
relating to SOE investments, including the qualification of SOEs for investment 
protections, the admission of foreign SOEs, substantive standards of SOE 
protections such as non-discriminatory treatment and fair and equitable treatment, 
and exceptions that justify host states’ measures against SOEs. This thesis argues 
that new generation investment treaties have struck a balance of rights and 
obligations between SOE investors and host states, namely, providing investment 
protections for SOEs whilst preserving host states’ regulatory rights to pursue 
national interests and public policy objectives, and at the same time, addressing 
investment promotion and liberalisation. Furthermore, the emergence of measures 
tailored to regulate SOE investments indicates that an ‘East-West’ contest has 
emerged in recent investment regimes, complicating the current major tension of the 
‘Public-Private’ debate and producing more divergence in states’ investment policies 
at both national and international levels.  
 
This thesis suggests that it is neither proper nor sensible for the international 
investment law regime to restrict or exclude SOE investments merely on the basis of 
state ownership. Further clarifications and recalibrations of investment protections 
will be helpful to strike a better balance of interests between investors and states and 
to minimise potential risks in international investment arbitration. It is hoped that 
this thesis contributes to the SOE investment commentary and provides some useful 
insights into the evolving international investment law as well as recommendations 
for a balanced, non-discriminatory and liberal future investment law regime. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
SOES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN 
A CHANGING WORLD 
 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it 
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the 
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of 
despair… 
- Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (1895) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The world has moved into an extremely interesting time of change and uncertainty 
with the United Kingdom exiting the European Union, President Donald Trump 
leading the United States, and the Chinese President Xi Jinping advocating 
globalisation at the United Nations and the World Economic Forum. The same is 
equally visible in the international investment law regime.1 Liberalisation of the 
investment law regime carries on as a general practice - with yet more investment 
treaties signed on the international stage and more liberalising measures adopted at 
the domestic level, increasingly states are taking a more cautious and restrictive 
approach in regulating international investments. 
 
One of the many demonstrations of such change and uncertainty is the remarkable 
rise of international investments made by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
consequential regulatory responses mounted by some major host states. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics show that, for 
instance, 15 per cent of the 100 largest multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the 
world are SO-MNEs. A considerable number of these are from developing and 
                                                             
1 A regime is traditionally understood as the ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations coverage in a given area of international relations’, Stephen D Krasner, Power, the 
State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (Routledge 2009) 113. For the purpose of this study, 
the international investment law regime refers to international investment treaties and investment arbitrations.  
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transition economies, concentrated in industries of public interest and strategic 
importance.2 As a consequence, some developed states have taken domestic and 
international measures to tighten the review and regulation of SOE investments due 
to a wide range of concerns, particularly national security and competitive distortion 
concerns.3 Such practices have undoubtedly added further complexity, divergence 
and uncertainty to the already troubled field of international investment law.  
 
Against this backdrop, it is important to explore and analyse whether and to what 
extent the rise of SOE investment affects the international investment law regime 
and how the regime should respond to emerging changes and uncertainty. However, 
little seems to have been done on this front. This thesis, therefore, attempts to take up 
the challenge by providing a systematic and novel review and analysis of the most 
important provisions of international investment treaties, in order to evaluate 
whether and to what extent the current investment law regime is adequately equipped 
to respond to policy challenges posed by SOE investments. This thesis focuses on 
issues broader than SOEs only. Rather, it covers a wide-range of issues relating to 
investment protections, investment promotion and liberalisation, and host states’ 
regulatory rights that need to be addressed in today’s world. The landscape of 
international investment has been changing significantly over the past decade, with a 
surge of SOE investments and a rise of state capitalism. On the one hand, the 
evolving regime of investment law and policy calls for more liberalisation at the 
international level. But on the other hand, it puts in place more protectionist 
measures at national levels. Hence, the resulting international investment law regime 
has been contested by policymakers, scholars, lawyers and stakeholders in order to 
achieve proper balance and sustainability. I hope this thesis can make a useful 
contribution towards such an endeavour. 
 
As an introductory chapter, the following sections will first elaborate on the 
changing landscape in international investment law and the challenges posed by the 
                                                             
2 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017- Investment and Digital Economy (UN Publication 2017) 32. 
3 Lu Wang and Norah Gallagher, ‘Introduction to the Special Focus Issue on State-Owned Enterprises’ (2016) 31 
ICSID Review 1, 1; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 - Non-Equity Modes of International Production 
and Development (UN Publication 2011) 36–7; Wouter PF Schmit Jongbloed, Lisa E Sachs and Karl P Sauvant, 
‘Sovereign Investment: An Introduction’ in Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and Wouter PF Schmit Jongbloed (eds), 
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (OUP 2012) 10–6. 
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rise of SOEs to the existing investment regime. It will then set out the overall design 
of the thesis, including its purposes, methods, structures and main findings.  
 
1.2 The Changing Landscape of International Investment Law 
 
The landscape of international investment and its governing regime has undergone 
dramatic changes in the past decades, especially following the global economic and 
financial crisis of 2008-2009.4 To begin with, global foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows fell from a historic high of $1,979 billion in 2007 to $1,697 billion in 2008.5 
While global FDI flows rose by 38 per cent to $1.76 trillion in 2015 - the highest 
level since the crisis and a modest recovery of which is forecast for 2017 - they still 
remained well below the pre-crisis peak (Figure 1.1).6 This crisis has coincided with 
new trends in international investment, notably with a surge of FDI from developing 
and transition economies.7 Some developing economies have now become important 
sources of FDI.8 The latest World Investment Report (WIR) shows that developing 
economies saw their FDI inflows reach $646 billion in 2016, which together with 
transition economies accounted for 6 of the top 10 host economies.9 Meanwhile, FDI 
outflows from developed countries declined by 11 percent to $1 trillion in 2016 
(Figure 1.2), but those from developing countries slipped 1 per cent to $383 billion, 
despite a surge which saw China rising 44 per cent to $183 billion as the second 
largest home country for FDI for the first time.10 To a certain extent, the pattern of 
                                                             
4 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009 - Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and 
Development (UN Publication 2009) xvii. 
5 ibid xix. 
6 UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 2. 
7 For example, by 2010, FDI inflows to developing economies and together with transition economies- for the 
first time- absorbed more than half of global FDI flows, UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 3. 
8 According to UNCTAD’s survey, while developed countries remain the dominant role in FDI outflows, major 
developing countries such as the BRICs, the UAE, the Republic of Korea and Turkey are also important sources 
of FDI. UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Prospects Survey 2014-2016’ (2014) 11 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2015d4_en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. In particular, 
China is not only the largest host country for FDI among developing economies (the third largest worldwide in 
2016), but also the second largest FDI home country among both developing and developed economies, 
UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 14. 
9 The US remained the largest recipient of FDI with $391 billion in inflows, followed by the UK with $254 
billion, and China was in third position with inflows of $135 billion, ibid 11. 
10 ibid 11, 13–4. Notably, according to the latest World Investment Prospects Survey by UNCTAD, China 
continues as the most promising source of FDI, closely followed by the United States, Germany and United 
Kingdom; among emerging economies, the UAE, the Republic of Korea and Turkey have improved standing 
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FDI flows has changed from the traditional ‘one-way street’ (from developed 
countries to developing countries) to the recent ‘two-way interchange’. 
 
Figure 1.1 FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 2005-2016, and projections 
2017-2018 (Billions of dollars and per cent) 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from FDI/MNE database 
<www.unctad.ord/fdistatistics> 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Developed economies: FDI outflows and their share in world outflows, 2005-
2016 (Billions of dollars and per cent) 
                                                                                                                                                                            
after a temporary setback, UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Prospects Survey 2014-2016’ (n 8) 8. 
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Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from FDI/MNE database 
<www.unctad.ord/fdistatistics> 
 
The international investment law regime has been affected accordingly. Today, the 
universe of international investment agreements (IIAs) contains about 3,324 treaties 
in total, including 2,957 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 367 treaties with 
investment provisions (TIPs) (Figure 1.3).11 However, the expansive network of IIAs 
has been criticised as a ‘spaghetti bowl’, which is highly fragmented and complex 
with numerous problems such as how the various (or diverging) investment 
protections and commitments interact and whether it is possible to disentangle the 
spaghetti strand of IIAs through regional and multilateral approaches.12  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Trends in IIAs signed, 1980-2016      
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from IIA Navigator 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> 
 
In recent years, international investment policymaking has been facing mounting 
challenges associated with some notable trends. First, at the systematic level, the 
regime of IIAs is becoming more complex and uncertain.13 While countries continue 
to sign and negotiate new IIAs, a few countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, South 
                                                             
11 ibid 111. 
12 James Zhan, ‘Investment Policies for Sustainable Development: Addressing Policy Challenges in A New 
Investment Landscape’ in Roberto Echandi (ed), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World 
Trade Forum (CUP 2013) 21–2. 
13 UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 22. 
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Africa and Indonesia have also begun to terminate some of their IIAs.14 Between 
January 1st 2016 and April 1st 2017, for instance, terminations became effective for 
at least 19 IIAs, with more scheduled to take effect later this year.15 Furthermore, the 
US decided to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) in 
2016, although it had never been approved by Congress, and started to renegotiate 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2017.16 A question may 
arise about whether the withdrawal from the TPP signifies a paradigmatic shift in 
international investment law and heralds an era of retreat from international 
investment treaties. Meanwhile, countries have been in recent years actively engaged 
in international investment policy-making at the regional level. An increasing 
number of mega-regional agreements and plurilateral agreements have been 
concluded or entering negotiations, including the Canada-EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the TPP, the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).17 Another question may arise about whether the proliferation of 
mega-regionals is going to change the content and future direction of international 
investment law.  
 
Secondly, recent investment treaties have revealed two divergent tendencies. On the 
one hand, while investment treaties have traditionally focused on investment 
protections against discrimination and uncompensated expropriation, a growing 
number of IIAs include investment liberalisation rules to extend national treatment 
                                                             
14 In fact, after the ‘golden age’ of the BIT movement in 1990s, many states are now realising the potential 
liabilities of signing an international treaty, which in turn has prompted a slowdown in treaty adoption, see 
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel, The Political Economy of the Investment 
Treaty Regime (OUP 2017) 21. 
15 Of the 19 terminated IIAs, 16 were unilaterally denounced, 1 was terminated by consent (the 1995 Argentina– 
Indonesia BIT), and 2 were replaced by a new treaty (the Japan–Mongolia BIT and the European Communities–
Ukraine Cooperation Agreement), UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2)112. 
16 See, for instance, ‘Trump says US to quit TPP on first day in office’ BBC (US & Canada, 22 November 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38059623> accessed 12 September 2017. In April 2017, President 
Trump warned that the US could terminate the NAFTA if it did not get a ‘fairer deal’ from the negotiation, see 
Shawn Donnan, Jude Webber and Anna Nicolaou, ‘Trump renews US threat to withdraw from Nafta’ Financial 
Times (New York, 27 April 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/4f4c269e-2b68-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
17 The CETA and the TPP were concluded in 2016, while the RCEP, the TTIP and other regional agreements 
including the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) remain 
at various stages of negotiation. 
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(NT) and most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) obligations to the pre-
establishment phase of investment (Figure 1.4).18 Some economies that had been 
reluctant to accept admission obligations, such as China, have begun to accept pre-
establishment NT obligations on the basis of a ‘negative list’ of reserved sectors in 
BIT negotiations. 19  The rise of pre-establishment IIAs has gradually affected 
domestic investment regulations on admission of foreign investment.20 Numerous 
countries have taken measures to ease entry and establishment conditions for foreign 
investors, whilst investment liberalisation and promotion continuously predominate 
in national investment policy measures (Figure 1.5).21 
                                                             
18 The bulk of investment treaties concluded by European countries and following European templates have 
traditionally been silent on the admission of foreign investment. However, the US treaties, unlike European 
treaties, have typically extended national and most-favored-nation treatment to the pre-establishment phase from 
the beginning, see e.g., Kenneth J Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements (OUP 2009) 236. In 
recent year, a growing number of investment treaties have followed the US approach of extending NT and MFN 
to the pre-establishment phase, most of which involved developed economies - especially Canada, Japan, Finland 
and the EU; also, a few developing countries are actively concluding pre-establishment IIAs, such as Chile, Costa 
Rica, the Republic of Korea, Peru and Singapore, UNCTAD, World Investement Report 2015 - Reforming 
International Investment Governance (UN Publication 2015) 110. By the end of 2014, 228 IIAs have pre-
establishment commitments, and such practice is also enshrined in mega-regional TPP, RCEP and TTIP. 
19 MOFCOM, ‘Spokesman Sun Jiwen comments on great progress made in US-China BIT negotiations’ (Beijing, 
6 September 2016) 
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201609/20160901389177.shtml> accessed 12 
September 2017; Wenhua Shan and Lu Wang, ‘The China-EU BIT and the Emerging “Global BIT 2.0”’ (2015) 
30 (1) ICSID Review 260, 261. Also, in the investment chapter of CETA, both the EU and Canada have agreed to 
extensive market access commitments with carve-out exceptions (Article 8.4) and extended non-discriminatory 
treatment to pre-establishment phase investment (Article 8.6 & 8.7). See also Ch 3. 
20 Pre-establishment commitments may improve the host countries’ openness for foreign investments, whilst 
helping home countries ‘lock in’ existing levels of openness, see UNCTAD, WIR 2015 (n 18) 111–2. 
21 Investment liberalisation and promotion measures include promulgating new investment laws, establishing 
special economic zones, reforming domestic investment dispute resolution system, expanding privatisation, 
adopting new public-private partnership regime, etc. Furthermore, national policy measures for FDI liberalization 
is most active in emerging economies in 2016 including India, China, and the Russian Federation, UNCTAD, 
WIR 2017 (n 2) 100–3. 
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Figure 1.4 Trends in pre-establishment IIAs signed, 1990-2014 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2015, based on information from IIA database 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org> 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Changes in national investment policies, 1992-2016 (Per cent) 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from Investment Policy Monitor Database 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IPM> 
 
On the other hand, however, some of the recent IIAs tend to refine and reform 
substantive provisions to preserve necessary regulatory rights of host states for 
pursuing national interests. For example, some IIAs have refined and clarified the 
definition of investment and general standards of investment protection such as NT, 
MFN, fair and equitable treatment (FET), right to transfer, and expropriation and 
compensation.22 Moreover, general and specific exceptions have become common in 
                                                             
22 The reform in new IIAs includes, for example, narrowing the scope of treaty protections by excluding certain 
types of assets from the definition of investment; refining the definition of investment with a reference to 
characteristics of investment; clarifying the treatment standards by including more details, such as equating FET 
to the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law or explicitly providing what does  and 
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recent treaties that allow host states to pursue regulatory objectives such as 
protecting public health and safety without a violation of investment treaty 
obligations.23 Some states have provided provisions to address a wide range of 
concerns on environment and labour protections, transparency, corporate behaviours, 
fair competition and anti-corruption.24 Meanwhile, national restrictive measures for 
foreign investors is rising (Figure 1.5). A question then arises whether the recent 
practice could achieve a balance between protecting foreign investors’ investments 
and protecting host states’ right to regulate, or would detract from investment 
protection and dissimulate protectionism ends. 
 
Finally, debates on the reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reached a 
new level. On the one hand, the number of ISDS cases continues to grow (Figure 
1.6).25 Many developing countries and transition economies have been facing huge 
amounts of compensation to foreign investors, such as Argentina, Venezuela, Czech 
Republic and the Russian Federation.26 On the other hand, the share of cases against 
developed states is on the rise. Before 2013, fewer cases were brought against 
developed countries, but between 2014 and 2015, above 40 per cent of all cases were 
against developed countries.27 As a result, developed countries that traditionally 
                                                                                                                                                                            
does not constitute an indirect expropriation; providing exceptions to transfer-of-funds obligations; limiting treaty 
provisions that are subject to the international investment arbitration; etc. UNCTAD, WIR 2015 (n 18) 112; 
UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 3) 111; UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 120. 
23 For example, some IIAs exclude taxation, financial services or government procurement from the scope of 
treaty; some IIAs provide general exceptions for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources; some IIAs explicitly include self-judging clauses to protect 
essential security interests of host states. See also Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
24 For example, some IIAs provide provisions to ensure responsible investment, such as a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) clause or a ‘not lowering of standard’ clause. For more see ibid 122–3; UNCTAD, WIR 
2016 (n 3) 111–2. Also, some recent IIAs, especially FTAs, have provided rules on competition policies, such as 
the Singapore-Australia FTA (Chapter 12), CETA (Chapter Seven) and the TPP (Chapter 16). 
25 According to the latest World Investment Report, 62 new cases were initiated in 2016, bringing the total 
number of known cases to 767; in addition, investors won 60 per cent of the total known cases decided on merits, 
UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 114. 
26 Argentina, Venezuela and Czech Republic are the most frequent respondent states that have been subject to 
dozens of arbitrations over the past decades. In 2007, the Hague’s arbitration court (PCA) ruled that Russian must 
pay a group of shareholders in Yukos around $50 billion for expropriation, although the award was overruled by 
domestic courts, see Neil Buckley, ‘Dutch court rejects $50bn Yukos award against Russia’ Financial Times (20 
April 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/9d3aa3d5-432f-3b2a-96c5-d10e0f61bc3c> accessed 12 September 
2017; Stanley Reed, ‘Dutch Court Overturns $50 Billion Ruling Against Russia in Yukos Case’ The New York 
Times (London, 20 April 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/business/international/yukos-russia-50-
billion-ruling.html> accessed 12 September 2017. 
27 UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 3) 105. 
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relied upon the ISDS for protecting their foreign investors and investments are 
increasingly ‘bitten’ by the dispute resolution mechanism.28 A famous example is 
two Vattenfall cases against Germany, which implies that international investment 
arbitration is no longer a ‘one-way street’.29 Hence, both developing and developed 
countries today have to be cautious on the possible constraining effects that IIAs and 
ISDS may have on their ability to regulate foreign investments in the public interest, 
such as in areas of public health safety and environment protection.30 Also, a number 
of concerns in relation to the current ISDS system have brought increasing criticisms. 
These include concerns relating to the deficit of legitimacy and transparency, 
contradictions between arbitral awards, difficulties in correcting erroneous arbitral 
decisions, questions about the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, and the 
cost and time of arbitral procedures.31 As a result, paths for reforming the ISDS have 
                                                             
28 Traditionally, most arbitrations have been brought by investors from developed countries against developing 
and transition states. However, an increasing number of cases in recent years have been brought against 
developed countries. According to UNCTAD’s statistics, Spain (34), Canada (26) and US (16) are among the top 
20 frequent respondent states, see UNCTAD, ‘International Dispute Settlement’ 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry> accessed 22 August 2017. Notably, some 
investors from developing countries also have started to use ISDS for treaty protections. In 2016, for example, 
investors from the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and the UAE were the most active claimants from 
developing countries and transition economies. So far, 109 countries including both developed and developing 
countries have been respondents to one or more know ISDS claim. UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 115. 
29 In 2009, a Swedish company, Vattenfall, filed its first case against Germany under the 1991 Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), alleging that restrictive measures imposed by local authorities constituted expropriation and unfair 
treatment and claiming more than $1.4 billion compensation. In 2012, Vattenfall filed a second arbitration against 
Germany under the ECT, where the dispute arose from Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power stations. 
For the first Vattenfall case, see Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award, 11 March 2011; for 
more discussion on the second Vattenfall case, see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Rhea Tamara Hoffman, 
‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background to the New 
Dispute Vattenfall v Germany (II)’ [2012] IISD Briefing Note 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/german_nuclear_phase_out.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017; Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘The State of Play in Vattenfall v. Germany II: Leaving the 
German Public in the Dark’ [2014] IISD Briefing Note <http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-
of-play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. See also 
Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 14)27.  
30 For instance, two claims were brought by the Philip Morris tobacco company against Australia and Uruguay 
where investors contested legislation on tobacco packaging on the grounds that it violated IIAs. Philip Morris 
Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 17 December 2015; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016. 
31 UNCTAD, ‘Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of A Roadmap’ (2013) 2 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. See also 
Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 14) 28–30. Notably, since October 2016, the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has begun work on updating and modernizing its rules and 
regulations, see ICSID, ‘Update on ICSID Rule Amendment 
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emerged in recent years, including clarifying substantive provisions, limiting 
investor access to ISDS and setting rules for greater transparency in investment 
arbitrations.32 In particular, the EU has proposed an investment court system (ICS) to 
replace the current ISDS regime, which is now updated to a multilateral ICS.33 The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNICITRAL) has also 
agreed to start work on the multilateral reform of ISDS.34 However, the reform of 
investment dispute resolution still requires numerous debates, and it is yet to be seen 
whether the investment dispute settlement system is to be ratified with a revised 
ISDS or the ICS, or alternative global mechanisms.35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Project’<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID%20NewsLetter/2017-Issue2/Update-on-ICSID-
Rule-Amendment-Project.aspx> accessed 12 September 2017. 
32 In 2014, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) provided the Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration for greater transparency, which has come into force. The 
United Nations has then adopted a Convention on the Rules on Transparency (‘Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency’) which is an instrument for parties to apply the Rules on Transparency. For a full text of the 
UNCITRAL Rules see <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. In addition, the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) launched the current amendment process in 2016 and published potential areas for 
amendment for public consultation, for more information see 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/ICSID%20Rules%20Amendment%20Process-ENG.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2017. See also UNCTAD, ‘Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of A 
Roadmap’ (n 31); Stephan W Schill, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual 
Framework and Options for the Way Forward’ (ICTSD and World Economic Forum, 2015) E15 Initiative 
<http://e15initiative.org/publications/reforming-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-conceptual-framework-
and-options-for-the-way-forward/> accessed 12 September 2017; Piero Bernardini, ‘Reforming Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: The Need to Balance Both Parties’ (2017) 32 ICSID Review 38. 
33 Both the CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EUVFTA) include provisions anticipating the 
transition from the bilateral ICS included in the agreements to a permanent Multilateral Investment Court. To 
ensure policy coherence at EU level, similar transitional provisions are proposed in the context of all other on-
going or future bilateral EU trade and/or investment negotiations. 
34 Timothy Lemay, ‘UNCITRAL to consider possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement’ UNCITRAL (14 
July 2017) <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl250.html> accessed 12 September 2017. 
35 A typical case is the current TTIP negotiations. For more discussion see e.g., Wolfgang Koeth, ‘Can the 
Investment Court System (ICS) Save TTIP and CETA?’ (EIPA 2016) 2016/W/01 
<http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/product/20160921135556_Workingpaper2016_W_01.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
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Figure 1.6 Trends in known treaty-based ISDS cases, 1987-2016 
 Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from ISDS Navigator 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> 
 
There is no doubt that the landscape of international investment has changed 
drastically over the past decades and the international investment law regime has 
never before faced as many challenges and debates as today. Investment 
policymaking in the twenty-first century is becoming more complex, divergent and 
uncertain. A question, therefore, arises about how best to equip the investment law 
and policy regime with the new reality of global investment. Notably, in July 2016, 
the G20 countries adopted non-binding Guiding Principles for Global Investment 
Policymaking, which has provided the blueprint for a new generation of investment 
policies and reached multilateral consensus on investment matters and sustainable 
development for the first time.36 
 
                                                             
36 European Commission, ‘G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Statement: Annex III’ (Shanghai, 9-10 July 2016) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dgra_09jul16_e.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. See also 
James Zhan, ‘G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Facilitator’s Perspective’ (ICTSD 
and World Economic Forum 2016) The E15 Initiative <http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-
Investment-Zhan-Final-1.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017; Karl P Sauvant, ‘China Moves the G20 Toward an 
International Investment Framework and Investment Facilitation’ (2017) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2901156> accessed 12 September 2017; Anna Joubin-Bret 
and Cristian Rodriguez Chiffelle, ‘G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Stepping 
Stone for Multilateral Rules on Investment’ (ICTSD and World Economic Forum 2017) The E15 Initiative 
<http://e15initiative.org/publications/g20-guiding-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking-a-stepping-
stone-for-multilateral-rules-on-investment/> accessed 12 September 2017.  
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1.3 The Rising Role of SOEs in International Investment Landscape: 
Concerns and Challenges 
 
While SOEs are not new in the marketplace, their rapid international expansion is a 
relatively new and very important phenomenon in the international economy of the 
twenty-first century.37 The rationale behind the emergence of SOEs varies among 
countries and industries. Traditionally, the creation of SOEs can be a result of 
ideology and political strategy of some governments because it was thought that the 
state ownership could speed up the national development and achieve public policy 
objectives. In economics, governments may intervene the economy via SOEs as a 
solution to market failures. Unlike private-owned firms that focus on profit-
maximising, SOEs are considered to be driven by both political and economic 
motivations where the state-owned nature plays a significant role. Nonetheless, there 
is no universally agreed definition of SOEs. The World Bank defines SOEs as 
‘government owned or government controlled economic entities that generate the 
bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services’.38 According to UNCTAD, 
SOEs are defined as ‘enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign 
affiliates in which the government (both national and sub-national) has a controlling 
interest (full, majority, or significant minority), whether or not listed on a stock 
exchange’. 39  What defines a controlling interest in each case may differ, but 
UNCTAD defines control as ‘a stake of 10 per cent or more of the voting power, or 
where the government is the largest single shareholder’; in addition, a government 
can control an entity through a ‘golden share’ that gives special voting rights and the 
ability to block key strategic decisions, especially takeovers by other shareholders.40 
                                                             
37 Cuervo-Cazurra Alvaro and others, ‘Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies’ (2014) 
45 Journal of International Business Studies 919, 919–20; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global 
Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (OECD Publishing 2016) 13; Przemyslaw Kowalski and Kateryna 
Perepechay, ‘International Trade and Investment by State Enterprises’ (2015) 184 7 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrtcr9x6c48-en%0AOECD> accessed 11 September 2017; Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition, Cambridge University Press 2010) 63; 
UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 3; UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) xi. 
38 World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership (OUP 1995) 263. 
39 UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n ) 28. 
40 ibid; UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 30. Likewise, the OECD provides that the control of the state includes either 
the state being the ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares or otherwise exercising an 
equivalent degree of control, see OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015 
Editioni, OECD Publishing 2015) 14. Similar definitions see e.g., Sebastien Miroudot and Alexandros Ragoussis, 
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For the purpose of this study, this thesis will accept UNCTAD’s definition of SOEs 
in general. For clarity, the term SOEs exclude sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
because they are not enterprises and are not necessarily governed by the usual 
corporate mechanisms, despite the similarity in state ownership and prominence in 
FDI.41 However, it is notable that SWFs often create sovereign wealth enterprises 
(SWEs) to make foreign investments where the SWEs can be regarded as a special 
kind of SOEs.42 Nevertheless, this thesis will mainly focus on SOEs and SOE 
investments, unless otherwise specified. 
 
1.3.1 The Rising Role of SOE Investments 
 
SOEs as a relatively new global actor contribute to the changing landscape of 
international investments.43 Over the past 15 years SOEs have not diminished but 
have undergone a dramatic revival.44 As estimated by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 22% of the world’s largest 100 firms are 
now effectively under state control, reaching the highest percentage in decades.45 
                                                                                                                                                                            
‘Actors in the International Investment Scenario: Objectives, Performance and Advantaes of Affiliates of State-
Owned Enterprises and Sovereign Wealth Funds’ in Pierre Sauvé and Roberto Echandi (eds), Prospects in 
International Investment Law and Policy : World Trade Forum (CUP 2013) 56; Adrian Blundell-Wignall and 
Gert Wehinger, ‘Open Capital Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Pension Funds, and State-Owned 
Enterprises’ in RA Fry, WJ McKibbon and J O’Brien (eds), Sovereign Wealth: The Role of State Capital in the 
New Financial Order (Imperial College Press 2011) 107. 
41 SWFs are special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by government, WIR 2011 (n 3), 
14. The concept was created by Rozanov in 2005 who defined SWFs as sovereign-owned asset pools which are 
neither traditional public pension funds nor reserve assets supporting national currencies, Andrew Rozanov, 
‘Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?’ (2005) 15 Central Banking Journal 52, 4; Fabio Bassan, ‘Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: A Definition and Classification’ in Fabio Bassan (ed), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and International Investment Law (EE Publishing 2015). 
42 However, some scholars argue that SWEs and SOEs are still different in management, purposes and behaviors, 
see Larry Catá Backer, ‘Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience’ (2010) 19 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 
4, 3–144; Blundell-Wignall and Wehinger (n 40) 105. 
43 Zhan, ‘Investment Policies for Sustainable Development: Addressing Policy Challenges in A New Investment 
Landscape’ (n 12) 15; UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 28. 
44 In the 1990s the demise of central planned economies and free market reforms in developing countries has 
triggered massive privatisations. According to the World Bank’s privatisation database, 8342 large-scale 
privatisations (more than US$1 million) occurred between 1988 and 1999 in 108 countries, see Miroudot and 
Ragoussis (n 40) 51. Against this background, the assumption was that ‘as the economy matured, the government 
would close or privatise them’, Editorial, ‘The Special Report on “The Rise of State Capitalism”’ The Economist 
(21 Jan 2012) <http://www.economist.com/node/21543160> accessed 12 September 2017. 
45 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 13. 
According to UCNTAD, while the number of SOEs continues to remain a small minority - only 1.5 per cent - of 
 
SOES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 
15 
 
UNCTAD in its latest WIR identified close to 15,000 SOEs, with more than 86,000 
foreign affiliates operating around the world.46  More importantly, although the 
number of SOEs represents only 1.5 per cent of the universe of multinational 
enterprises, the value of their FDI has reached about 11 per cent of global FDI flows 
(Figure 1.7).47 As global investors, SOEs are active in both greenfield investments 
and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) purchases.48 FDI by SOEs increased 
dramatically during the global financial crisis that began in 2008. Over the period 
between 2010 and 2016, the total value of their announced projects reached $514 
billion.49 In addition, the value of SOEs’ outward M&As spiked at the outset of the 
financial crisis (between 2008 and 2010). Today, international M&As by SOEs still 
make up about 30 per cent of all M&A activities (Figure 1.8).50 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Announced greenfield FDI projects by SO-MNEs, value and share of total, 2010-
2016 (Billions of dollars and per cent) 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets 
<www.fDimarkets.com> 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the universe of multinational enterprises, their share of the world’s largest non-financial multinational enterprises 
in 2015 was 10 times higher, UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 32. 
46 ibid 30. 
47 ibid 37. FDI by SOEs has grown rapidly since 2000, and the amount reached a peak in 2008 with $149 billion 
of announced greenfield investments and $109 billion cross-border M&As, UNCTAD, WIR 2015 (n 18) 17. 
48 UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 32. 
49 UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 38. 
50 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 30. 
CHAPTER 1 
16 
 
 
Figure 1.8 SOEs as targets and acquirer of international M&A by deal value, 1996-2015 
(Millions of dollars) 
Source: OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity 
(2016), 51 
Note: SOEs here are only wholly-state owned enterprises 
 
There are two prominent characteristics of the current global expansion of SOEs. 
Firstly, most SOEs are from developing economies, especially China, Malaysia, 
India, the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). EU member 
states also have a considerable number of SOEs, especially Sweden, France and Italy 
(Figure 1.9).51 Based on the 2015 Forbes 2000 Global ranking of companies, 128 of 
the world’s largest SOEs in 2014 are based in mainland China, and an additional 13 
domiciled in Hong Kong (China), with OECD countries accounting for 33 largest 
SOEs.52  
 
                                                             
51 According to the UNCTAD’s new database, more than half of SOEs worldwide are from developing 
economies, especially China (257), Malaysia (79), India (61), the Russian Federation (51) and UAE (50), while 
close to two fifths are from developed countries especially EU member states, UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 31. 
Based on the 2015 Forbes 2000 Global ranking of companies, 128 of the world’s largest SOEs in 2014 were 
headquartered in Mainland China. Moreover, compared with SOEs from developed countries, SOEs from 
emerging economies have been more active in investing abroad which have contributed significantly to the 
growth of FDI flows, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 - Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan (UN 
Publication 2014) 22. 
52 In addition, among the world’s largest companies, 34 SOEs from India, 29 SOEs from the Middle Eastern 
countries, 10 from Russia and 7 from Brazil, OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A 
Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 21. 
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Figure 1.9 SO-MNEs: Distribution by major home economy, 2017 (Number of companies)   
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from UNCTAD’s SO-MNE database 
<www.unctad.org/fdistatistics> 
Note: Grey bars indicate European countries that are not members of the EU 
 
In terms of SOE investments, it is interesting to note that developing countries 
normally play the role of home states while developed countries mainly act as host 
states. During 2003-2010, 56 per cent of global outward FDI came from developing 
and transition economies.53 In 2015, the value of international M&A by SOEs from 
emerging economies was about $58,000 million, while that from developed 
economies was about $16,000 million.54 Geographically, in 2017, the EU was host to 
almost 33,000 (38 per cent) of the more than 86,000 SOEs foreign affiliations, while 
the top individual host countries around the world are the US (close to 9,000), the 
UK (close to 8,000) and Germany (close to 5,000) (Figure 1.10).55 In addition, 
empirical studies indicate that SOEs from both Asia and Europe focus heavily on the 
EU market, followed by the US and a few emerging economies. To some extent, 
SOEs from European countries are more regional, whereas SOEs from Asia appear 
more globalised.56 
 
                                                             
53 UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 32. 
54 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 52. 
55 UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 32. 
56 ibid 35. 
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Figure 1.10 Foreign affiliates of SO-MNEs: Distribution by major host economy, 2017 
(Number of affiliates) 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from UNCTAD’s SO-MNE database      
<www.unctad.org/fdistatistics> 
Note: Grey bars indicate European countries that are not members of the EU 
 
Secondly, the global presence of SOEs is considerable in critical sectors or so-called 
‘strategic industries’, including financial services, infrastructures and natural 
resources (Figure 1.11).57 During 2010-2016, for instance, greenfield projects by 
SOEs in utilities, and in automotive and transportation sectors together accounted for 
close to 60 per cent of the cumulative value of announced projects; meanwhile, most 
of the international M&As by SOEs focused on telecommunication, electricity and 
transport services.58 In fact, over half of SOEs are concentrated in sectors of financial 
service and natural resource, reflecting that state owners wish to control more 
directly key resources and key infrastructure networks.59 For example, more than 
three-fourths of global crude oil reserves are controlled by SOEs, some of which are 
from developing states including CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC in China, Gazprom in 
the Russian Federation, Petronas in Malaysia, Petrobras in Brazil and Saudi Aramco 
in Saudi Arabia.60 
 
                                                             
57 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 21; 
UNCTAD, WIR 2014 (n 51) 21; UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 38. 
58 ibid 38. 
59 ibid.  
60 UNCTAD, WIR 2014 (n 51) 21. 
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Figure 1.11 Value of announced greenfield FDI projects by SO-MNEs, by sector and 
industry, 2013-2016 (Billions of dollars) 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2017, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets 
<www.fDimarkets.com> 
 
1.3.2 Concerns and Policy Responses in Relation to Cross-Border SOEs 
 
The global expansion of SOEs from emerging economies and developing states - 
dubbed by some commentators as a (re-)emergence of ‘state capitalism’ - has met 
with rising doubts and critical reactions.61 The Economist once stated that ‘the rise of 
state capitalism - the spread of a new sort of business in the emerging world will 
cause increasing problems’.62 While Western countries as host states have generally 
welcomed the inward SOE investments as an important source of capital and finance, 
especially after the recent economic crisis, they have also raised a broad range of 
                                                             
61 Kowalski and Perepechay  (n 37) 7. ‘State capitalism’ is not new, but it has undergone resurgence over the past 
three decades. Despite its widespread use, there is no unitary definition of the term. According to Ian Bremmer, 
‘state capitalism’ is a form of capitalism where the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets 
primarily for political gain. In this system, state-owned enterprise, selected privately owned companies and 
sovereign wealth funds are important vehicles for states to exercise influence in the market. In particular, China 
has been argued as a typical example of state capitalism in the 21st century. Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free 
Market (Portfolio 2010) 4–5; Editorial, 'The Special Report on “The Rise of State Capitalism”' The Economist 
(21 Jan 2012) <http://www.economist.com/node/21543160> accessed 12 September 2017; Ming Du, ‘China’s 
State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 409, 410. See 
more, generally, e.g., Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G Lazzarini, ‘Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State 
Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance’ (2012); Curtis J Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, 
‘Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm’ (2015) 103 The Georgetown Law Journal 665; Li-
Wen Lin and Curtis J Milhaupt, 'We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China' (2013) 65 Standard Law Review 697; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, 'An Analysis of 
State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China’ (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
2011) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
62 ‘The Special Report on “The Rise of State Capitalism”’ (n 61). 
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concerns over foreign SOEs in relation to national security, competitive neutrality, 
corporate governance and transparency.63  
 
From an investment perspective, a primary concern is that SOE investments may be 
driven by non-commercial objectives - especially in critical and strategic sectors - 
that might have detrimental impacts on national security or other vital interests of the 
receipt country.64 In 2006, for example, the US Congress overturned a deal by the 
UAE state-owned company, Dubai Ports World (DPW), for acquiring five US port 
terminal facilities on the ground of national security considerations. 65  In the 
CNOOC-Unocal deal, Chinese SOE investment was described as a ‘Trojan horse’ of 
Chinese values and politics that would imperil the national security of the US 
because it would enable China to access sensitive technology and information, to 
control the vital energy assets of the US and to facilitate Chinese strategic policy.66  
 
Moreover, as SOEs expand into the global marketplace, some advantages granted to 
SOEs by the (home) government may create anti-competitive effects in the global 
marketplace.67  For instance, SOEs may enjoy preferential access to finance or 
preferable regulatory treatment which put their private-sector counterparts at a 
competitive disadvantage. A relevant concept here is ‘competitive neutrality’ (CN), 
which concerns the maintenance of a level playing field between public and private 
                                                             
63 UNCTAD, WIR 2017 (n 2) 37; UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 36–7; Sauvant, Sachs and Jongbloed (n 3) 10–2; 
Wang and Gallagher (n 3) 1. 
64 UNCTAD, WIR 2011 (n 3) 36; Graham Mott and Wan Khatina Nawawi, ‘SOE Provisions in International 
Agreements’ in Deborah Healey (ed), Competitive Neutrality and Its Application in Selected Developing 
Countries (UNCTAD 2014) 290; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An 
Opportunity? (n 37) 34; Michael Gestrin and others, ‘Governments as Competitors in the Global Marketplace: 
Options for Ensuring a Level Playing Field’ (ICTSD and World Economic Forum 2016) E15 Initiative 4 
<http://e15initiative.org/publications/governments-as-competitors-in-the-global-marketplace-options-for-
ensuring-a-level-playing-field/> accessed 12 September 2017. 
65 Edward Alden, Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Dubai cedes control in US ports battle’ 
Financial Times (Washington, 10 Mar 2006) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/325d3dcc-af99-11da-b417-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4oPLt6ixX> accessed 12 September 2017. 
66 See Ming Du, ‘When China’s National Champions Go Global: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself’ (2014) 48 
Journal of World Trade 1127; Sophie Meunier, ‘Economic Patriotism: Dealing with Chinese Direct Investment in 
the United States’ [2012] Columbia FDI Perspectives <https://doi.org/10.7916/D8CV4RZ7> accessed 12 
September 2017; OECD, ‘SOEs Operating Abroad: An Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-Border Operations of SOEs’ 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/44215438.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
67 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 30. 
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businesses.68 Although CN is not a new concept in domestic competition law, it has 
become the subject of a heated international debate in recent years.69 In 2011, the 
then US Under Secretary Robert Hormats argued that ‘now is the key moment to 
focus on competitive neutrality and attempt to re-level the playing field for US and 
other global companies’.70 His reasoning was that state-owned enterprise, and state-
supported enterprises or ‘National Champions’ as serious global competitors ‘are 
using a multitude of advantages gained at home’ and ‘may have unfair competitive 
advantages in the US or third countries’.71 
 
The root cause of above fears about SOEs is their political nature, i.e., their close ties 
to the government. As mentioned earlier, the state-owned nature makes SOEs unique 
from private-owned firms. The government can not only establish SOEs by state 
capital but also appoint state officials as board members when it is a controlling 
owner. Moreover, SOEs may focus on political objectives and strategies of the 
government over economic objectives. This may present a risk of SOEs becoming 
less independent in their decisions or even used for political purposes. As a result, 
some has considered SOEs as the agent of their (home) government. Although the 
marriage of state ownership and market systems on a global scale sparks heated 
debates, no one can deny the close affiliation of SOEs to the government. 
 
                                                             
68 See e.g., Antonio Capobianco and Hans Christiansen, ‘Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: 
Challenges and Policy Options’ (OECD 2011) 1 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfgjdhg6-en> accessed 12 
September 2017; Karl P Sauvant and others, ‘Trends in FDI , Home Country Measures and Competitive 
Neutrality’ in Andrea K Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2012-2013 (OUP 
2014). 
69 The concept of competitive neutrality can be traced back to the National Competition Policy of Australia in 
1993. To address CN concerns, Australia has established a comprehensive competitive neutrality framework that 
can effectively address CN problems ex ante. In contrast, some countries are using remedies to deal with CN 
problems ex post, i.e., applying competition law to require public sector businesses to cease actions that have a 
detrimental impact on the competition - a typical example is Article 106 TFEU (ex Article 86 TEC). For more 
discussion see Matthew Rennie and Fiona Lindsay, ‘Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises in 
Australia: Review of Practices and Their Relevance for Other Countries’ (OECD 2011) 4 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cxkmx36-en> accssed 12 September 2017; OECD, ‘State-Owned Enterprises 
and the Principle of Competitive Neutrality’ (2009) DAF/COMP(2009)37 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/46734249.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
70 Robert D Hormats, ‘Ensuring a Sound Basis for Global Competition: Competitive Neutrality” DIPNOTE-US 
Department of State Official Blog (6 May 2011) <https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/05/06/ensuring-sound-
basis-global-competition-competitive-neutrality> accessed 14 October 2016. 
71 ibid. 
CHAPTER 1 
22 
 
It is notable, however, that increasing concerns over SOE investments are mostly 
suspicions, not evidenced by any significant number of actual conflicts in practice. 
Consequently these suspicions fuel policy debates.72 For example, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent SOEs do put private multinational enterprise at a 
competitive disadvantage; and it is problematic whether and to what extent the 
possible ‘undue’ advantages for SOEs could have beggar-thy-neighbour or 
internationally negative effects.73 More basically, whether SOE investment is driven 
by commercial or public policy objectives is a very controversial issue and there is 
no clear division between the two. While some assume that SOEs and their home 
governments are identical in respect of strategic motivations for investment, further 
political economic analysis suggests that there exist gaps between governments and 
SOEs in relation to motives for outward investments; and motives of an SOE 
investing overseas are case-specific.74 For example, the primary motivation for some 
Indian SOEs to invest overseas is arguably to gain more resource independence from 
other state actors at home.75 In the case of Chinese SOEs, some argue that their 
global expansion does not always accord with governmental interests, but is 
primarily driven by domestic competition pressures and independent expectations on 
profits. A 2014 OECD survey identified that the primary motivations of Chinese 
SOEs for overseas expansion include: ‘better allocating resources globally; acquiring 
advanced technologies and management experience; and integrating the company’s 
product line and catering for the Chinese domestic market’.76 
 
Nonetheless, fears have prompted some Western countries to take regulatory 
measures to address their concerns over SOEs. At the domestic level, some countries 
such as Australia, Canada and the US have tightened their screenings of FDI 
                                                             
72 Michael V. Gestrin, ‘State-owned Enterprises Finding Bigger Role in Global Investment’ East Asia Forum (27 
November 2014) <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/27/state-owned-enterprises-finding-bigger-role-in-
global-investment/> accessed 12 September 2017. 
73 At least, until now, empirical work and economic studies have been unable to reach a definite answer, see 
OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 15, 59. 
74 ibid 53. See also Sanja Tepavcevic, ‘The Motives of Russian State-Owned Companies for Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment and Its Impact on State-Company Cooperation: Observations Concerning the Energy Sector’ 
23 Transnational Corporations 29, 29–54. (The case study of three outward investments by Russian SOEs 
suggests that despite usually being portrayed as channeled for Russian political influence, ‘the primary drivers for 
outward FDI by Russian state-owned companies are their business interests’.) 
75 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37) 53. 
76 ibid 54. 
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(especially M&A) for foreign SOEs. 77  At the international level, the US has 
proposed the use of bilateral, regional and multilateral trade and investment policy 
tools in responding to the important challenges of ‘state capitalism’ to the US and 
global economy.78 Indeed, the WTO law has already provided several disciplines on 
anti-competitive activities of state enterprises, although regulatory gaps and 
uncertainties still exist.79 Moreover, an increasing number of bilateral and regional 
treaties have covered SOEs or attempted to include SOE disciplines, including the 
Chinese BIT talks with the US and the EU, and the TPP and the TTIP.80 In particular, 
the newly concluded TPP includes an entire chapter on SOEs in support of a level 
playing field between SOEs and private investors, which may have implications for 
future BIT and FTA negotiations.81 
 
1.3.3 Problems for the Investment Law Regime Posed by SOEs  
 
                                                             
77 For instance, the DPW case also prompted US Congress to pass the Foreign Investment and National Security 
Act of 2007 (FINSA) which clarifies that SOEs fall within the scope of national security considerations, see 
Przemyslaw Kowalski and others, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’ (2013) 147 
37; Yuri Shima, ‘The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-Controlled Investors: A Fact 
Finding Survey’ (OECD 2015) 2015/01 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7svp0jkns-en%0AOECD> accessed 12 
September 2017; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 
37) 86–7. For more discussion see Chapter 3. 
78 The US Under-Secretary of State, Robert Hormats, argued that ‘now is the key moment to focus on 
competitive neutrality and to re-level the playing field of US and other global companies’ because ‘state-owned 
enterprise, and state-supported enterprises or “National Champions” are emerging to become serious global 
competitors’, see Hormats (n 70). 
79 See e.g., Du, ‘China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law’ (n 61) 409; Kowalski and others, ‘State-Owned 
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’ (n 77) 27–9; Gestrin and others (n 61) 11. 
80 For example, a few BITs expressly include SOEs in the definition of ‘investors’, see also Ch 2. For the Chinese 
BIT negotiations with the US and the EU, see e.g., Lauren Gloudeman and Nargiza Salidjanova, ‘Policy 
Considerations for Negotiating a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty’ (Economic and Security Review 
Commission Staff Research Report 2016) <https://www.uscc.gov/Research/policy-considerations-negotiating-us-
china-bilateral-investment-treaty> accessed 12 September 2017; Axel Berger, ‘The Case for An EU-China 
Investment Treaty’ (DIE 2014) <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/the-case-for-an-eu-china-
investment-treaty/> accessed 12 September 2017. For a text of TPP rules on SOEs see 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-State-Owned-Enterprises-and-Designated-Monopolies.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2017; for SOE rules in the TTIP, see EU’ initial proposal for legal text on SOEs in TTIP 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153030.pdf > (7 January 2015) accessed 12 
September 2017. 
81 For more discussion see e.g., Sean Miner, ‘Commitments on State-Owned Enterprises’ in Cathleen Cimino-
Isaacs and Jeffrey J Schott (eds), Trans-Pactific Partnership: An Assessment (Peterson Institute For International 
Economics 2016) 335–48; Ines Willemyns, ‘Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic 
Law: Are We Moving in the Right Direction?’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 657. 
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It has been recognised that the upsurge of SOE investments from developing 
countries challenges the investment law regime. The state is playing a triple role in 
global investment - it has become an active global investor in addition to its previous 
roles as a regulator of foreign investments and a rule-maker of IIAs. As a result, the 
growing role of SOEs in economic life has complicated existing tensions between 
foreign investors and host states as well as home states and host states, whilst 
intensifying policy divergences in the investment law regime. For example, a 
question arises whether or not SOEs should be protected by international investment 
treaties which were originally intended to protect and promote private investment. A 
further concern is whether or not SOE investors should be excluded from ISDS 
because they are already privileged in home states or backed by their home 
governments. 
 
Indeed, policy concerns and responses for SOEs reflect only one facet in which the 
landscape of international investment is changing and the regime of international 
investment law and policy continues to evolve. It is recognised that investment treaty 
programmes were originally designed by advanced capital-exporting states (i.e., 
developed countries) after the Second World War to protect their investors and 
investments against potential political risks, especially nationalisation and 
expropriation, in host states (i.e., developing countries) under treaties and customary 
international law and by a ‘depoliticised’ investment arbitration mechanism. 82 
However, with the growth of FDI outflows from developing countries such as China, 
both developed and developing countries now see themselves not just as home states 
but also as host states in investment treaty negotiations. As a result, the gap between 
                                                             
82 As noted by some scholars, the objective of IIA programs designed by developed countries was not just to 
protect individual investors but also to develop customary international law on foreign investment. In fact, it was 
part of a reaction from the developed countries to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) movement that 
was crystallised by the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (Permanent Sovereign over Natural 
Resources, adopted in 1962) and Resolution 3281 (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in 
1974) that essentially denied the legitimacy of an international minimum standard under customary international 
law espoused by developed countries, especially concerning the Hull rule on compensation for expropriation. See 
e.g., Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 U.C. Davis 
Journal of International Law & Policy 157, 157; Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements (n 18) 1; 
Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 14) 193–200; Wenhua Shan, ‘Toward a Multilateral or Plurilateral Framework 
on Investment’ (ICTSD & World Economic Forum 2015) E15 Initiative 5 
<http://e15initiative.org/publications/toward-a-multilateral-or-plurilateral-framework-on-investment/> accessed 
12 September 2017. 
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developed and developing countries - also called the ‘North-South’ divide - in the 
old IIA regime became blurred. Instead, the theme of international investment law in 
new realities has shifted to strike a balance of rights and obligations between foreign 
investors and host states, i.e., the ‘Private-Public’ debate.83 
 
With the emergence of measures tailored to regulate SOE investments, it seems a 
third dimension, namely the ‘East-West’ contest, is surfacing in international 
investment law. It is termed as the ‘East-West’ contest because it primarily touches 
upon the investment relationship between the emerging economic powers from the 
East (such as China and Russia) on the one hand, and on the other, traditional 
advanced economic powers from the West. More fundamentally, it represents a 
contest between two models of economic development. One is the traditional 
Western model of ‘laissez faire’ free market economy emphasising the ‘invisible 
hand of the market’, or market capitalism. The other is an economy that emphases 
the ‘visible hand of the state’, or state capitalism.84  
 
Like the existing ‘North-South’ and ‘Private-Public’ dimensions of international 
investment law regime, the emerging ‘East-West’ dimension demonstrates a further 
layer of tensions in the international investment relationship. Whilst the ‘Private-
Public’ dimension focuses on the direct relationship of the two key players, namely, 
the investor and the host state, the ‘East-West’ dimension like the ‘North-South’ 
dimension focuses on the indirect relationship between the host and home states of 
foreign investment. However, the ‘East-West’ dimension also differs from the 
‘North-South’ dimension in terms of the focus of its concerns: whilst the ‘North-
South’ conflict has focused on the establishment of an international minimum 
                                                             
83 Wenhua Shan, ‘The Protection of Foreign Investment’ in Karen B Brown and David V. Snyder (eds), General 
Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (Springer 2012) 504; 
Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 14) 8–30. 
84 For more discussion of the two models see Erik S Reinert, ‘The Role of the States in Economic Growth’ in Pier 
Angelo Toninelli (ed), The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World (CUP 2011); Deng 
Feng, ‘Indigenous Evolution of SOE Regulation’ in Benjamin L Liebman and Curtis J Milhaupt (eds), Regulating 
the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism (OUP 2015); Bremmer (n 61); 
Subitha Subramaniam, ‘The Rise of the Visible Hand in Economic Policy’ Financial Times (3 May 2015) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/408379fc-edb0-11e4-987e-00144feab7de> accessed 26 August 2017; ‘The Special 
Report on “The Rise of State Capitalism”’ (n 61); Niall Ferguson, 'We’re All State Capitalists Now' Foreign 
Policy (9 Feb 2012) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/09/were-all-state-capitalists-now/> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
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standard of foreign investment protection, its ‘East-West’ counterpart focuses on 
whether and to what extent the same international minimum standard of protection 
afforded to private foreign investment is equally extended to cover SOE investments.  
 
Given the significance of SOE investments in world investments as highlighted 
above, the new ‘East-West’ dimension of international investment law merits a 
thorough and comprehensive investigation. The question today is neither whether 
state should play a role in economic life, nor whether state capitalism is better or 
worse vis-à-vis market capitalism. Rather, the real problem is how to regulate SOE 
investments in order to achieve a proper balance of rights and obligations between 
foreign investors - whether privately or publicly owned - and host states.  
 
1.4 Existing Literature Review 
 
As stated earlier, SOEs are relatively new actors in the international investment law 
and policy regime. Before the twentieth century, both international investment 
treaties and associated materials seldom referred to SOEs. An exception is the US. 
As noted by Vandevelde, US BIT negotiators in the early 1990s had provided SOE 
provisions in some of its BITs which typically provided a definition, application and 
non-discriminatory treatment.85 However, the aim of including SOEs in BITs, as 
argued by Vandevelde, was ‘to ensure that state enterprises were not used to 
circumvent BIT obligations’,86 rather than to protect SOEs investing abroad. For a 
long time, discussions surrounding SOEs in the context of international law focus on 
whether states are responsible for SOE conducts. As will be shown in Chapter 2, 
some arbitral tribunals have relied on the International Law Commission’s Articles 
(ILC Articles) on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts to 
decide whether action of SOEs could be attributed to the state.87 Another relevant 
                                                             
85 The US negotiators drafted a uniform provision that appears at Article II (2) of seven BITs- with Moldova, 
Ecuador, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania- that were based on the1992 model, and the 1994 and 
2004 model included successors to the seven BITs, Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements (n 18) 
458. 
86 ibid. 
87 Maffezini v. Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, 25 Jan 2000 (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7), para 75. For more 
discussion see e.g., Michael Feit, ‘Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract 
Committed by a StateOwned Entity’ (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 142; Kaj Hobér, ‘State 
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legal issue is whether SOEs enjoy state immunity from foreign jurisdictions.88 Today, 
discussions on these two issues still play a role in the literature of SOEs. 
 
Since 2000, a growing number of government officials and scholars from both 
developed and developing worlds have been debating about concerns and policy 
options relating to SOEs. The OECD is the most active organisation that has 
conducted research on a wide range issues of SOEs, especially the corporate 
governance and competition impacts of SOEs. For example, the OECD in 2005 
adopted guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs (new edition updated in 2015) 
to help governments assess and improve the way they exercise their ownership 
functions in SOEs.89 Furthermore, the OECD has taken stock of national trends in 
state ownership practices to identify good practices and support effective 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs.90 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Responsibility and Attribution’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008); Simon Olleson, ‘Attribution in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ (2016) 31 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 457; Eduardo Silva Romero, ‘Are States 
Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities? ICC Case Law’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Jennifer Younan 
(eds), State Entities in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2008). 
88 See, generally, e.g., David Gaukrodger, ‘Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investor’ 
(2010) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/2 <doi: 10.1787/5km91p0ksqs7-en> accessed 
11 September 2017; Leon Chung, ‘Recent Trends in State Immunity’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 2013) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/04/25/recent-trends-in-state-immunity/> accessed 11 September 2017; 
AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘State Enterprise, Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity Issues: A Look at Recent Trends’ 
(2005) 69 Dispute Resolution Journal 77; Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Effectiveness of Arbitral Awards, State Immunity 
from Execution and Autonomy of State Entities: Three Incompatible Principles’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and 
Jennifer Younan (eds), State Entities in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2008). 
89 OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (n 40). See also OECD, 
‘State-Owned Enterprise Governance Reform: An Inventory of Recent Change’ 56 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/48455108.pdf> accessed 11 
September 2017. 
90 The research covers a broad range issues in relation to corporate governance, including boards of directors of 
SOEs, risk management, rationales for state ownership, disclosure and transparency. See e.g., OECD, Boards of 
Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (OECD Publishing 2013); OECD, 
Risk Management by State-Owned Enterprises and Their Ownership (OECD Publishing 2016); OECD, State-
Owned Enterprise Governance. A Stocktaking of Government Rationales for Enterprise Ownership (OECD 
Publishing 2015); Korin Kane and Hans Christiansen, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Good Governance as a 
Facilitator for Development’ [2015] Coherence for Development; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Development Process (OECD Publishing 2015); OECD, Accountability and Transparency: A Guide for State 
Ownership (OECD Publishing 2010); OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate 
Governance (OECD Publishing 2011). Moreover, some research has adopted comparative studies to evaluate the 
national practice on corporate governance, see e.g., OECD, State-Owned Enterprises in Asia: National Practices 
for Performance Evaluation and Management (OECD Publishing 2016); OECD, Broadening the Ownership of 
State-Owned Enterprises: A Comparison of Governance Practices (OECD Publishing 2016); OECD, The Size 
and Sectoral Distribution of SOEs in OECD and Partner Countries (OECD Publishing 2014). 
CHAPTER 1 
28 
 
With SOEs having come to play a more important role as investors after the 2008 
financial crisis, some Western countries have expressed concerns regarding the 
‘competitive neutrality’ of SOEs. In 2012, the US and the EU issued a Statement on 
Shared Principles for International Investment and reaffirmed their shared 
commitments on maintaining open, transparent and non-discriminatory investment 
climates.91 In this Statement, both the EU and the US have committed to the 
principle of ‘a level playing field’ and support the work of the OECD in the area of 
competitive neutrality.92 In fact, the OECD has engaged in multiple projects on 
competitive neutrality since 2009 and has published a series of reports to identify the 
concerns and challenges of SOEs in the marketplace.93 The OECD has conducted 
many empirical studies to identify the importance of SOEs in the marketplace and to 
explore the various national approaches to competitive neutrality.94 As noted by the 
OECD, international trade and investment by SOEs is likely to increase, creating 
competition challenges and policy issues both in their domestic economies and 
international market place.95 According to the OECD, both national and international 
policy instruments can be used to address anti-competitive cross-border effects of 
SOEs, including the OECD SOE Guidelines, national competitive neutrality 
frameworks, national competition laws, the WTO agreements, preferential trade 
                                                             
91 ‘Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principles for International Investment’ 
(2012) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf> accessed 11 September 2017. 
92 ibid. 
93 See e.g., OECD, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and the Principle of Competitive Neutrality’ (2009) 
DAF/COMP(2009)37 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/46734249.pdf>; Capobianco and Christiansen (n 
68); Rennie and Lindsay (n 69); OECD, Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between 
Public and Private Business (OECD Publishing 2012); OECD, ‘Maintaining A Level Playing Field Between 
Public and Private Business for Growth and Development: Backgound Report’ (2013); Hans Christiansen, 
‘Balancing Commercial and Non- Commercial Priorities of State-Owned Enterprises’ (2013) 6 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhztkp9r-en%0AOECD>; OECD, ‘Levelling the International Playing Field 
Between Public and Private Business: What Have We Learnt So Far?’ (2014) <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/C-
MIN(2014)20-ENG.pdf>; Hans Christiansen and Yunhen Kim, ‘State-Invested Enterprises in the Global 
Marketplace: Implications for a Level Playing Field’ (2014) 14 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvfvl6nw-
en%0AOECD>. 
94 See e.g., OECD, ‘Competitive Neutrality: National Practices’ (OECD Publishing, 2012) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50250966.pdf> accessed 20 January 2016; OECD, Financing State-Owned 
Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (OECD Publishing 2014). 
95 See e.g., OECD, ‘Levelling the International Playing Field Between Public and Private Business: What Have 
We Learnt So Far?’ (n 93); Przemyslaw Kowalski and others, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy 
Implications’ (2013) (n 77)147; Kowalski and Perepechay (n 37) 184; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as 
Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37). 
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agreements and bilateral investment agreements.96 In 2016, the OECD assessed 
concerns and policy options for SOEs as global competitors from perspectives of 
international investment law, international trade law, competition law and corporate 
governance to maintain a level playing field and reconcile SOE public policy 
obligations.97 It has argued that ‘governments should neither use SOEs to influence 
competition in international markets, nor unduly discriminate against foreign SOEs 
that trade and invest according to market principles’.98 
In addition to the OECD, UNCTAD has also actively engaged in research on SOEs 
and competitive neutrality. For example, UNCTAD has explored the tendencies and 
relevant concerns of SOE investments in WIRs since 2009. In 2014, it focused on 
issues of competitive neutrality in a number of developing countries including China, 
India, Malaysia and Vietnam in comparison with existing CN policy in Australia.99 
This UNCTAD research has revealed that ‘most jurisdictions have considered the 
issue of competitive neutrality in developing their market, while the specific 
approach differs vastly’.100 In particular, a chapter of the research has outlined SOE 
provisions in international agreements, showing that while a large number of 
agreements attempt to address the market behaviour of SOEs, international 
agreements have not evolved in many cases at the same rate as the characteristics 
and functions of SOE.101 
 
While the two leading international organisations have provided some useful 
empirical evidence of SOEs and outline issues surrounding SOEs, only a small part 
of their research touches upon investment regulations for SOEs whilst the relevant 
analysis is neither comprehensive nor in-depth. 
 
In the context of international investment law, SOEs have until recent years attracted 
little attention. Although I will elaborate and discuss these literatures in detail in 
                                                             
96 Kowalski and others, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’ (n 77) 37–42. 
97 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (n 37); Michael 
Gestrin and others, ‘Governments as Competitors in the Global Marketplace: Options for Ensuring a Level 
Playing Field’ (2016) <www.e15initiative.org/> accessed 11 September 2017. 
98 Kowalski and Perepechay (n 37) 2; OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or 
An Opportunity? (n 37) 157. 
99 UNCTAD, Competitive Neutrality and Its Application in Selected Developing Countries (n 64). 
100 ibid. 
101 Mott and Nawawi (n 64). 
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substantive chapters, it is necessary to address some important publications here. For 
instance, Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions in 2012 provided the 
first major holistic examination and interdisciplinary analysis of sovereign 
investments, including SWFs and SOEs.102 A research handbook of SWFs published 
in 2015 investigated the juridical foundation of SWFs and investments, including 
national and international regulatory framework for SWFs and SWF investments 
protection.103 In 2016, scholars from both China and the US together examined the 
domestic and global consequences of Chinese capitalism, focusing on the impact of 
Chinese SOEs on regulation and institutional policy from comparative perspective.104 
Also in 2016, the ICSID Review produced a special focus issue on SOEs which 
illustrated some important issues of SOE regulations in investment arbitration.105  
 
Since 2010, a growing number of scholars has begun to discuss the legal issues 
surrounding SOE investments, such as the standing of SOEs in international 
investment treaties and arbitrations, treatment standards and national security 
concerns. 106  Some scholars also explored the regulatory framework for SOE 
investments from other perspectives. For example, Larry Becker addressed the 
regulation of SWFs and SOEs in times of crisis at both national and international 
                                                             
102 Sauvant, Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed (n 3). 
103 Fabio Bassan (ed), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (EE 
Publishing 2015). 
104 Benjamin L Liebman and Curtis J Milhaupt (eds), Regulating the Visible Hand?: The Institutional 
Implications of Chinese State Capitalism (OUP 2015). 
105 Wang and Gallagher (n 3) 1-4. 
106 See, for example, Mark Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ in Karl P 
Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010–2011 (OUP 2012); Ji Li, ‘State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration’ in Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo 
(eds), The Role of The State in Investor-State Arbitration (BRILL 2015); Max Büge and others, ‘State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reason for Concern?’ (VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal, 2013) 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/state-owned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern> accessed 11 September 
2017; Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When Are State-Owned 
Entities and Their Investment Protected?’ (2011) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 1; 
Claudia Annacker, ‘Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Rreaties’ (2011) 10 
Chinese Journal of International Law 531; Walid B Hamida, ‘Sovereign FDI and International Investment 
Agreements: Questions Relating to the Qualification of Sovereign Entities and the Admission of Their 
Investments under Investment Agreements’ [2010] The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 
17; Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘Investment Treaties and the Globalisation of State Capitalism: Opportunities 
and Constraints for Host States’ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International 
Investment Law and Policy : World Trade Forum (CUP 2013); Julien Chaisse and Dini Sejko, ‘Investor-State 
Arbitration Distorted: When the Claimant Is a State’ in Leïla Choukroune (ed), Judging the State in International 
Trade and Investment Law: Sovereignty Modern, the Law and the Economics (Springer 2016). 
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levels and discussed Chinese SOEs’ investments as a case study.107 Ming Du focused 
on the regulation of Chinese SOE in national foreign investment laws,108 while Karl 
Sauvant explored the main issues relating to home country measures and their 
impacts on SOEs and the implications for competitive neutrality.109 Sean Miner 
addressed the SOE rules in TPP,110 while Ines Willemyns outlined the existing 
disciplines on SOEs in international economic law, arguing that it is necessary to 
provide a specific rules for SOEs,111 etc. As stated, I will revisit their key arguments 
in subsequent main chapters. 
 
It is worth stressing here that the growing body of literature on the role of SOEs in 
foreign investment is mostly quite recent, whereas the substantive issues reviewed in 
this thesis have been under discussion for much longer in international investment 
law. 112  Nonetheless, current research on the role of SOEs and the regulatory 
framework for SOEs from an investment perspective is still unclear and 
unsatisfactory. On the one hand, primary materials including international 
investment agreements, investment arbitral cases and domestic legislation on SOEs 
are limited, divergent and rapidly evolving. On the other hand, secondary materials 
on SOE investments and policy responses are still very incipient, fragmented and 
debatable. Consequently, there are some research gaps in interactions between SOEs 
and international investment law. 
 
                                                             
107 Backer (n 42). 
108 Ming Du, ‘The Regulation of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in National Foreign Investment Laws: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 5 Global Journal of Comparative Law 118. 
109 Sauvant and others (n 68). 
110 Miner (n 81). 
111 Willemyns (n 81). 
112 For literatures on international investment law and arbitration, in general, see e.g., Rudolf Dlozer and 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Second Edi, OUP 2012); Jeswald W Salacuse, 
The Law of Investment Treaties (Second Edi, OUP 2015); August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment 
Protection (OUP 2008); Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International Investment Law: A Handbook (Hart 
Publishing 2015); Catharine Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (Hart Publishing 2014); 
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008); Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and The Law (Second Edi, OUP 
2007); Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2011); Norah 
Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice (OUP 2009); Chester Brown 
(ed), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (OUP 2013). 
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However, regulating SOEs in the international arena is not an easy task. In fact, 
states have mixed views on SOE investments due to various political, economic and 
cultural considerations.113  Moreover, the international investment law regime is 
presenting more complexities and problems where both developed and developing 
countries have been debating the reform of the IIA regime.114 Furthermore, the 
globalisation of SOEs may intensify the current divergence and even politicise the 
reform of investment law regime.115 Clearly, previous research is not enough.  
 
It is important to clarify here that it is difficult to provide a thorough and convincing 
literature review on SOEs in international investment law. As will be shown in 
substantive chapters, the matter of SOEs is often dealt with through implication in 
primary materials, or materials are simply silent, leaving it open to interpretation and 
the pattern of implication, omission and silence is often replicated in literature 
scrutinising the primary materials. Hence, this section only attempts to provide a 
general picture of the current literature, and I will conduct a systematic review and 
analysis of both primary materials and secondary literature on SOEs and 
international investment law in substantive chapters. 
 
1.5 This Thesis: Purposes, Methods, Structure and Main Findings 
 
Against the above backdrop, this thesis attempts to provide a novel and systematic 
review and analysis of the existing international investment law regime governing 
SOE investments, with a view to strike a proper balance between protecting foreign 
                                                             
113 For example, while some countries have raised concerns over foreign SOEs, they are not willing to lose the 
important source of FDI by SOEs. Also, emerging economies with major interests of SOE investments are 
undoubtedly wishing to promote the protections of SOE investments at both national and international levels. By 
contrast, Western countries as hosts are attempting to strengthen regulations against foreign SOEs to minimise 
potential risks. 
114 The universe of investment treaties continues to grow and there are 3324 agreements in total; meanwhile, 
some governments have terminated their investment treaties and the megaregional agreements are increasingly 
difficult to negotiate and implement (for example, the TPP), UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2017- 
Investment and Digital Economy’ (United Nations Publication 2017) 20–1 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf>. Moreover, the number of international investment 
arbitrations is growing and host states are facing more challenges and difficulties in regulating foreign investors 
and investments. See also UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 3) 108. 
115 For example, the rise of sovereign investors has been assumed as a highly politicised and sensitive 
development in the international investment regime, Poulsen (n 106) 89. 
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SOE investment and addressing the host state’s right to regulate SOEs in its national 
interests. The intention of this PhD thesis is to analyse to what extent international 
investment law protects SOEs as investors and to what extent these protections take 
into account the twin objectives of preserving host states’ interests while facilitating 
investment promotion and liberalisation through international investment treaties. To 
this end, it will a) investigate whether and how current investment law regime 
addresses issues surrounding SOE investments; b) assess whether the evolution of 
the international investment law regime has provided adequate responses to the rise 
of SOEs; and c) how to improve the international investment law regime to achieve 
the proper balance between protecting foreign investment, regardless of whether it is 
publicly or privately owned, and protecting the host state’s interests. This thesis, 
therefore, is not just about SOE investments. Rather, it aims to address evolving 
realies in today’s world, including the rise of SOEs and state capitalism. It it futher 
intended to analyse whether the international investment law regime as it is evolving 
and changing has adequately responded to these changes as well as being equipped 
with rules for good governance and sustainable development. 
 
This thesis is primarily a doctrinal study by offering some historical (how the IIA 
regime and SOE rules have evolved) and normative analysis (whether the policy and 
legal responses are adequate and effective). It will explore the key provisions of 
international investment treaties, including definitions of investor and investment, 
foreign investment admission, substantive treatment standards and treaty exceptions, 
on the basis of a tremendous volume of international investment treaties and arbitral 
cases, to assess whether and how international investment law regulates SOE 
investments. Since the SOE as global investor is a relatively new issue in 
international investment law, with the relevant cases still being limited at the time 
the research was completed, this thesis will use hypotheses or analogies to analyse 
the regulatory responses and potential risks in relation to SOE investments. It will 
also adopt comparative studies to explore policy responses at both national and 
international levels, including domestic regulations on the admission of SOE 
investments and trends in investment treaty practice. 
 
The thesis will progress as follow. As this chapter has briefly introduced the research 
background and explained the challenges posed by SOEs for the current investment 
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law regime, the following chapters will focus on the most important substantive 
issues surrounding SOEs in the context of international investment law. To be 
specific, Chapter 2 will focus on the qualification of SOEs for international 
investment protections, including whether SOEs are qualified ‘investors’, whether 
SOE investments are covered ‘investments’, and whether SOEs can initiate investor-
state arbitrations. Chapter 3 will deal with the issue of admission of foreign SOEs, 
including domestic rules on the entry and establishment of foreign SOEs (especially 
FDI screenings) and investment treaty practice in relation to admission. Chapter 4 
will explore whether and to what extent SOE investments can enjoy non-
discriminatory treatment and FET under international investment agreements. 
Chapter 5 will move on to treaty exceptions to explore whether and to what extent 
host states’ restrictive measures against foreign SOEs can be justified under 
international investment law. 
 
This thesis concludes in Chapter 6 that recent practice of the international investment 
law regime has generally achieved a balance of protections between foreign SOEs 
and host states, while further clarification of the key provisions would be very 
helpful in minimising potential risks. Furthermore, the international investment law 
regime for SOE investments should focus on the commercial capacity rather than the 
state ownership of the SOE investors, which implies that policymakers should act in 
the spirit of non-discrimination, liberalisation and balancing of interests. 
 
This thesis will be useful for investment policy-making at both national and 
international levels, and contribute to ongoing debates on the reform of current 
investment law regime. The rapid growth of SOEs as a relatively new type of 
investors and the rise of ‘state capitalism’ indicate on the one hand that the landscape 
of international investments is changing. Meanwhile, the rising protectionism and 
safeguards in investment regime on the other hand need to be concerned with various 
national interest considerations and highly politically sensitive sovereign 
investments. All these changes raise the question of whether international investment 
law is catching up with these new realities and how the current international 
investment law regime accommodates changing circumstances. For instance, a real 
problem faced by policymakers is whether international investment law could 
minimise potential political risks posed by foreign SOEs or would politicise 
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investment disputes arising from SOE investments. This thesis reveals that some 
forms of regulation by host governments could potentially conflict with international 
obligations. Also, national restrictions on foreign SOEs in Western countries might 
discourage FDI by SOEs and generate a protectionist or political backlash against 
foreign investments from certain emerging economies. Hence, a further question 
may arise of whether the future international investment regime will enhance 
investment protection and liberalisation, or retreat from investment protection and 
even return to investment protectionism. In this context, it is hoped that this thesis 
can provide useful insights into changing realities of international investment law 
and make contributions to the work of enhancing governance and sustainability of 
the evolving international investment law regime. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
ARE SOES QUALIFIED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) qualified for international investment 
protections? This is a primary and fundamental problem in this thesis. Generally, 
only covered ‘investments’ made by qualified ‘investors’ are protected by the 
applicable investment treaty, including substantive protections such as non-
discriminatory treatment and fair and equitable treatment, protection from 
expropriation without compensation; and procedural rights such as access to 
investor-state arbitration. Hence, it is of great importance to explore whether SOEs 
are qualified ‘investors’ and whether SOEs investments are covered ‘investments’ to 
ensure that SOEs could enjoy relevant international investment protections.  
 
However, most investment treaties are silent on whether SOEs are qualified for 
investment protections. 1  As a result, arbitral tribunals will have considerable 
discretion to decide whether SOE investments are protected by the applicable 
international investment treaty. A more challenging question is whether an SOE can 
file a case against another state before an international tribunal? According to the 
ICSID Convention, only qualified ‘investment’ by a ‘national’ of contracting state 
falls within the jurisdiction of the ICSID.2 The question then becomes whether SOE 
is a ‘national’ of the contracting state. Some argue that an SOE investing abroad may 
pursue non-commercial objectives, rather than commercial objectives, which either 
acts as a state organ or performs governmental functions.3 In such a case, the SOE 
                                                             
1 An important reason for such a silence is because IIAs were not designed for protecting sovereign investments, 
see Ch1. Furthermore, as noted by Vandevelde, US BIT negotiators stipulated provisions for state enterprises in 
earlier BITs were to ensure that SOEs in the transitional economies were not used by host states to circumvent 
BIT obligations, rather than to protect US sovereign investments abroad, Vandevelde, U.S. International 
Investment Agreements 458. 
2 Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention. 
3 Although SOEs can act on the basis of commercial considerations, they may also pursue non-commercial 
priorities such as fulfil public service obligations. The boundary of commercial and non-commercial activities is 
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should be treated as a state, rather than a private investor, which is not eligible for 
the investor-state arbitration.4 However, it is disputable whether an SOE investing 
abroad acts in governmental capacity rather than commercial capacity; hence, it is 
unclear whether an SOE can initiate an investor-state arbitration.  
 
While a growing body of literature has explored the rise of SOEs and their standing 
in international arbitration,5 the issue is far from being resolved. Moreover, although 
some SOEs have submitted claims to ICSID arbitration against host states, few 
arbitral tribunals have discussed whether the SOE was qualified as an ‘investor’ 
under the applicable treaty and met the criterion of ‘national’ of a contracting state 
under the ICSID Convention.6 In addition, questions may arise of whether the SOE 
                                                                                                                                                                            
not always clear. In recent years, an increasing concern raises that a foreign government may be using SOEs as a 
vehicle for pursing political or strategic objectives. See Przemyslaw Kowalski and others, ‘State-Owned 
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’ (2013) OECD Trade Policy Papers 147 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en> accessed 10 September 2017, 5; Paul Michael Blyschak, ‘State-
Owned Enterprises in International Investment’ (2016) 31 ICSID Review 5, 5–6. 
4 As noted, in many countries, state enterprises still retain primacy in critical economic sectors and strategic 
industries. Foreign investors normally enter contracts with state enterprise to enter into these sectors. Many 
investment disputes arise in this scenario where SOEs breach the contract and foreign investors allege that the 
contractual breach of SOEs are attributable to states. In these cases, the tribunal assessed the circumstances under 
which acts of a SOE can be attributable to the state under both the ICSID Convention and ILC Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition, CUP 2010) 64–5. For more discussion see Michael Feit, 
‘Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a StateOwned 
Entity’ (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 142–77.. 
5 See, e.g., Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When Are State-
Owned Entities and Their Investment Protected?’ (2011) 6 Journal of International Law and International 
Relations 1; Claudia Annacker, ‘Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Rreaties’ 
(2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 531; Mark Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities 
under Investment Treaties’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010–
2011 (Oxford University Press 2012) 615; Lu Wang, ‘State Controlled Entities as Qualified “Investors”: 
Implications for the Pacific Region Investment Treaty Making’ (2015) 12 Transnational Dispute Management 
<https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2188> accessed 10 September 2017; Mark 
Feldman, ‘State-Owned Enterprises as Claimants in International Investment Arbitration’ (2016) 31 ICSID 
Review 24; Julien Chaisse and Dini Sejko, ‘Investor-State Arbitration Distorted: When the Claimant Is a State’ in 
Leïla Choukroune (ed), Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law: Sovereignty Modern, the 
Law and the Economics (Springer 2016) 77. 
6 The CSOB case was previously the most important exception where the tribunal had seriously discussed 
whether CSOB as a SOE could bring a claim under the ICSID Convention. Most recently, another ICSID tribunal, 
in the BUCG v. Yemen case, had discussed whether the Chinese SOE could bring a claim before the ICSID. See 
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999; Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd v. Republic of Yemen, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 May 2017. Other cases brought by SOEs see e.g., 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Decision on the Treaty 
Interpretation Issue, 12 June 2009; CDC Group plc v. Republic of Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, 
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investment is covered ‘investment’ given that the ICSID Convention does not define 
the term, and arbitral tribunals’ interpretations are divergent in practice. Thus, one 
may, for instance, argue that the ICSID tribunal has no jurisdiction for public 
investments or SOE conducts do not have the characteristics of investment.7 
 
This chapter aims to investigate whether and to what extent SOEs are qualified for 
international investment protections by addressing three questions: first, whether 
SOEs are covered by the definition of ‘investors’ under IIAs; second, whether SOEs 
are entitled to initiate investor-state arbitrations under the ICSID Convention; third, 
whether SOE investments are covered by the definition of ‘investments’ under both 
investment treaties and the ICSID Convention. With the worldwide increasing 
sovereign investments and state protectionist measures against these investments, 
sovereign investors are likely to have recourse to treaty-based arbitration when 
running into disputes with host states.8  In this sense, this chapter is of great 
importance for both SOE investors and host states to understand the standing of 
SOEs in investment treaties. 
 
2.2 SOEs as Qualified ‘Investors’ under IIAs 
 
2.2.1 SOEs under the Definition of ‘Investors’ 
 
The definition of investor provision plays a critical role in determining whether or 
not SOEs are qualified as investors under international investment treaties, including 
whether SOEs can enjoy substantive protections and whether SOEs have procedural 
rights in dispute resolution.9 Investors normally refer to natural persons or juridical 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Annulment Decision, 29 June 2005; Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, 13 September 2006.  
7 For example, some may argue that SOEs do not have high incentive as private companies for pursuing profits, 
so SOE activities lack the characteristics as ‘investments’. Or, they may argue that SOEs are supported by the 
government and lack accountability, thus SOE investment does not have risks.  
8 See Markus Burgstaller, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law’ in Chester Brown and 
Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 177; Lauge N Skovgaard 
Poulsen, ‘States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal Fictions’ (2016) 31 ICSID Review 12, 16. 
9 Yuri Shima, ‘The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-Controlled Investors: A Fact 
Finding Survey’ (2015) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2015/01 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7svp0jkns-en> accessed 10 September 2017, 10. 
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persons. 10  Although most IIAs define the term ‘investor’, the wording varies 
significantly among treaties. For instance, some treaties do not have a definition of 
‘investor’, but provide the equivalent definition of ‘nationals’.11 Furthermore, some 
treaties use the term ‘companies’,12 ‘enterprises’,13 ‘corporations’,14 ‘legal entities’,15 
or ‘economic entities’16 instead of the juridical or legal persons. As a result, the scope 
of ‘investor’ under a specific investment treaty might have a slight difference based 
on the term adopted.  
 
Investors can be defined to exclude or include different types of entities according to 
certain characteristics, such as the legal personality, profit or non-profit status and 
the state ownership.17 The main difference of SOE investors from private investors is, 
obviously, the state ownership. According to the OECD survey, however, most IIAs 
do not distinguish between investors on the basis of ownership.18 For the purpose of 
my research, IIAs are divided into three types in respect of provisions of investor 
definition, namely, treaties not explicitly covering SOEs, treaties explicitly covering 
SOEs, and treaties explicitly covering both SOEs and the state. 
 
A. Treaties not explicitly covering SOEs 
  
The OECD survey demonstrates that the majority of IIAs define investors without an 
express reference to state entities and companies.19 For example, the ‘investor’ under 
                                                             
10 For example, Article 1 (3) of the Finland-Kuwait BIT. See Rudolf Dlozer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law (Second Edi, OUP 2012) 44; UNCTAD, ‘Scope and Definition: UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II’ (UN Publication 2011) 72.  
11 See e.g., Cambodia-Viet Nam BIT (2001), Article 1(2); Algeria-Indonesia BIT (2000), Article 1(2); Indonesia-
Sudan BIT (1998), Article I (2); Chile-Netherlands BIT (1998), Article I (b); Cambodia-Philippines BIT (2000), 
Article 1 (2); etc. 
12 See e.g., Peru-Singapore BIT; China-Brunei Darussalam BIT; etc. 
13 See e.g., Canada-El Salvador BIT; Canada-South Africa BIT; etc. 
14 See e.g., Kazakhstan-Malaysia BIT. 
15 See e.g., China-Uganda BIT. 
16 Many Chinese BITs use the term ‘economic entities’ for ‘investors’, see e.g., China-Djibouti BIT; China-
Jordan BIT; etc. 
17 UNCTAD (n 10) 80–1. 
18 Of the 1813 agreements surveyed by the OECD, 1524 (80%) agreements are silent on whether SOEs are 
qualified as ‘investors’ under the definition clause, Shima (n 9) 11. 
19 ibid. See also Jo En Low, ‘State-Controlled Entities as “Investors” under International Investment Agreements’ 
[2012] 80 Columbia FDI Perspectives <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_80.pdf> accessed 10 
September 2017. 
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the Morocco-Viet Nam BIT means, ‘any legal person having its head office in the 
territory of the Kingdom of Morocco or the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and 
constituted under Moroccan or Vietnamese law respectively and making an 
investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party’.20 
 
A definition not expressly covering SOEs can be found in the first BIT concluded 
between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, where the definition from the beginning 
was not restricted to any particular legal form.21 Furthermore, the first BIT concluded 
by most states did not refer to the ownership or SOE under the definition of 
‘company’.22 There might be various reasons contributing to such a broad definition 
of investor. IIAs are primarily to promote and protect foreign investments, so a broad 
definition of investor could guarantee a wide range of protections for various kinds 
of investors and investments. Moreover, the existence of SOEs as active global 
investors has been a phenomenon since the twentieth century.23 Thus, the earlier 
treaty drafters might have never thought that the absence of an explicit inclusion of 
SOEs in the definition of investor could someday be a problem.24  
 
B. Treaties explicitly covering SOEs 
  
States that actively pursue investment activities - either directly or through 
government-owned entities - may wish to ensure that relevant entities, including 
SOEs and other sovereign investors, are protected by IIAs.25 According to the OECD 
survey, many investment treaties expressly include SOEs in the definition of investor, 
and the frequency of treaties that explicitly include SOEs as protected investors are 
clearly rising. 26  In these treaties, SOEs are typically defined as either 
                                                             
20 Morocco-Viet Nam BIT (2012), Article 1 (2) (b). Similar provisions see e.g., Greece -Viet Nam BIT (2008), 
Article 1(3); Malaysia-Slovakia BIT (2007), Article 1(b); Congo-Korea BIT (2005), Article 1(c); China-Uganda 
BIT (2004), Article 1(2); etc. 
21 See e.g., Germany-Pakistan BIT, Article 8 (4). Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, 
Policy, and Interpretation (OUP 2010) 164.  
22 ibid 164–8. The exceptions include Austrian and US practices. 
23 Sornarajah (n 4) 63. 
24 As the OECD survey shows, most of the existing treaties were drafted before sovereign investors became 
prominent in the global market. In this context, the relative infrequency of explicit reference to SOEs may reflect 
the fact that not much attention would have been paid to them as investors at the time of drafting. Shima (n 9) 11. 
25 UNCTAD (n 10) 81. 
26 According to the OECD survey, 287 (16%) IIAs specify that SOEs are covered; furthermore, until the early 
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‘governmentally owned’ or ‘governmentally owned or controlled’.27 For example, 
the Mexico-India BIT defines that ‘investor’ includes ‘enterprise of a Contracting 
Party’ which refers to ‘any entity… whether privately or governmentally owned…’28 
Concepts such as ‘public institutions’29 and ‘governmental institutions’30 are also 
used.31 Although the specific language differs in investor definition clauses, these 
treaties expressly include that SOEs are qualified ‘investors’ for protection under the 
treaty. 
 
Nevertheless, treaty practice in respect of investor definitions varies significantly 
across countries. The US, Australia, Canada, Japan and the UAE are the countries 
which most often include SOEs explicitly in the definition of investor (Figure 2.1).32 
By contrast, most European countries do not mention sovereign investors in their 
treaties at all.33 Interestingly, China as a main source of sovereign investments 
seldom includes any explicit references to sovereign investors in their IIAs,34 even 
though this situation has changed in some recent Chinese treaties.35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1980s very few treaties mentioned SOEs in the investor definition, while in the past few years IIAs have come to 
address SOEs regularly, Shima (n 9) 11–2. 
27 ibid 12. 
28 India-Mexico BIT (2007), Article 1(3) & (8). 
29 Some treaties involving Italy contain the word ‘public institution’ (instituti pubblici). A public institution in 
Italy is a juridical person established according to public law through which the public administration exercises 
its functions in the general interest, Federico Ortino, ‘Italy’ in Chester Brown (ed), Commentaries on Selected 
Model Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 330. See also, e.g., Article 1 (2) & (4) of the Egypt-Indonesia BIT, which 
provide that ‘judicial person’ covered in ‘investor’ shall mean ‘any entity established in accordance with, and 
recognized as a juridical person by the law of the State, such as public institutions, corporations, foundations, 
private companies, firms, establishments and organizations’. 
30 See e.g., Article 1 (3) of the Malaysia-Saudi Arabia BIT (2000), which provides that investor includes ‘the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its financial institutions and authorities such as the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency, public funds and other similar governmental institutions existing in Saudi Arabia’. 
31 Shima (n 9) 12. 
32 ibid 13; Annacker (n 5) 537–9; Wang (n 5) 13.. 
33 Poulsen, ‘States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal Fictions’ (n 8) 15. 
34 ibid. 
35 Most of the recent concluded Chinese treaties explicitly include SOEs as protected investors, see e.g., China-
Canada BIT (2013), Article 1 (1) & (10); Australia-China FTA (2015), Article 9.1; China-Republic of Korea FTA 
(2015), Article 12.1; China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment agreement (2012), Article 1 (4); etc. 
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Figure 2.1 Share of IIAs that explicitly cover SOEs under the definition of ‘investor’, by 
country 
Source: Shima, ‘The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-Controlled 
Investors: A Fact Finding Survey’ (OECD 2015) 
 
The motives for including SOEs vary among countries. For some countries like the 
Arab countries, such express inclusion is to rule out any doubt that their sovereign 
investments are protected by the relevant BITs signed.36  In contrast, for other 
countries like the US, such inclusion is to ensure that state enterprises were not used 
to circumvent BIT obligations.37 Accordingly, the express inclusion of SOEs in the 
investor definition clause might serve two goals: one is to clarify the scope of treaty 
coverage, and the other is to clarify the content of treaty coverage. The former means 
that foreign state or public investors should be protected alongside foreign private 
investors. The latter would also be reflected in the standards of treatment. For 
example, if SOEs are covered as protected ‘company’, then SOEs in host states 
would be potential comparators for purposes of establishing the national treatment 
standard.38 Foreign investors should, therefore, be accorded treatment equal not only 
to domestic private investors, but also to domestic state or public investors. 
 
It is notable that there are three BITs with Panama that explicitly exclude SOEs in 
                                                             
36 Hamida 21. 
37 Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements (n 1) 193. 
38 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (n 21)159. 
  CHAPTER 2  
44 
 
the definition of investor.39 The reason for such exclusion is not clear, and the 
exclusion does not apply to SOEs of the treaty partners, i.e., the UK, Germany and 
Switzerland.40 
 
C. Treaties expressly covering states 
 
Among the treaties which expressly include SOEs, some treaties go further to cover 
states as investors explicitly (Figure 2.2).41 The Arab states, especially Kuwait, Qatar, 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, typically include their governments in the definition of 
investors in treaties that they concluded.42 For example, the Kuwait-South Africa BIT 
provides that ‘the Contracting Party itself’ and ‘any State entity’ are protected 
investors, and the latter is defined as ‘a department of government, corporation, 
institution or undertaking wholly or partially owned or controlled by the government 
and engaged in activities of a commercial nature’.43 Similarly, the 2012 US Model 
BIT provides that ‘investor of a Party’ means ‘a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a 
national or an enterprise of a Party’.44  
 
                                                             
39 Panama-Germany BIT (1983), Panama-Switzerland BIT (1983) and Panama-UK BIT (1983). 
40 For example, Article 1(d) of the Panama-United Kingdom BIT (1983) provides that, ‘companies’ means ‘all 
those juridical persons constituted in accordance with legislation in force in Panama… which have their domicile 
in the territory of the Republic of Panama, excluding State-owned enterprises’, but no such exclusion for 
companies in respect of the UK. 
41 Shima (n 9) 13. 
42 Annacker (n 5) 531–2.. 
43 Article 1 (2) of the Kuwait-South Africa BIT (2005). Likewise, Article 1 (2) (b) of the China-UAE BIT (1993) 
provides that ‘investor’ in respect of the United Arab Emirates includes (1) the Federal Government of the UAE; 
(2) the Local Governments and their local and financial institutions; (3) the natural and legal person who have the 
nationality of the UAE; (4) companies incorporated in the UAE; but the investor in respect of China does not 
include the Chinese governments. 
44 2012 US Model BIT, Article 1. See also e.g., US-Rwanda BIT, Article 1; 2004 Canada Model BIT, Article 1; 
Canada-Peru BIT, Article 1; Colombia- Japan BIT (2011), Article 1(b); etc. 
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Figure 2.2 Share of IIAs that explicitly cover states under the investor definition, by country 
Source: Shima, ‘The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-Controlled 
Investors: A Fact Finding Survey’ (OECD 2015) 
 
It is also notable that a few treaties explicitly refer to specific governmental 
authorities or institutions as protected investors.45 For example, the Kuwait-Germany 
BIT provides that ‘investor’ in respect of Kuwait includes ‘the government of the 
State of Kuwait acting either directly or indirectly through the Kuwait Investment 
Authority or its offices abroad as well as development funds, agencies or other 
similar government institutions having their seats in Kuwait’.46 The Kuwait-Canada 
BIT specifies that, ‘the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the 
Kuwait Investment Authority are investors of Kuwait’.47 Likewise, the Saudi Arabia- 
India BIT provides that investor in respect of Saudi Arabia includes ‘the Government 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its financial institutions and authorities such as 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, public funds and other similar governmental 
                                                             
45 Shima (n 9) 14. 
46 Article 1 (3) of the Germany-Kuwait BIT (1994); ‘Investor’ in respect of Germany does not include neither the 
government nor any governmental institutions. Similar provisions see also, e.g., Article 1 (2) of the Germany-
United Arab Emirates BIT (1997). 
47 Article 1 of the Canada-Kuwait BIT (2011). The express ‘for greater certainty’ used in the definition clause of 
investor aims to further clarify the status of Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAE) and the 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) as investors. 
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institutions existing in Saudi Arabia’. 48  Undoubtedly, the above treaties that 
expressly include contracting states and specific governmental institutions as 
qualified investors indicate that the contracting states wish to extend investment 
protections to states and certain governmental institutions.  
 
Such an explicit inclusion may have two implications. First, it helps to promote 
public investment. This is typical in Arab states, especially considering the fact that 
some Arab countries carry on investment activities either directly or through public 
structures.49 Second, it could guarantee that SOEs and state entities be protected as 
investors, regardless of whether such state entities will be interpreted as states. 
According to the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, conduct of state entities 
might be attributable to the state in certain circumstances.50 If the treaty expressly 
includes state itself as qualified investors, SOEs or state entities would indisputably 
fall within the scope of qualified investors and thus be covered by the applicable 
treaty protection. 
 
However, it is noteworthy that the explicit inclusion of the state in the definition of 
investor does not serve only one end, i.e., extending the treaty protection to public 
investments including the state itself and state enterprises; it may also effectively 
impose obligations on the SOE as if it were a state, especially when the two terms 
appear in the same clause of investor definition simultaneously. For example, the US 
2012 BIT defines the ‘investor of a Party’ as ‘a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a 
national or an enterprise of a Party’.51 Such wording seems to suggest that the state 
                                                             
48 Article 1 (3) (b) (III) of the India-Saudi Arabia BIT (2006). 
49 Hamida (n 36) 21. 
50 Article 4 (Conduct of organs of a State) provides: 1) The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act 
of the State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2) An organ includes any person or entity which has that 
status in accordance with the internal law of the State. Article 5 (Conduct of persons or entities exercising 
elements of governmental authority) provides: The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the 
State under Article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance. Article 8 (Conduct directed or controlled by a State) provides: The 
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction and control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct. 
51 Article 1 of the 2012 US Model BIT. 
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enterprise equates to the state, rather than a national or an enterprise, which may in 
turn make it possible to extend the treaty obligations of states to state enterprise. 
 
On the whole, a review of existing investment treaties illustrates that in almost all 
cases, SOEs are not explicitly excluded from the investor definition,52 regardless of 
whether expressly covering states and state enterprises or not. Although treaty 
practices on the definition of investor are disordered and unsystematic (even in the 
same state) and the specific language varies in IIAs, many newly concluded 
agreements tend to expressly include state enterprises and even states as qualified 
investors.53 For example, the TPP defines that ‘investor’ means ‘a Party, or a national 
or an enterprise of a Party’, and the ‘enterprise’ means ‘any entity… whether 
privately or governmentally owned or controlled’.54 Also, the Argentina-Qatar BIT 
defines that the term ‘investor’ includes ‘juridical person, whether privately or 
governmentally owned or controlled’, and ‘juridical persons’ include ‘official 
agencies, sovereign funds, trusts, and organisations established or organised in 
accordance with the respective state legislation of the Contracting Parties’. 55 
Although the express inclusion of SOEs and states in recent treaties do not mean a 
significant evolution of the definition of investor, it at least demonstrates a trend that 
SOEs investing abroad is attracting more attention and likely to be discussed more 
frequently in the future. 
 
2.2.2 SOEs Considered as ‘Investors’ When the Treaty is Silent 
 
SOEs or state entities are qualified investors without any doubt if they are expressly 
included in the definition of investor. The problem is, however, when the treaty is 
                                                             
52 As mentioned earlier, there are only three exceptions in BITs with Panama and the exclusion of state 
enterprises only applies to investors of Panama. 
53 For instance, the Chile-Hong Kong, China SAR BIT (2016), Nigeria-Singapore BIT (2016), Canada-EU 
CETA(2016), Canada-Mongolia BIT (2016), Canada-Hong Kong, China SAR BIT (2016), Mexico-UAE BIT 
(2016), Nigeria-UAE BIT (2016), Kuwait-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2015), Australia-China FTA (2015), Canada-Korea 
FTA (2014), Australia-Korea FTA (2014), Canada-Honduras FTA (2013) expressly provide that ‘investor of the 
Party’ includes ‘the Party’ and ‘state enterprises’. Meanwhile, some BITs, e.g., Japan-Kenya BIT (2016), Iran, 
Islamic Republic of - Japan BIT (2016), Iran, Islamic Republic of - Slovakia BIT (2016), Japan-Oman BIT 
(2015), Japan-Myanmar BIT (2013), Japan-Mozambique BIT (2013), Benin- Canada BIT (2013), China-Japan-
Korea trilateral investment agreement (2012) expressly include state enterprises as qualified investors. 
54 Article 9.1 & Article 1.3 of the TPP. 
55 Article 1 (1) of the Argentina-Qatar BIT (2016). 
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silent, will an SOE or state entity still be considered as a protected investor under the 
applicable treaty? 
 
Scholars normally maintain that SOEs and state entities are covered as investors if 
not explicitly excluded.56 Annacker considers that relying on the ordinary meaning, 
entities or companies that are owned or controlled by the state or one of its 
subdivisions are generally covered by the terms ‘legal persons’ or ‘juridical entities’, 
regardless of their form, functions and purpose.57 Moreover, the object and purpose 
of investment treaties are to protect and promote investments, which do not draw any 
distinction between investments made by public investors and that of private 
investors.58 Vandevelde also believes that when the language does not expressly state 
whether the investor definition includes those governmentally-owned entities and 
privately-owned entities, the definition clause may be phrased in terms broad enough 
to include both governmental and private entities implicitly.59 Nevertheless, one may 
challenge these arguments because the treaty language of investor definition is 
unclear and ambiguous. Hence, there exists uncertainty as to whether sovereign 
investors are qualified investors if the investment treaty does not expressly include 
them in the investor definition.  
 
In practice, arbitrators would have to decide whether the investment treaty regime 
covers SOEs when an express inclusion is absent. Until now, there have been some 
claims filed by sovereign investors for investment arbitrations,60 but few tribunals 
have addressed the issue of whether sovereign investors qualified as investors under 
the applicable treaty.61 Meanwhile, respondent states were often surprisingly quiet on 
                                                             
56 Hamida (n 36) 21. 
57 Annacker (n 5) 539. 
58 ibid. 
59 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (n 21) 159. 
60 For example, BUCG (n 6); HEP (n 6); Telenor (n 6); CSOB (n 6); Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, S.A. v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, Award, 18 April 2013; Hanocal Holding B.V. and IPIC 
International B.V. v. Republic of Korea, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/17, 2015, discontinued; State General Reserve 
Fund of the Sultanate of Oman v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/43, 2015, pending; OAO Tatneft 
v. Ukraine, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits, 29 July 2014; Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003; Oschadbank v. Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 2016, pending; etc. 
For more discussion about the cases, see Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 5) 624–30; Chaisse and Dini (n 5) 94–7.  
61 For example, in the HEP and Telenor cases, tribunals just confirmed that investment protections apply to state 
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the issue, and the claims proceeded as if sovereign investors were naturally covered 
by investment treaties.62 For example, when the Swedish SOE, Vattenfall, filed two 
investment claims against Germany under the ECT, which followed the vast majority 
of IIAs by not explicitly covering sovereign investors but not excluding them 
either,63 no party had publicly questioned the qualification of Vattenfall as an investor 
for investment protections.64 
 
The situation, however, may change according to the recent arbitral practice. In the 
Tatneft v. Ukraine case,65 for example, the respondent state alleged that Tatneft was a 
governmental entity, and the Ukraine-Russia BIT only protected private investors.66 
In particular, Ukraine relied on the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility to argue 
that Tatneft met the structural and functional tests for attribution of its conduct to 
Russia. The Paris Court, however, rejected this argument, noting that firstly, the 
BIT’s text did not require investors to be private entities; and secondly, the 
attribution test under the ILC Articles for determining state responsibility was in an 
‘entirely different’ context from determining whether a BIT claimant can be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
entities without detailed analysis; in the famous CSOB case, the tribunal discussed whether CSOB falls within the 
personal jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention, rather than whether CSOB was a qualified investor under the 
BIT. Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ 624–30 (n 5); Annacker (n 5) 
542. 
62 Poulsen, ‘States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal Fictions’ (n 8) 16. 
63 Article 1 (7) of the ECT defines ‘investor’ with respect to a Contracting Party as natural person, and company 
or other organization organized in accordance with the law applicable in that Contracting Party. 
64 ibid. For more discussion on Vattenfall case, see Luke Eric Peterson, ‘German media reveal details of 
Vattenfall claim v. Germany; NGOs raise enviro fears as two arbitrators named’ IAReporter (27 July 2009) 
<http://tinyurl.com/pjszjb9> accessed 2 May 2017; Nathalie Bernasconi, ‘Background Paper on Vattenfall v. 
Germany Arbitration’ (IISD July 2009) <https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/background_vattenfall_vs_germany.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
65 Notably, the awards (on jurisdiction and on merits) remain unpublished to date, but on 29 November 2016, the 
Paris Court of Appeal released a decision on judicial review. For the original French version see 
<https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7882.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. For 
more discussion see the Editorial, ‘UPDATED: Paris Court of Appeal weighs in on Russia-Ukraine BIT awards’ 
IAReporter (30 November 2016) <http://tinyurl.com/zyl7tde> accessed 8 May 2017; Damien Charlotin, 
‘Previously-unseen jurisdictional award waves away objections to Russian-owned investment claim’ IAReporter 
(19 April 2017) <http://tinyurl.com/n44q4oq> accessed 8 May 2017. For the factual background, see Damien 
Charlotin, ‘In long-confidential Russia-Ukraine BIT award, tribunal reviews evidence of alleged “black raid” by 
oligarch, facilitated by Ukraine's courts and Prosecutor’ IAReporter (7April 2017) <http://tinyurl.com/lnrdjv9> 
accessed 8 May 2017. 
66 Article 1 (2) of the Ukraine-Russia BIT defines investor as: ‘b) any legal entity, set up or instituted in 
conformity with the legislation prevailing on the territory of the given Contracting Party, under the condition that 
the said legal entity is legally capable, under the legislation of its respective Contracting Party, to carry out 
investments on the territory of the other Contracting Party’. 
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assimilated to a state.67 Interestingly, although the Paris Court did recognise Tatneft’s 
connections to the Russian government, it held that did not deprive Tatneft of 
‘structural, organic and decisional autonomy’ and was insufficient to assimilate 
Tatneft to the state itself.68 In the tribunal’s view, Tatneft’s connection with the 
government was perhaps ‘inevitable’ in the context of the former Soviet Republics’ 
conversion to market economies, and that did not mean that the company lost its 
essential commercial aims.69 The current arbitral practice, nonetheless, is still very 
limited, and it is impossible to predict whether or not future tribunals would come to 
the same conclusion.  
 
Meanwhile, arbitral tribunals are not unanimous on the question of an SOE’s status 
as an investor. In Abengoa S.A. y Cofides S.A. v. Mexico,70 for instance, Mexico 
alleged that the Spanish state’s fund (FIEX), not COFIDES (the second claimant), 
was the true investor; and the BIT did not define ‘investors’ to include relevant 
contracting states.71 The majority held that, firstly, under the Mexican law, COFIDES, 
not the Spanish government, was the owner of the investment; any delegation of the 
FIEX did not affect its ownership or ‘control’ of the shares in SDS.72 Secondly, the 
majority found that COFIDES did not act as an ‘agent’ of the state. Thus there was 
no need to analyse whether or not a state is a protected investor under the BIT.73 The 
majority held that ‘being state-owned did not alter the commercial nature of 
COFIDES’ activities and the private nature of the relevant investment’, and the BIT 
                                                             
67 Editorial, ‘UPDATED: Paris Court of Appeal weighs in on Russia-Ukraine BIT awards’ (n 65). 
68 The Court noted that: (1) 36% of Tatneft’s shares were held by the semi-autonomous Russian republic of 
Tatarstan; (2) Tatarstan might hold a ‘golden share’ to veto over certain Tatneft decisions; and (3) Tatarstan’s 
president sat as the chairman of Tatneft’s board. Furthermore, the Court observed that Tatneft made a statement in 
2006 that the Tatarstan government exercised a ‘significant influence’ on the company. ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 Filip Balcerzak and Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Newly Obtained Mexico BIT Award Reveals that Arbitrators 
Disagreed on Jurisdiction over State-Owned Claimant; Details Emerge of Final Settlement Sum’ IAReporter (21 
May 2014) <http://tinyurl.com/pmzcmge> accessed 8 May 2017. For more see Abengoa (n 60).  
71 According to Article 1 (5) of the Mexico-Spain BIT, ‘investor’ means ‘companies, defined as, legal entities, 
including companies, associations, companies, corporations, branches and other organizations that are constituted 
or, in any case, duly organized under the law of a Contracting Party and have their seat in the territory of that 
Party Contracting’. 
72 The majority held that even if the ownership was not established, COFIDES controlled the shares for purposes 
of Mexican law; and a same conclusion would be held according to Spanish law, see Balcerzak and Peterson (n 
70). 
73 ibid. The majority noted that COFIDES is not ‘integrated within the general administration of the state and 
does not exercise any prerogative of a public authority’.  
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did not exclude SOEs from its scope.74 However, one arbitrator held that the claim 
fell outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction because COFIDES was actually a 
‘vehicle’ of the investment - the ‘depositary’ or ‘custodial’ agent for the FIEX.75 
Furthermore, the dissenter noted that COFIDES was merely a ‘manager’ under the 
instructions of the Fund, and the potential loss or damage was borne by FIEX.76 
Although this tribunal did not further discuss whether states were protected investors 
under the BIT, the arbitrators, obviously, had no consensus in determining the 
‘investors’ when an SOE is involved.  
 
It is notable that disputes involving SOEs often raise the question of whether the 
SOE acts in its own commercial capacity or should be viewed as a state, i.e., as an 
entity that acts in governmental capacity. In practice, tribunals have discussed 
whether host states were responsible for the conduct of state-owned entities, relying 
on ILC Articles on State Responsibility. A typical case is Maffezini v. Spain where 
the tribunal had to answer whether the Spanish SOE, SODIGA, was a state entity or 
characterised as a private commercial corporation for jurisdiction. Following the 
‘structural’ and ‘functional’ tests for attribution set out in ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility, the tribunal concluded that SODIGA was an entity of the Spanish 
state, because it was created by a state decree, was majority-owned by the 
government (structural test), and carried out governmental functions for promoting 
regional development (functional test).77 While most of the cases were concerned 
with the attribution, not the status of the SOE investing abroad when the treaty is 
silent, arbitral decisions have at least implied that it is possible for tribunals to turn to 
the attribution tests, i.e., the structural and functional tests, in determining the status 
of the SOE investing abroad, i.e., whether the SOE acts as a state or a company.  
 
However, the issue of attribution itself is problematic and disputable. For example, 
                                                             
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid. 
77 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, paras 74-5, 89. Likewise, in a newly released ICSID decision, the 
tribunal adopted the same test and concluded that acts of two Egyptian SOEs were attributed to Egypt, see 
Ampal-American and others v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, 21 
February 2017, paras 71, 138-9, 145-6. 
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the Paris Court in reviewing the Tatneft case mentioned that the tests for the 
attribution of conduct for determining state responsibility under the ILC Articles was 
developed in the ‘entirely different’ context of determining whether a BIT claimant 
can be assimilated to a state.78 Furthermore, arbitral practice is not consistent in 
attributing conduct of the state-owned entity to the state. For example, in Ampal-
American and others v. Egypt, the dispute arose out of alleged breaches of a long-
term contract of natural gas supply between the claimants and two Egyptian SOEs, 
EGPC and EGAS.79 The tribunal held that actions of SOEs were attributable to 
Egypt, because SOEs’ funds came directly from the state while their profits went to 
the state, and SOEs’ board members were recommended by the state. Also, EGPC 
and EGAS had always acted under the direction of Egypt (satisfying ILC Article 8) 
and that Egypt had anyway acknowledged all SOEs’ conducts as its own (satisfying 
ILC Article 11).80 Likewise, in Flemingo Duty Free v. Poland, the tribunal held that 
the Polish state-owned airport operations company, PPL, was a de facto state organ 
whose action could be attributed to the state.81 In particular, although the tribunal 
acknowledged that PPL was an independent SOE, it also noted that: (1) PPL was 
owned by the Polish State Treasury and was required to obtain state approval for 
various transactions; (2) PPL’s mission was not typically a private business function 
and Poland had said that PPL was performing a strategic function for the state; and 
(3) PPL was clearly controlled by the Ministry of Transport.82  
 
Notably, the Almås v. Poland tribunal came to an opposing conclusion, i.e., none of 
the impugned conduct of the Polish land agency, ANR, in relating to a long-standing 
farming venture could be attributed to the Polish state.83 The tribunal firstly held that 
ANR could not be considered as a state organ de jure because it had independent 
                                                             
78 Editorial, ‘UPDATED: Paris Court of Appeal weighs in on Russia-Ukraine BIT awards’ (n 65). 
79 Ampal-American and others (n 77). 
80 ibid. Jarrod Hepburn, ‘In new Egypt ruling, disproportionate contract termination and failure to prevent 
pipeline attacks underpin Fortier-chaired tribunal's findings of BIT breach’ IAReporter (28 February 2017) 
<http://tinyurl.com/hrqtylu> accessed 9 May 2017. 
81 Flemingo Duty Free Shop Private Limited v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Award, 12 August 2016, paras 
418-48. 
82 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘n new BIT award, arbitrators deem state-owned company to be a state organ, and see FET 
and expropriation violations due to contract termination’ IAReporter (1 November 2016) 
<http://tinyurl.com/j4dpca8> accessed 9 May 2017. 
83 Kristian Almås and Geir Almås v. The Republic of Poland, PCA Case No. 2015-13, Award, 27 June 2016, paras 
207-72. 
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legal personality under local law;84 nor was the ANR viewed as a state organ de facto 
because it engaged in commercial transactions on its own account - even though 
these were important to the national economy and the ANR was supervised by the 
Ministry of Agriculture.85 Secondly, the tribunal held that the termination of the lease 
by the ANR was not performed in the exercise of governmental authority - 
unsatisfying ILC Article 5 - nor on the instructions of the Polish government - 
unsatisfying ILC Article 8.86 Similarly, in Tenaris and Talta v. Venezuela,87  the 
tribunal held that CVG FMO was not a ‘state organ’ because its acts were purely 
commercial and had no bearing on the legislative, executive, judicial or other 
function of the Venezuelan state - even though it was clearly a state-owned entity; 
also, CVG FMO was not empowered to exercise governmental authority, but 
operated in a more modest and commercial manner.88 Whether a state-owned entity 
acts as a state - either as a state organ or empowered to exercise governmental 
function - is a very complex issue, where the tribunal might come to distinct 
conclusions under the customary international law as codified in the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility.  
 
Most importantly, while SOEs may exercise dual functions in its national economy, 
it is disputable whether and to what extent an SOE investing abroad could behave in 
its governmental capacity and thus be regarded as a state. A 2011 report from the 
International Energy Agency, for example, stated that Chinese state-owned oil 
companies are driven by commercial interests, rather than acting as puppets of the 
government.89 In fact, no sufficient evidence has shown that an SOE investing 
                                                             
84 Similar conclusions see also Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2010, paras 199-201; EDF (Services) Ltd v. Romania, ICSID Case no ARB/05/13, 
Award, 8 December 2009, para 190; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID ARB/03/29, Award, 27 August 2009, para 119. 
85 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Poland prevails in face of claim under Norway investment treaty; Crawford-chaired 
tribunal analyzes attribution issues’ IAReporter (23 August 2016) <http://tinyurl.com/hm2pdee> accessed 9 May 
2017. 
86 ibid. Almås (n 83), paras 214-72. 
87 Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26, Award, 29 January 2016. 
88 The tribunal also noted that it had not seen any persuasive evidence that the CVG FMO acted as a puppeteer of 
the Venezuelan state that sought to manipulate Matesi’s access to raw materials. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘In Tenaris 
award, a purchasing contract is not deemed part of protected investment; arbitrators see discrimination, but can't 
see attribution’ IAReporter (15 February 2016) <http://tinyurl.com/jcp4e92> accessed 9 May 2017. 
89 Julie Jiang, ‘IEA: China’s oil companies aren’t puppets’ UPI (Paris, 18 February 2011) 
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abroad aims to pursue political priorities. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for a state 
to engage in commercial activities and there exist ‘grey zones’ between commercial 
and non-commercial capacities. As a result, when the investment treaty is silent, 
tribunals may turn to customary international law, i.e., the attribution test in ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility, to decide the status of an SOE investing abroad. 
Although the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis, there exist risks for 
SOEs investing abroad to be characterised as a state rather than a corporate entity, 
and thus be excluded from the scope of investment treaties. As a result, it is very 
important for those states that wish to protect SOEs investing abroad to explicitly 
include SOEs as ‘investors’ in the investment treaty.  
 
2.2.3 States Considered as ‘Investors’ When the Treaty is Silent 
 
A more controversial and challenging issue is whether a state qualifies as an 
‘investor’ if not expressly covered in the applicable treaty. Some scholars consider 
that: 
 
The question whether State-owned or controlled enterprises are covered by 
an investment agreement has to be treated differently from the question 
whether States parties to the agreement themselves can act as investors. 
Usually, State 
enterprises are covered even if not explicitly stated while States themselves 
tend not to be unless this is expressly provided for.90  
 
However, treaty negotiators or arbitrators may have a different view. According to 
Article 31(1) the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty shall 
be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. This rule must be 
followed by tribunals when dealing with investment disputes. The ‘investor’ 
definition includes ‘legal persons’ or ‘juridical entities’ constituted under the laws of 
a contracting party, and the ordinary meaning of the term ‘legal person’ or ‘juridical 
                                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.upi.com/Energy-News/2011/02/18/IEA-Chinas-oil-companies-arent-puppets/42251298034373/> 
accessed 9 May 2017. 
90 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (Volume I) (UN Publication 2004) 142. See also 
Hamida (n 36) 21. 
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entities’ does not countenance an exclusion of state investor.91 This assumption was 
considered in the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 
where most delegations thought that the concept of a legal person or the definition of 
SOE would cover the situation where a state was an economic actor, and considered 
that the State as such would otherwise be protected by diplomatic processes under 
international law.92 
 
The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) considers that there is no 
reason why a state may not qualify as an investor.93 In terms of the divergence 
between public and private entities, the opinion from the FDFA held that, with the 
exception of a limited number of cases in which the state has immunity (acts jure 
imperii), there are no legal grounds, under public international law and national case-
law, to treat public and private investments differently.94 In other words, sovereign 
investors should not be differentiated from private investors unless in the case of 
state immunity. 
 
The issue of whether or not a state can be considered as a qualified ‘investor’ has 
important implications for SOEs as it can further guarantee the qualification of SOEs 
as investors: since the SOE is sometimes suspected to be the agent of the state, if the 
state is a qualified investor, the SOE is undoubtedly qualified as an investor. Indeed, 
it is not uncommon for a state to conduct commercial activities and such public 
investments should not be prohibited or treated differently. In such a case, the 
capacity of a state is similar to that of a private investor which therefore should 
qualify for investment protections. This interpretation may help to distinguish state 
activities from state enterprise activities. In other words, the state is different from 
state enterprises in principle, and the only exception is when the state conducts 
commercial activities. However, without expressly covering states in the investor 
                                                             
91 Annacker (n 5) 533. 
92  Drafting Group No.3 on Definition, Treatment and Protection of Investors and Investments, ‘Report to the 
Negotiating Group’ (OECD 1996) 6 <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/dg3/dg3963e.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017; Negotiating Group on the MAI, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to 
the Consolidated Text’ (OECD 1998) 5 <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
93 Hamida (n 36) 22. 
94 Annacker (n 5) 535. 
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definition, the host state might challenge the status of the state investing abroad as a 
qualified investor. Nevertheless, when a state invest abroad, i.e., acts primarily as an 
‘investor’ in another country, it is more likely to be acting on a commercial rather 
than political basis. As such it should enjoy the same protection afforded other 
‘investors’. However, the further question is that in case a state does not enjoy 
immunity and is qualified as an investor under the treaty, should the state resort to 
investor-state or state-state mechanisms to resolve investment disputes? 
 
At the time of writing, investment claims brought by states are very rare, so it is 
unclear and unpredictable whether or not tribunals would consider that a state is a 
qualified investor for investment protection if the treaty is silent. In Kaliningrad 
Region v. Lithuania, the tribunal had to determine whether a Russian regional 
government, Kaliningrad, was a qualified ‘investor’ under the Russia-Lithuania 
BIT.95 While Lithuania questioned that Kaliningrad should resort the state-to-state 
mechanism, the tribunal considered that BIT referred to Russian law for guidance as 
to which persons and entities could be considered ‘investors’; hence, the Kaliningrad 
regional government qualified as an investor under the investor definition. 96 
However, the persuasiveness of this interpretive approach may be disputable in other 
further investment arbitration cases because of the special investor definition under 
the Russia-Lithuania BIT.97 
 
Nonetheless, whether or not a state can be considered as a qualified investor under 
the investment treaty is likely to be more important and frequently scrutinised, 
particularly given the large volumes of foreign investments made by states or state-
controlled entities. Recently, the Republic of Tatarstan filed a claim under the 
                                                             
95 See Editorial, ‘Lithuania prevails in investor-state BIT claim over enforcement of ICC award in case brought 
by Russian regional Gov’t’ IAReporter (17 March 2009) <http://tinyurl.com/pquy5fr> accessed 9 May 2017. 
Notably, the final award of the case has not been published, but the Paris Court of Appeal in 2010 released a 
judgement on application to set aside the award, Kaliningrad Region v. Lithuania, ICC, Judgment of the Paris 
Court of Appeal on application to set aside award (French), 18 November 2010.  
96 Article 1 (1) (b) of the Russia-Lithuania BIT defines ‘investor’ in respect of Russia Federation as ‘any legal 
person, constituted or established according to the legislation in force in the territory of the Russian Federation 
provided this legal person is authorised according to the legislation of the Russian Federation to invest in the 
territory of the Republic of Lithuania’. ibid. 
97 ibid. 
ARE SOES QUALIFIED FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS 
57 
 
UNICITRAL rules against Ukraine pursuant to the Russia-Ukraine BIT.98 While the 
tribunal has not made any decision, it is reported that Ukraine views the case should 
resort to a state-to-state mechanism while an investor-state tribunal would lack 
jurisdiction.99 If so, the tribunal is likely to determine whether or not the Ministry of 
Land and Property Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan is qualified as an investor 
to bring a case, since the BIT does not expressly define the contracting state or the 
state entity as an ‘investor’.100 It is interesting to note that one arbitrator in this 
tribunal has chaired the Lithuania case,101 but whether this tribunal would adopt the 
same approach is still unknown. 
 
In short, there is limited discussion of whether SOEs and states fall into the category 
of qualified investors under applicable treaties in arbitral practice. Clearly, a clear 
and refined definition of investors which expressly includes SOEs and states would 
diminish the potential for conflicting interpretations. Besides, as arbitral practices 
have shown, national legislation may play a significant role in clarifying the status of 
corporations or entities as qualified investors, considering most BITs requiring 
incorporation or establishing as a legal entity according to domestic law. However, 
given the lack of conformity between treaty practice and national practice, and the 
growth of public investment in global markets, the issue of whether or not state 
enterprises and states are protected by the same international legal regime that 
protects private foreign investors is likely to be discussed more frequently. 
 
2.3 Can SOEs Initiate Investor-State Arbitration under Article 25 of 
ICSID Convention 
 
In order to guarantee the effectiveness of treaty protection, most investment treaties 
                                                             
98 Luke Eric Peterson and Zoe Williams, ‘Tribunals finalized in two Russian-related investment treaty arbitrations 
(ICSID and UNCITRAL), with Boeckstiegel once again in a familiar role’ IAReporter (16 March 2017) 
<http://tinyurl.com/jdc4ly9> accessed 9 May 2017. 
99 ibid. 
100 Article 1 (2) of the Russian Federation-Ukraine BIT (1998) provides that: 
Investor of a Contracting Party shall imply (a) any natural person…; (b) any legal entity, set up or 
instituted in conformity with the legislation prevailing on the territory of the given Contracting Party, 
under the condition that the said legal entity is legally capable, under the legislation of its respective 
Contracting Party, to carry out investments on the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
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have provided dispute resolution mechanisms, including investor-state arbitration 
and state-state arbitration.102 The question of whether SOEs are qualified investors is 
linked to but different from the question of whether they have standing before an 
investor-state arbitration. They are linked together because the treaty provisions in 
respect of investor-state arbitration often refer to the investor definition in order to 
define the scope of the investors eligible to bring a case against the host state. Thus, 
only when SOEs are qualified as covered investors, can the treaty protection then be 
applicable to them. As a result, where SOEs and states are expressly covered in the 
investor definition clause, they would have the standing to enforce the treaty rights 
through an investor-state arbitration. On the contrary, if the treaty is silent, SOEs and 
even states might still have standing if the tribunal determines that the investor 
definition includes state-owned entities and contracting parties.103 However, it should 
be noted that a qualified ‘investor’ under the BIT is not necessarily guaranteed 
access to international investment arbitration, as it also has to meet the requirements 
imposed by the rules of arbitration to which the BIT refers. As most investment 
arbitrations are conducted under the ICSID Convention, it is, therefore, important to 
take a close look at the ICSID Convention and relevant practice to gain further 
insights into the issue. 
 
Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention provides that the Centre’s jurisdiction 
extends to ‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State… and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to 
the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre’.104 This article sets out core 
requirements of the ICSID jurisdiction, including the subject matter of the dispute 
(jurisdiction ratione materiae) and the parties to the dispute (jurisdiction ratione 
personae). Furthermore, to establish the jurisdiction, both parties must have 
expressed their consent to arbitration.105 In this context, in order to gain access to 
                                                             
102 See, e.g., Canada-Egypt BIT, Article 13&15; Canada-Philippines BIT, Article 13 & 15; Egypt-Italy BIT, 
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dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention, an SOE is required to be ‘a national 
of another Contracting State’.  
 
It is, however, not clear whether SOEs or public investors are entitled to initiate a 
claim before the ICSID.106 As stipulated in Article 25 (2) (b), ‘national of another 
Contracting State’ means ‘any natural person’ and ‘any juridical person’, without a 
distinction between private and public investors.107 As a result, it is arguable that an 
SOE or a state entity is considered as a ‘national’ of the contracting party and thus 
enjoys access to the ICSID arbitration. 
 
Pursuant to its Preamble, the ICSID was established for the promotion of private 
international investment.108 Some scholars accordingly maintain that the language of 
the Preamble ‘would indicate that the investor must be a private individual or 
corporation’ and thus ‘States acting as investors have no access to the Centre in that 
capacity’.109 Moreover, the Report of the Executive Directors has mentioned ‘private 
international capital’ and ‘private international investment’ in many places.110 
 
The above interpretations, however, are not convincing. According to Article 31 of 
the VCLT, the treaty shall be firstly interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning, and the purpose and object shall be considered as a supplementary 
approach. In fact, the Preamble of the ICSID Convention has never expressly 
excluded public investors and their investments from the protection, although it was 
                                                                                                                                                                            
see Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 616–7. 
106 For more discussion see generally, Christoph H Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Second Edi, 
CUP 2009). 
107 Article 25 (2) of the ICSID Convention provides: 
National of another Contracting State’ means: (a) any natural person…; and (b) any juridical person 
which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on 
which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical 
person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, 
because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention. 
108 The Preamble speaks specially that, ‘[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein’. Dolzer and Schreuer (n 10) 250. 
109 Schreuer (n 106) 161. 
110 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Report of the Executive Directors on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’ (1965) 
<http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section03.htm> accessed 12 September 
2017, Section III. 
  CHAPTER 2  
60 
 
considering ‘the need for international cooperation for economic development, and 
the role of private international investment therein’.111 Moreover, the jurisdiction of 
the ICSID provided in Article 25 is not restricted to private investments and private 
investors. 
 
Some scholars consider that claims brought by SOEs or state entities under BITs 
should be settled through other procedures such as the state-state arbitration - the 
basic idea of the ICSID Convention is to fill a particular procedural gap by providing 
for dispute settlement between foreign investors and host states.112 While ICSID 
tribunals do not have jurisdiction over disputes between two contracting states,113 the 
ICSID Convention has never excluded public investors from its jurisdiction, as long 
as the public investor has been considered as ‘a national of the Contracting State’. 
Moreover, the state-state dispute settlement in most investment treaties is provided 
for certain claims, including diplomatic protection, interpretation or declaratory 
relief.114 Accordingly, even if an SOE or state entity is characterised as a state, its 
claim may fall outside the scope of the state-state dispute settlement. Therefore, it is 
not reasonable to preclude public investors from the ICSID jurisdiction merely in 
light of the state ownership of the claimant of the investment dispute. 
 
It is notable that during the preparation of the ICSID Convention, drafters were 
disposed to accept state entities and contracting states as eligible ‘nationals’ to bring 
a claim against host states. The comment to the Preliminary Draft of the Convention 
by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) stated that:  
 
[T]he definitions have been broadly drawn. ‘Nationals’ include both natural 
                                                             
111 The Preamble of the ICSID Convention. 
112 Schreuer (n 106) 160; Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 636.. 
113 For example, the Maffezini tribunal held that the center ‘has no jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between two 
States… it also lacks jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between two private entities’, see Maffezini (n 77), para 74. 
114 Anthea Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and 
Shared Interpretive Authority’ (2014) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 69–70; Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, ‘State–State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties’ (IISD 2014) 7–16 
<https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-
treaties.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017; Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and 
Interpretation (n 21) 499–50. 
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and juridical persons as well as associations of such persons. It will be noted 
that the term ‘national’ is not restricted to private-owned companies, thus 
permitting a wholly or partially government-owned company to be a party to 
proceedings brought by or against a foreign State.115 
 
However, neither the ICSID Convention nor the associated report by the Executive 
Directors of IBRD has mentioned SOEs or public investors; instead, they repeatedly 
speak of private foreign investments.116 Hirsch argues that ICSID tribunals should 
‘adopt a narrow interpretation, rejecting the participation of bodies that cooperate 
with states’.117 Such a narrow interpretation is justified by virtue of the aim of the 
drafters of the Convention, who rejected attempts to involve any additional state 
(apart from the host state) in arbitration proceedings, ‘even where those states played 
an important role in the investment transaction’.118 Accordingly, ICSID arbitration 
may not be available to states themselves and their subdivisions even if they are 
protected investors for purposes of an applicable investment treaty that provides for 
ICSID arbitration.119 
 
In the author’s view, however, the interpretation of excluding state enterprises and 
states from jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICSID is not convincing. On the one 
hand, state enterprises are clearly different from states, although the conduct of SOEs 
or state entities may be attributable somehow to the states. Scholars who have argued 
that the ICSID framework excludes SOEs or state entities are in fact assuming that 
public investors are states per se, and exclude them from the ICSID jurisdiction 
accordingly. In Tulip v. Turkey, for example, the tribunal held that: 
 
[T]here is no basis under international law to conclude that ownership of a 
corporate entity by the State triggers the presumption of statehood…whilst 
state ownership may, in certain circumstances, be a factor relevant to the 
question of attribution, it does not convert a separate corporate entity into an 
                                                             
115 ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention: Volume II-1 (ICSID Publishing 2009) 230. 
116 Hamida (n 36) 24–5. 
117 Moshe Hirsh, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 55–6; Hamida (n 36) 26. 
118 ibid 26. 
119 Piero Bernardini, ‘Nationality Requirements under BITs and Related Case Law’ in Federico Ortino and others 
(eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues II (BIICL 2007) 17–24. 
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‘organ’ of the State.120  
 
Also, the Electrabel v. Hungary tribunal stated that:  
 
…[T]he fact that a State acts through a State-owned or State-controlled 
company over which it exercises some influence is by itself insufficient for 
the acts of such entities to be attributed to the State. This has been expressed 
in the clearest possible terms in the ILC Commentary under Article 8.121 
 
On the other hand, scholars have confused the dual role of states in international 
investments, namely, states as regulators (in governmental capacity) and states as 
investors (in commercial capacity). As mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon that a 
state acts through a state enterprise or in its own name to engage in international 
investments. While scholars consider that SOEs investing abroad in a governmental 
capacity cannot submit a claim against states under the ICSID Convention,122 the 
evidence is not enough to suggest that a state enterprise or even a state investing 
abroad exercises its governmental capacity, rather than commercial capacity.123 In 
such a case, the state or state enterprise, in fact, acts as a foreign investor, rather than 
a regulator of inward investments. 
 
The Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), for example, is a 
government organ of China acting as the regulator of foreign exchange in principle, 
but it also has the commercial capacity to engage in international financial 
                                                             
120 Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, 
Award, 10 March 2014, para 289. In addition, the tribunal agreed with the EDF tribunal that, ‘state-owned 
corporations possessing legal personality under [municipal] law separate and distinct from that of the State, may 
[not] be considered as a State organ’, EDF (n 84), para 190. 
121 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 November 2012 (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19), para 7.95. The ILC Commentary stated that:  
The fact that the State initially establishes a corporate entity, whether by a special law or otherwise, is 
not a sufficient basis for the attribution to the State of the subsequent conduct of that entity. Since 
corporate entities, although owned by and in that sense subject to the control of the State, are 
considered to be separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their activities is not attributable to 
the State unless they are exercising elements of governmental authority within the meaning of article 5. 
See James Crawford, The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (CUP 2002). 
122 Feldman, ‘State-Owned Enterprises as Claimants in International Investment Arbitration’ (n 5) 24. 
123 See also Section 2.2.3. 
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activities.124 If the SAFE purchased US Treasury bills and then had a dispute relating 
to this, can the SAFE bring a case against the US Government under the ICSID? 
Obviously, in this hypothetical case, the SAFE acts as an investor in a commercial 
capacity rather than as a regulator in a governmental capacity. The question whether 
the conduct of a state organ can be attributable to the state is normally discussed 
under state responsibility in international law. But here we are discussing whether 
the SAFE shall be excluded from the ICSID arbitration because of its public body 
status even if it acts as an investor. According to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
the question becomes whether or not the state is a ‘national’ of the state, namely, 
whether the Chinese SAFE is ‘a national of China’ under the ICSID Convention? 
 
According to Article 25 (2) (b) of the ICSID Convention, ‘a national of another 
Contracting State’ includes ‘juridical person’ that has the ‘nationality’ of that state.125 
However, these terms are defined broadly under the ICSID Convention, which does 
not specify any particular test to determine the nationality of a ‘juridical person’.126 
As a result, whether there is a ‘juridical person’ that has the ‘nationality’ of a 
contracting state in dispute is determined by that state in light of its domestic 
legislation.127 Hence, the question in the above example becomes whether or not the 
SAFE is a juridical person under Chinese law. According to the General Principles 
of the Civil Law of China, an independently funded state organ shall have legal 
personality from the date of its establishment.128 Apparently, the SAFE is a qualified 
                                                             
124 For major functions of the SAFE see <http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/AboutSAFE/Major> 
accessed 18 May 2017. 
125 Article 25 (2) (b) of the ICSID Convention provides: 
[A]ny juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the 
dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration 
and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that 
date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of 
another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention. 
126 Anthony C Sinclair, ‘ICSID’s Nationality Requirements’ (2008) 23 ICSID Review 57, 88. 
127 As noted, ICSID tribunals have drawn from the fact that, ‘the Convention does not define corporate 
nationality that the drafters’ intention was to leave in the hands of each state the power to determine whether a 
company does or does not have its nationality, within broad limits imposed by international law’, ibid 87–8. 
128 See Article 50 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of China. Similarly, on 15 March 2017, the General 
Rules of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China has been adopted at the Fifth Session of the 12th 
National People’s Congress of the PRC, and will be effective from 1 October 2017. Article 97 of the Rules 
provides that ‘[t]he governmental bodies with independent funds and the statutory bodies that bear administrative 
functions shall have the legal personality of governmental bodies from the date of their establishment, and may 
engage in the civil activities required for the performance of their functions’. 
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legal person under the Chinese law, so it should have the standing under the ICSID 
Convention. Although it is hard to say, prima facia, a ‘state’ is ‘a national of the 
state’, the government or governmental organ could qualify as a ‘national’ of the 
state logically and legally. The situation is clearer when it comes to state entities as 
long as they are qualified legal persons under domestic legislation and have the 
nationality of the contracting state in dispute. However, given that national 
legislation varies in respect of juridical persons, a risk exists that a state entity might 
not be considered as a juridical person under the domestic law. In such a case, the 
state entity might be denied access to ICSID arbitration on the ground that it was not 
qualified as ‘a national of the contracting state’ under the ICSID jurisdiction. 
 
Some ICSID tribunals have acknowledged that SOEs are qualified as the ‘national of 
another Contracting State’ under the ICSID Convention,129 but neither the respondent 
state nor the tribunal has seriously addressed the issue of jurisdiction ratione 
personae becoming involved with SOEs. 130  One exception is the Rumeli v. 
Kazakhstan case, where the respondent state challenged the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
tribunal, arguing that the claimants (Rumeli and Telsim) were just empty shells for 
the ICSID arbitration, while the Turkish state was the true party.131 The tribunal held 
that claimants had the standing to bring the arbitration under Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention132 In particular, the tribunal pointed out that Article 25 (2) (b) ‘was 
inserted to broaden the scope of ICSID jurisdiction and not to limit it’.133 
 
In CSOB v. Slovak, the tribunal for the first time discussed whether an SOE qualified 
as a national of another contracting state to bring a claim before the ICSID.134 In the 
tribunal’s view, the language of Article 25 (1) ‘makes clear that the Centre does not 
have jurisdiction over disputes between two or more Contracting States’. But, the 
history of the ICSID Convention indicated that the concept of ‘juridical persons’ was 
                                                             
129 Schreuer (n 106) 162. 
130 See e.g., HEP (n 6); CDC (n 6); Telenor (n 6); etc. See also Poulsen, ‘Investment Treaties and the 
Globalisation of State Capitalism: Opportunities and Constraints for Host States’ 78. 
131 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Award, 
29 July 2008 (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16), para 324. 
132 ibid, para 331. 
133 ibid, para 329. 
134 CSOB (n 6). 
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‘not intended to be limited to private-owned companies, but to embrace also wholly 
or partially government-owned companies’. 135  More importantly, the tribunal 
adopted Mr Broches’ formulation as an ‘accepted test’ to examine whether an SOE 
qualified as ‘a national of another Contracting State’ under Article 25 (1), namely: 
 
…[F]or purposes of the Convention a mixed economy company or 
government-owned corporation should not be disqualified as ‘a national of 
another Contracting State’ unless it is acting as an agent for the government 
or is discharging an essentially governmental function.136  
 
Relying on the test, the tribunal eventually concluded that CSOB qualified as a 
‘national’ under the ICSID Convention.137 As the tribunal noted: 
 
It cannot be denied that for much of its existence, [CSOB served as agent or 
representative of the state] … But in determining whether CSOB, in 
discharging these functions, exercised governmental functions, the focus must 
be on the nature of these activities and not their purpose. While it cannot be 
doubted that in performing the [governmental capacity], CSOB was 
promoting the governmental policies or purposes of the State, the activities 
themselves were essentially commercial rather than governmental in 
nature.138 (emphasis added) 
 
Moreover, the tribunal noted that ‘CSOB took various steps to gradually throw off its 
exclusive economic dependence on the State and to adopt measures to enable it to 
function in this new economic environment as an independent commercial bank’.139 
Although CSOB’s lending activities were ‘driven by State policies’, the banking 
transactions themselves that implemented these policies ‘did not thereby lose their 
commercial nature’. Therefore, these activities could not be characterised as 
governmental in nature.140 
 
However, the CSOB case has received criticisms from scholars. For example, some 
                                                             
135 ibid, para 16. 
136 ibid, para 17. 
137 ibid. 
138 ibid, para 20. 
139 ibid, para 21. 
140 ibid. 
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argue that the CSOB tribunal failed to apply the test of ‘acting as an agent for the 
government’ despite finding that ‘CSOB is …an agent of the Czech Republic’.141  
 
Most recently, an ICSID tribunal ruled on the jurisdictional objections raised by 
Yemen in its dispute with a Chinese SOE, BUCG.142 The claim had arisen from the 
alleged forced deprivation of the Chinese SOE’s assets and termination of the 
construction contract concerning an airport project.143 The respondent contended that 
BUCG as a Chinese SOE did not qualify as ‘a national of another Contracting State’ 
and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention.144 In this case, both 
parties accepted the Broches test.145  
 
In light of the two criteria, the tribunal first held that BUCG was performing its work 
on the airport site under a construction contract as a commercial contractor, rather 
than an agent of the Chinese government.146 While the respondent argued that BUCG 
was acting on the project as an ‘agent’ for the Chinese government because it in 
general was expected to ‘advance China’ national interest’ and should ‘accept the 
supervision and inspection’ of Chinese authorities, the tribunal held that the issue 
was not ‘the corporate framework of the State-owned enterprise’ but whether ‘it 
functions as an agent of the State in the fact-specific context’.147 Moreover, the 
respondent itself had contended that the termination of the contract was associated 
with BUCG’s failure in performing its commercial services, rather than Chinese 
government’s decisions or policies. Also, the respondent took the position that the 
present dispute was an ‘ordinary garden variety commercial dispute’ which should 
be resolved under the relevant contract provisions.148 
 
                                                             
141 See e.g., Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When Are State-Owned 
Entities and Their Investment Protected?’ (n 5) 37–40; Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under 
Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 628–30. 
142 BUCG (n 6). 
143 ibid, para 25. 
144 ibid, para 29. 
145 In the Tribunal’s view, the Broaches test mirrored the arbitration rules in Article 5 and 8 of the ILC’s Articles 
on State Responsibility and laid down markers for the non-attribution of state status, ibid, paras 33-4. Schreuer (n 
106) 161. 
146 ibid, para 41. 
147 ibid, paras 37-9. 
148 ibid, para 40. 
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In terms of the second test, the tribunal pointed out that the ‘Respondent’s 
positioning of BUCG in the broad context of the PRC State-controlled economy is 
convincing but largely irrelevant’; also, its assertion that ‘the Chinese State is the 
ultimate decision maker’ for BUCG is too remote from the facts of the airport project 
to be relevant.149 In the tribunal’s view, an appropriate focus of the function test 
should be placed ‘in the particular instance’, namely, the airport project, but in that 
capacity BUCG was not discharging a PRC government function.150 In addition, the 
tribunal noted that the host state’s action in question (the alleged military aggression) 
was not by Yemen against China but in relation to BUCG as a contractor that fell 
down the job.151 
 
At the time of writing, only the above two tribunals have elaborated the application 
of the Broches test. Yet, both the CSOB case and the BUCG case favour SOE 
investors which have confirmed that the state ownership would not disqualify a state 
enterprise in bringing a case before ICSID tribunals. In particular, the BUCG 
decision will be of interest to Chinese SOEs which have made significant 
investments abroad in a variety of economic sectors, by providing important 
implications that Chinese SOEs are qualified to bring claims against foreign states 
under the ICSID Convention. Nonetheless, whether the future tribunal will accept 
the BUCG tribunal’s interpretation remains to be seem. 
 
Indeed, the Broches test per se is not perfect. Although Professor Schreuer has 
described the test as ‘probably the best guideline’ for deciding whether a state 
enterprise is qualified to bring a claim against another state under the ICSID 
Convention,152 I would argue that it is merely an ambiguous directive, rather than a 
clear formula. According to the Broches test, whether an SOE has standing under the 
ICSID Convention is not decided by the ownership (structure) but by the function; 
and when determining the function, the tribunal should focus on the nature of the 
activities instead of the purpose.153 This approach was adopted by the US Congress 
                                                             
149 ibid, paras 42-3. 
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in determining the commercial character of foreign state’s activities for immunity 
exception.154 Undoubtedly, such an approach has merits that it attempts to opt for a 
more objective standard and thus to avoid a troublesome inquiry into a state’s 
motivation.155 However, the Broches test does not solve the problem but leaves 
considerable confusion in its application.156 The purpose and the nature of an activity 
are not absolutely separate standards, and both objective and subjective standards are 
necessary and vital to distinguish foreign sovereign acts from commercial 
activities.157 
 
Considering that the genuine purpose of an activity conducted by a state or state 
entity is hard for international tribunals to discern, a more reliable assessment might 
be to rely on the effect of the activity instead of its purpose. Meanwhile, the 
definition of ‘investment’ could contribute to determining the nature of the activities. 
Hence, if a respondent state challenges the ICSID jurisdiction arguing that a state 
enterprise or state entity is not qualified to submit the case because it performs a 
governmental function, an appropriate and workable approach for tribunals in 
determining the character of the activity should be a mixed test with both subjective 
and objective standards. 
 
As noted, the commercial nature of SOEs plays a central role for their qualifications 
for international investment protections. While the assessment on the commercial 
character of a SOE investor should in principle focus on its single investment, i.e., 
the activity of the SOE, rather than the ownership (structure) of the investor, the 
distinction between ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ activities of SOEs is not 
                                                             
154 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) of the United States provides a most important 
exception for commercial activity by state. In determining the commercial character of an activity, the FSIA 
requires that courts to look at the nature of the act itself, rather than the purpose, see Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, PUBLIC LAW 94-583-OCT. 21, 1976 90 STAT. 2893, 28 USC § 1603. 
155 Howard J Lager, ‘Avoiding The “Nature-Purpose” Distinction: Redefining An International Commercial Act 
of State’ (1997) 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1085, 1091. 
156 In fact, this test in FSIA has also been sharply criticized by commentators and courts alike, see for example, 
ibid 1101–2. 
157 Meanwhile, either the purpose or the nature may involve different levels. For example, the purpose of a 
conduct may have both a short-term and a long-term purpose. Presumably, a foreign state investing in energy 
industries may have a short-term purpose to make money while having a long-term purpose for energy security. 
Also, supposing that a state enterprise holds controlling interests in energy industries, subjectively, the act might 
be made on strategic or governmental considerations; but objectively, the company might make excessive profits 
at the same time. 
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always easy to clarify. Some countries have therefore proposed to oblige SOEs to 
more transparency to maintain a level playing field between state-owned and 
privately-owned entities operating on a commercial basis. For example, the EU 
Transparency Directive provides specific transparency requirements concerning the 
financial relations between public authorities and public undertakings in EU  (and 
EEA) member states, including requiring SOEs (and other entities entrusted with 
public service obligations) to separate costs and assets between commercial and non-
commercial accounts.158 The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs 
recommended that where SOEs combine economic activities and public policy 
objectives, high standards of transparency and disclosure regarding their cost and 
revenue structures must be maintained. Also, SOEs should disclose material 
financial and non-financial information…including enterprise objectives, financial 
and operating results, governance, ownership and voting structure of the enterprise, 
etc.159 Although these rules and guidelines are either limited to the EU context or 
voluntary in nature, they can be a useful reference for policy makers to regulate 
SOEs in international context.160  
 
In the current TTIP negotiations, for example, the European Parliament has 
recommended the Commission to include provisions on state enterprises and 
enterprises granted special or exclusive rights or privileges.161 The EU’s initial 
proposal for legal text on SOEs explicitly requires that SOEs shall observe high 
standards of transparency and corporate governance in accordance with the OECD 
Guidelines on corporate governance of state owned enterprises.162 More importantly, 
the EU’s proposal in respect of transparency obligations of SOEs in TTIP seems also 
to stress a focus on the structure the enterprise.163 Similar provisions can also be 
                                                             
158 Commission Directive 2006/11/EC of 16 November 20006 on the transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings [2006]  
OJ  L 318/17. OECD, Competitive Neutrality: National Practice  (OECD 2012), 41-2. 
159 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD 2015). 
160 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors: A Challenge or An Opportunity? (OECD 2016), 87. 
161 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s 
recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP)’ [2015] P8_TA(2015)0252. 
162 Article 7.1 of the textual proposal, see the European Union’s initial proposal for legal text on ‘State-owned 
Enterprises’ in TTIP (published on 7 January 2015), 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153030.pdf> accessed 12 December  2017. 
163 Article 7.3  provides that each party shall make available information on SOEs, including: (a) the 
organisational structure of the enterprise, the composition of its board of directors… (b) the ownership and the 
voting structure of the enterprise…(c) a description of any special shares or special voting… (d) the name and 
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found in the EU proposal for a legal text in the EU-Indonesia FTA.164 Nonetheless, 
the application of these rules for SOEs remains to be tested in practice. 
 
In addition, the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) 
issued the Santiago Principles to identify a framework of generally accepted 
principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and 
accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practice by SWFs 
on a prudent and sound basis.165 Specifically, under the Santiago Principles 1.2, the 
key features of the SWF’s legal basis and structure,  as well as the legal relationship 
between the SWF and other state bogies, should be publicly disclosed. The 
Principles 19 requires that SWF’s investment decisions should ‘aim to maximize 
risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and 
based on economic and financial grounds’; if investment decisions are subject to 
other than economic and financial considerations, these decisions ‘should be clearly 
set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed’.166 
 
The transparent rules for SOEs in new generations of IIAs and the Santiago 
Principles have indicated countries’ efforts to stress commercial objectives of SOEs 
and SWF activities and call for greater transparency on the enterprises and funds to 
ensure they conduct commercial activities in the international marketplace. Although 
it is possible for future treaties to incorporate the principles of good governance and 
transparency, a notable feature of the current international investment regime is an 
absence of binding investor obligations. In fact, SOEs’ obligations of corporate  
government and transparency can be addressed either through national and 
supranational laws or through non-binding international guidelines. Nonetheless, 
developed states may be willing to provide binding rules on SOEs’ obligations in 
international treaties for two reasons: first, enterprises from developed countries, 
whether publicly or privately owned, have already been subject to higher obligations 
                                                                                                                                                                            
title(s) of any government official serving as official or member of the board… (e) details of the government 
departments or public bodies… (f) the role of the government of any public bodies in the appointment, dismissal 
or remuneration of managers… 
164 See European Union’s proposal for a legal text on state-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special rights 
or privileges, and designated monopolies in the EU-Indonesia FTA (published on 19 December 2016) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/february/tradoc_155286.pdf> accessed 19 December 2017. 
165 IWG, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles” (2008) 
<http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf> accessed 19 December 2017. 
166 ibid. 
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on corporate governance and transparency than SOEs from developing countries; 
second, SOEs from developing countries have been assumed to be driven by political 
objectives and thus the developed host countries are more eager to assess the 
possibly political interference in the operation of SOE investments. 
 
2.4 SOE Investments as Protected ‘Investments’ 
 
This section turns to another important issue of whether SOE investments are 
covered as qualified ‘investments’ under investment treaties, or whether ‘state 
ownership disqualifies an SOE investment as a protected ‘investment’. 
 
2.4.1 SOE Investments under the ‘Investment’ Definition 
 
As a key term and prerequisite issue in international investment law, almost all 
investment treaties define what constitute an ‘investment’.167 Most of the treaties 
typically provide a very broad asset-based definition of ‘investment’ with an 
illustrative list of investment forms.168 For example, the Germany-Malaysia BIT 
defines that: 
 
The term ‘investment’ shall comprise every kind of asset and more 
particularly, though not exclusively: 
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem…; 
(b) shares or other kinds of interests in company;  
(c) title to money or to any performance having an economic value.169  
 
Under this formulation of investment definition, the specific categories of 
investments are merely provided as examples. Hence, even if an alleged investment 
is not specifically included in the list of assets, it may still enjoy investment 
protections.170 By contrast, some treaties provide an exhaustive list of assets that are 
                                                             
167 Sornarajah (n 4) 190. 
168 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (n 21) 122. 
169 Article 1 (1) of the Germany-Malaysia BIT (1960). 
170 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, Decisions on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004 (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8), para 137. Salacuse JW, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2015), 178. 
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covered by the ‘investment’, such as the China-Canada BIT.171 While an exhaustive 
list seems to limit the coverage of covered investments, the definition of investment 
is usually still broad enough to include all the major investments currently employed 
by investors. 172  While the language of investment definitions differs among 
investment treaties, there is no distinction between public and private investments. 
 
A feature of SOE investments is, obviously, that they are state-owned, i.e., the 
investments are funded or financed by states or state entities. According to the above 
broad definition of ‘investments’, however, whether a foreign investment is financed 
by a foreign government or public entity seems to be irrelevant to the existence of a 
qualified ‘investment’ since they are not part of the definition clause.173 In Tokios 
                                                             
171 Article 1 (1) of the China- Canada BIT (2012) provides: 
investment means:  
(a) an enterprise;  
(b) shares, stocks and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;  
(c) bonds, debentures, and other debt instruments of an enterprise;  
(d) a loan to an enterprise  
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or  
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years;   
(e) notwithstanding sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a loan to or debt security issued by a financial 
institution is an investment only where the loan or debt security is treated as regulatory capital by the 
Contracting Party in whose territory the financial institution is located;  
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the income or profits of the enterprise;  
(g) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on 
dissolution; 
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Contracting 
Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under 
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor’s property in the territory of the Contracting 
Party, including 
turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions to search for and extract oil and other natural 
resources, or 
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenue or profits of 
an enterprise; 
(i) intellectual property rights; and 
(j) any other tangible or intangible, moveable or immovable, property and related property rights 
acquired or used for business purposes; 
but ‘investment’ does not mean: 
(k) claims to money that arise solely from 
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services, or 
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, 
other than a loan covered by sub-paragraph (d); or 
(l) any other claims to money,  
that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (j); 
172 Salacuse (n 170) 184. 
173 Annacker (n 5) 543. 
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Tokelés v. Ukraine, for instance, the tribunal held that neither the text of the 
definition of ‘investment’, nor the context in which the term is defined allowed an 
‘origin-of-capital’ requirement to be implied.174 Furthermore, the tribunal also noted 
that the ‘origin-of-capital’ requirement was ‘inconsistent with the object and purpose 
of the Treaty, which… [was] to provide broad protection to investors and their 
investment in the territory of either party’.175 Likewise, the Saipem v. Bangladesh 
tribunal also noted that ‘the origin of the funds [was] irrelevant’ according to the 
drafting history of the ICSID Convention and several arbitral decisions relating to 
BITs.176 Therefore, under the commonly adopted definitions of ‘investments’, SOE 
investments are covered as protected investments.  
 
Nonetheless, some may argue that SOE investments are not purely commercially 
motivated, so that they are not qualified as ‘investments’.177 However, the motivation 
of foreign investors in making an investment is not relevant to the definition of 
‘investments’ under IIAs either. As the Saluka tribunal stated, ‘even if it were 
possible to know an investor’s true motivation in making its investment, nothing in 
[the investment definition clause] makes the investor’s motivation part of the 
definition of an investment’.178 In Tatneft v. Ukraine,179 the tribunal refused to read 
additional requirements into the BIT’s definition of investment or to enter into an 
                                                             
174 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, para 77. 
Article 1 (1) of the Lithuania- Ukraine BIT (1994) provides that, ‘The term “investment” shall comprise every 
kind of asset invested by an investor of the Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of the latter and shall include, in particular, though not exclusively…’ 
175 ibid. 
176 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
21 Mar 2007, para 106. 
177 For example, some suspect that SOE investments are motivated by non-commercial considerations, such as 
seeking critical energy and resources or implementing a state’s political aims or strategic policies. 
178 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 206. Article 
1(a) of the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT (1991) provides that, ‘investments shall comprise every kind of 
asset invested either directly or through an investor of a third State and more particularly, though not 
exclusively…’ 
179 The claim was brought by a Russian oil company, OJSC Tatneft, against Ukraine under the Russian 
Federation-Ukraine BIT (1998). In the case, the tribunal held that Tatneft was not controlled by the Republic of 
Tatarstan, so there was no need to decide or prejudge whether public entities are allowed to claim under the 
Russia-Ukraine BIT. Notably, the full jurisdictional decision has not been published until now; information 
discussed here is from the IAReporter that obtained a copy of the September 28, 2010 partial award on 
jurisdiction after Tatneft initiated additional enforcement proceedings in London and in Russia. For more analysis 
see Damien Charlotin, ‘PREVIOUSLY-UNSEEN JURISDICTIONAL AWARD WAVES AWAY OBJECTIONS 
TO RUSSIAN-OWNED INVESTMENT CLAIM’ (n 65). 
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examination of the motives of the investment.180 In the tribunal’s view, while the 
investment had both public and private purposes, this could be attributed to ‘the 
transition period between the command economies of the past and the market 
economies of the present’; ultimately, Tatneft’s activities were ‘in their essence, 
commercially-oriented’, which was enough to qualify as an investment under the 
BIT. Some scholars argue that the political motivation of a particular sovereign 
investment may be questionable but it should not affect the jurisdiction of ICSID.181  
 
However, it is notable that some investment treaties expressly provide that 
‘investments’ shall comprise any kinds of assets invested in connection with 
economic activities. 182  Under such a definition, an asset that is qualified as 
‘investment’ for treaty protections is required to be economic activities or 
commercial in nature. Accordingly, an SOE investment might not be considered as a 
qualified ‘investment’ if it did not have a commercial intention (e.g., not for making 
profit) or engaged in non-commercial activities (e.g., political espionage). In Phoenix 
Action v. Czech Republic, for instance, the tribunal held that ‘if the sole purpose of 
an economic transaction is to pursue an ICSID claim, without any intent to perform 
any economic activities in the host country, such transaction cannot be considered as 
a protected investment’.183 However, the intention of a foreign SOE investment is a 
very controversial and complicated issue. On the one hand, it is hard for a tribunal to 
discern the genuine purpose of a foreign SOE in making an investment; on the other 
                                                             
180 ibid. Article 1 (1) of the Russian-Ukraine BIT provides:  
‘Investments’ shall denote all kinds of property and intellectual values, which are put in by the investor 
of one Contracting Party on the territory of the other Contracting Party in conformity with the latter’s 
legislation, and in particular:  
a) movable and immovable property and any other rights of property therein;  
b) monetary funds and also securities, liabilities, deposits and other forms of participation;  
c) rights to objects of intellectual property, including authors' copyrights and related rights, trade marks, 
the rights to inventions, industrial samples, models and also technological processes and know-how;  
d) rights to perform commercial activity, including rights to prospecting, development and exploitation 
of natural resources.  
No alteration of the type of investments, which the funds are put in, shall affect their nature as 
investments, unless such alteration is contrary to the laws of a Contracting Party on whose territory the 
investments were made. 
181 Mathias Audit, ‘Is the Erecting of Barriers against Sovereign Wealth Funds Compatible with International 
Investment Law?’ (2009) 10 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 617, 626; Annacker (n 5) 543. 
182 See e.g., Czech Republic-Israel BIT (1997), Article 1 (1); Belarus-Czech Republic BIT (1996), Article 1; 
NAFTA (1992), Article 1139; etc. 
183 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, paras 93, 144. 
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hand, SOE investments may have both commercial and non-commercial purposes. In 
this context, tribunals are strongly advised to make a thorough review on a case-by-
case basis, especially focusing on the activity or transaction itself, rather than just the 
motivation, to determine whether it is commercial or economic in essence. 
 
2.4.2 SOE Investments with Characteristics of ‘Investments’: ‘Salini test’ under the 
ICSID Convention 
 
Despite the above discussion, a more complex issue in relation to SOE investments 
may arise out of the undefined ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention for 
jurisdiction.184 In fact, how to interpret ‘investment’ under Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention has long been debated in arbitral practice and by the scholars.185 
However, it is still necessary to address this issue for two main reasons. Firstly, some 
tribunals’ interpretation may disqualify the SOE investment for jurisdiction ratione 
materiae under the ICSID Convention. When assessing the existence of investment 
under the ICSID Convention, many tribunals have relied on the ‘Salini test’ which 
defines an investment as having four elements: (1) a contribution of money or assets; 
(2) a certain duration; (3) an element of risk; and (4) a contribution to the economic 
development of the host state.186  
 
Regardless of tribunals’ divergence on this test, it is notable that these elements may 
have implications on SOE investments if a tribunal considers them as necessary 
                                                             
184 According to Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment. This article serves as the jurisdictional gateway for access to ICSID 
arbitration. Dolzer and Schreuer (n 10) 65. 
185 See generally, e.g., Mavluda Sattorova, ‘Definition Investment Under the ICSID Convention and BITs: Of 
Ordinary Meaning, Telos, and Beyond’ (2012) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 267; Emmanuel Gaillard, 
‘Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice’ in Christina 
Binder and others (eds), nternational Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph 
Schreuer (OUP 2009); Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, ‘The Long March Towards A Jurisprudence 
Constante on the Notion of Investment’ in Meg Kinnear and others (eds), Building International Investment Law: 
The First 50 Years of ICSID (Kluwer Law International 2016); Alex Grabowski, ‘The Definition of Investment 
under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini’ (2014) 15 Chicago Journal of International Law 289; Julian 
Davis Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment 
Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257; Joseph M Boddicker, ‘Whose Dictionary Controls?: 
Recent Challenges to the Term “Investment” in ICSID Arbitration’ (2010) 25 American University International 
Law Review 1031; Dolzer and Schreuer (n 10) 65-76; Salacuse (n 170) 196-200. 
186 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 31 July 2001; English translation see 42 ILM 609 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep 400 (2004), para 52. 
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elements of constituting an investment. The first two criteria are less problematic: 
there is no requirement for the sources of the contribution, such as whether or not it 
is made by a foreign state;187 and there is no difference between public and private 
investments in respect of duration. Some may argue that the SOE investment lacks 
risks because it is backed by a sovereign state. Here, it does not matter who 
ultimately takes the risk of investment - either a corporation or a state, and whether 
or not the risk has occurred already.188 But, ordinary commercial transactions such as 
sales contracts are likely to be disqualified as investments under the ICSID 
Convention.189 Hence, some scholars argue that ICSID tribunals have no jurisdiction 
on sovereign bonds regardless of their values.190 
 
The most controversial element is the ‘contribution to the host state’s 
development’. 191  The CSOB tribunal pointed out that the language in the 
Convention’s Preamble suggested that an international transaction as an investment 
had to promote a state’s economic development.192 However, many scholars and 
tribunals consider that this subjective element is perceived as being unnecessary.193 
Moreover, some tribunals noted that the element of ‘contribution to the economic 
development’ was difficult to establish and was already implicit in other three 
elements.194 Furthermore, contribution to economic development might well be a 
                                                             
187 For example, Mr. Broches said that he did not see how the Convention could make a distinction based on the 
origin of funds, see ICSID (n 115) 261. 
188 Usually, the element of risk is merely the assumption of risk. 
189 See, e.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 19 February 2009, para 112; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004, para 57. See also Schreuer (n 106) 
89. 
190 Michael Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration’ (2007) 101 American 
Journal of International Law 711, 718–32. 
191 Schreuer (n 106) 131. 
192 CSOB (n 6) paras 64, 88. 
193 As noted, the Preamble’s reference to ‘the need for international cooperation for economic development, and 
the role of private investment therein’ appears to be a mere acknowledgement that investment fosters economic 
development, Gaillard and Banifatemi (n 185)119. 
194 See e.g., LESI, S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A. v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/3, Award, 12 November 2008, para 72; Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, 
Award, 14 July 2010, para 111; Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 September 2012, para 
221; KT Asia Investment Group B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/8, Award, 17 October 
2013, para 5.43. 
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consequence of an investment, rather than an essential component of the notion.195 
To date, the case law in respect of this criterion is still very contentious. Yet, 
considering that SOE investments are sometimes viewed with suspicion, such as 
threatening to national security interests or distorting market competition in some 
Western countries, it may be possible for host states to challegne ICSID jurisdictions 
for SOE investment disputes by disqualifying the SOE investment on the basis of 
contributing to economic development. 
 
In the author’s view, nonetheless, foreign investments, whether publicly or privately 
owned, may have positive impacts on host states (such as contributing to the GDP or 
increase employment opportunities) as well as negative impact (such as disrupting 
the local environment and other public interests, or corruption). Hence, the 
contribution to the host state’s development should be treated as a sufficient rather 
than a necessary element of investment, and tribunals should assess this with 
particular care.196 While such a contribution to development is an object and purpose 
of foreign investments, the actual impact of the SOE investment in the host state 
warrants closer attention. 197  For practical reasons, a ‘positive/negative impact’ 
criterion might be a preferable approach, i.e., if an SOE investment did not harm the 
host state’s development it should be deemed to satisfy the requirement. As Schreuer 
stated, it does not follow from the test that ‘an activity that does not obviously 
contribute to economic development must be excluded from the Convention’s 
protection’.198 
 
The second reason to address the ICSID jurisprudence on ‘investment’ under Article 
25 is that the criteria established in arbitral practice are considered to focus on the 
economic nature of the investment, which could be used to distinguish investment 
activities by state entities from a sovereign acting in its governmental capacity. 
Despite the divergence on the ‘Salini test’, the case law is progressively evolving 
towards a greater recognition of an objective requirement under Article 25 of the 
                                                             
195 Quiborax (n 194) para 220; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 8 
November 2010, para 312. 
196 Schreuer (n 106) 134. 
197 Waibel (n 190) 724. 
198 Schreuer (n 106) 134. 
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ICSID Convention and an economic concept of investment - the ordinary meaning of 
the word.199  Specifically, many tribunals have acknowledged that the objective 
definition of investment under the ICSID Convention comprises three elements of 
contrition of money or assets, risk and duration.200 These elements focus on the 
‘characteristics’ of investment, rather than the ownership of the investment and the 
purpose of the activity. Accordingly, only genuine investments that have the 
characteristics of investments are protected under the ICSID Convention. Therefore, 
in determining whether an SOE investment qualifies for investment protections, the 
tribunal can rely on the characteristics of investment to ensure that the activity by a 
state entity is commercial or economic in nature. 
 
Indeed, some investment treaties expressly define protected investments as assets 
with the characteristics of an investment. This is typical in the US BIT practice. For 
example, the 2012 US Model BIT provides that ‘investment’ means ‘every asset that 
an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other 
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk’.201 The 2009 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement provides in a footnote that, ‘[w]here 
an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, that asset is not an investment 
regardless of the form it may take’.202 In light of these treaty provisions, SOE 
investments have to satisfy these characteristics of investment for qualification as an 
investment under the investment treaty.  
 
It is notable that the listed characteristics of investment in treaties are not exactly the 
same as that in ICSID jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the characteristics of investment 
provided in treaties are normally non-exhaustive with reference to ‘including’; thus, 
other characteristics of an investment, such as the element of duration, might also 
                                                             
199 Gaillard and Banifatemi (n 185) 124. 
200 For example, see Quiborax (n 194) para 227. 
201 Article 1 of the US 2012 Model BIT. Similar provisions see also Article 9.1 (d) of the Australia-China FTA 
(2015), Article 12.1 of the China-Republic of Korea FTA (2015), Article 1(1) of the China-Japan-Korea trilateral 
investment agreement (2011), etc. 
202 Further, the Agreement provides that, ‘[t]he characteristics of an investment include the commitment of capital, 
the expectation of again or profit or the assumption of risk’. 
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have to be satisfied for an SOE investment to be covered by the treaty.203 A problem 
may arise in respect of ‘the expectation of gain or profit’. Some may argue that SOE 
investments are driven by non-commercial motivations so that they do not have 
expectations of gain or profit. Here, it is necessary to address the fact that an 
expectation of profit does not mean that investment is profitable or has made profits. 
Nonetheless, this element may exclude some assets of SOEs as qualified investments 
and limit the protected SOE investments to those made on a commercial basis.204 
  
2.4.3 SOE Investments in accordance with Host State’s Legislation 
 
Another interesting issue concerning SOE investments is the legality requirement. In 
contrast to US treaties, most of the investment treaties signed by European countries 
explicitly define that investments are assets made or invested in accordance with 
laws and regulations of the host state.205 Likewise, the Investment Agreement for the 
COMESA Common Investment Area provides that ‘investment’ means ‘assets 
admitted or admissible in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the 
COMESA Member State in whose territory the investment is made’.206 Also, the ‘in 
accordance with host state’s laws and regulations’ is the only generally applied 
qualification on the definition of investment in Chinese BITs.207 This requirement 
can, on the one hand, limit the broad coverage of investments; and on the other hand, 
ensure that foreign investors observe the host state’s laws and regulations.208 More 
importantly, the ‘in accordance with the host state’s law' requirement reserves certain 
regulatory space for the host state to ensure that an investment is covered only if it is 
consistent with the national legislation, even after the investment is made.  
 
The legality requirement has important implications for foreign SOE investments. 
                                                             
203 Salacuse (n 170) 182. 
204 It is notable that the characteristics of investment provided in investment treaties are considered as examples, 
which implies that they are not required to be satisfied cumulatively. In other words, a SOE asset that lacks the 
expectation of profits is not necessarily disqualified as a protected investment under the treaty. 
205 See e.g., Article 1 (1) of the Germany-Philippines BIT (1997). 
206 Articlee 1 (9) of the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (2007). 
207 Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2009), para 2.05. Notably, some Chinese treaties such as the 2003 Germany BIT and 2004 Uganda BIT 
have removed the requirement from the definition of investment clause. 
208 Salacuse (n 170) 184. 
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With this limitation, a host state, and ultimately a tribunal, may deny treaty 
protection to an SOE investment that is found not to be in compliance with the host 
state’s national law. As noted in the previous chapter, an increasing number of states 
have enacted or amended legislation to strengthen regulations on SOE 
investments.209 In this context, SOE investors are recommended to observe domestic 
regulations carefully and to ensure that their investments are consistent with host 
state laws. If an SOE has failed to comply with local laws, the tribunal may deny the 
jurisdiction over the claim by the SOE since its investment is not protected under the 
applicable treaty; and obviously, the host state will not be liable for compensation on 
the merits of the SOE’s claim.  
 
However, it may be controversial whether an SOE investment in question is legal or 
not. On the one hand, national law and regulations in respect of SOE investments 
differ among countries. The next chapter will elaborate the national legislation in 
respect of SOEs in selected countries. Notably, some treaties remove the ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ requirement from the provision of investment 
definition to the provision of promotion and admission,210 while some include the 
legality requirement in both definition and admission clauses.211 It is necessary to 
address here that the legality requirement in different provisions may have different 
implications for SOE investments. If the treaty provides the legality requirement in 
the investment definition clause, this limitation is a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Accordingly, a foreign SOE can pursue a claim only if its investment is in 
accordance with the host state’s law. Also, an international tribunal can dismiss the 
jurisdiction for an SOE investment if it is found to be illegal. By contrast, if the 
                                                             
209 See also Ch 3. 
210 For example, the China-Germany BIT (2003) does not provide the ‘in accordance with local laws’ in the 
definition of ‘investment’ (Article 1 (1): the term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset invested directly or 
indirectly by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party), but includes this 
limitation in the provision of promotion and protection of investment (Article 2 (1): Each Contracting Party shall 
encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments in its territory and admit such 
investments in accordance with its laws and regulations). 
211 For example, the Germany-Philippines BIT (1998) provides the legality requirement in both the definition of 
investment clause ( Article 1 (1): the term ‘investment’ shall mean any kind of asset accepted in accordance with 
the respective laws and regulations of either Contracting State), and the clause of promotion and acceptance 
(Article 2 (1) (1): Each Contracting State shall promote as far as possible investments in its territory by investors 
of the other Contracting State and admit such investments in accordance with its Constitution, laws and 
regulations as referred to in Article 1 paragraph 1. 
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legality requirement is merely found in the admission or promotion provision under 
an applicable treaty, an SOE investor that has failed to comply with host state’s law 
can still pursue a claim and should not be excluded from the tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
although the tribunal may deny the substantive protections for the SOE investments 
due to the illegality in the merits phase.212 
 
On the other hand, the issue of the legality requirement on investment bears various 
debates, and the tribunals’ interpretations are inconsistent. 213 In particular, it is 
problematic which host state law investors have to comply with.214 For example, 
some tribunals held that investments would be excluded from BIT protections when 
made in breach of ‘fundamental principles’ of the host state’s law,215 while many 
other tribunals did not mention or assume that the host state law was limited to 
fundamental principles.216 Furthermore, some tribunals indicated that the principle of 
good faith and international public policy (such as fraud and corruption) were 
involved in the legality requirement.217 Moreover, some tribunals held that the 
legality requirement was limited only to laws ‘governing the admission of 
investments in the host state’,218 while some tribunals considered that other domestic 
laws such as contract law, criminal law and competition law in relation to investment 
                                                             
212 See Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006, 
para 153. See also Lu Wang, ‘The “In Accordance with Local Laws” Requirement in BITs: Implications for the 
China-US BIT Negotiations’ (2013) 30 Studies in Law and Business 120, 121–2. 
213 See generally, e.g., Salacuse (n 170) 184–8; Rahim Moloo and Alex Khachaturian, ‘The Compliance with the 
Law Requirement in International Investment Law’ (2011) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 1473; Jean 
Kalicki, Dmitri Evseev and Mallory Silberman, ‘Legality of Investment’ in Meg Kinnear and others (eds), 
Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID (Kluwer Law International 2016). 
214 For further discussion see Jarrod Hepburn, ‘In Accordance with Which Host State Law? Restoring the 
Defence of Investor Illegality in Investment Arbitration’ (2014) 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 531, 
531–59; Wang, ‘The “In Accordance with Local Laws” Requirement in BITs: Implications for the China-US BIT 
Negotiations’ (n 212) 120–6. 
215 See e.g., LESI (n 194), para 83; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No ARB/05/17, Award, 6 
February 2008, para 104; Rumeli (n 131), para 319. 
216 In particular, the Quiborax tribunal explicitly rejected the fundamental principles limitation; the tribunal 
considered that interpretation was ‘too narrow’, going ‘beyond the terms of the BIT, in an attempt to further the 
investor’s protection without due regard for the state’s interests’, Quiborax (n 194) Decision on Jurisdiction 
(ICSID Case No ARB/06/2), para 263. See Hepburn (n 214) 536–9. 
217 See e.g., Inceysa (n 212), paras 237 & 245; Phoenix Action (n 183), paras 100 & 106-7; Hamester (n 84), para 
123; Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 December 2012, para 317. 
218 See e.g., Saba Fakes (n 194), para 119. 
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might be considered as well.219 As a result, there exists a risk that tribunals may have 
different conclusions on whether or not an SOE investment is in accordance with the 
host state’s law. 
 
It is not intended to discuss here the proper interpretation of the legality requirement. 
Rather, it is necessary to note that compliance with local laws is crucial to enable the 
host state to protect its national interests from being affected by foreign SOE 
investments. As the Anderson v. Costa Rica tribunal held that, ‘[t]he assurance of 
legality on investment has important, indeed crucial, consequences for the public 
welfare and economic well-being of any country’.220 In recent years, some countries 
have enacted or amended their national legislation on SOE investments to protect 
national security or address other public policies. Nevertheless, such regulations are 
the domestic legal regime for SOE investors where a breach of law would not result 
in any consequences at the international law level. However, if investment treaties 
contain a requirement that investments subject to treaty protections must be in 
compliance with the host state’s law, it will effectively impose an international 
obligation on SOE investors to ensure that their investments must be made legally in 
the host state, such as satisfied the national security review or obtained approvals 
from authorities. For example, the Anderson tribunal pointed out that, the words ‘in 
accordance with the laws’ reflected both sound public policy and sound investment 
practices, and the prudent investment practice required that ‘any investor exercise 
due diligence before committing funds to any particular investment proposal’.221 
Accordingly, a tribunal might dismiss the jurisdiction on the ground that the SOE 
investor did not exercise due diligence in assuring that their investments were in 
accordance with the host state’s law.  
 
The result would be a big advantage for states in regulating SOE investments: while 
a host state’s action or measure against an SOE investment violates substantive 
obligations under investment treaties such as non-discriminatory treatment or fair 
                                                             
219 Hepburn (n 214) 548–9. 
220 Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/07/3, Award, 19 May 
2010, para 53. 
221 ibid, para 58. 
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and equitable treatment,222 the state might not be liable for compensation on the 
merits of the SOE investor’s claim if the SOE investor failed to comply with the host 
state’s law - because the claim falls outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In this context, 
states that have concerns over SOE investments are advised to include the ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ requirement in the definition of investment in their 
treaties; meanwhile, SOE investors are advised to exercise due diligence when 
making and operating an investment. As mentioned earlier, some countries have 
required greater obligations of transparency for SOEs operating in commercial 
activities. In such cases, if an SOE investor fails to disclose information required  by 
host state’s laws, the SOE may be disqualified for international investment 
protections. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Both the definition of ‘investor’ and that of ‘investment’ are highly contested issues 
in international investment law. Based on the discussions made above, most of the 
investment treaties do not explicitly exclude SOEs from the definition of investor, 
while some treaties explicitly define state enterprises and even states as ‘investors’. 
Meanwhile, most of the investment treaties provide a broad and open-ended asset-
based definition of investment where neither the origin of capital nor the motivation 
of the investor is relevant to the qualification of an investment. Accordingly, SOEs 
are in principle qualified for investment protections. However, investment treaties 
are not always clear on the standing of SOEs, and international tribunals are not 
consistent on how to interpret the investor and investment provisions. As a result, 
whether or not an SOE is qualified as an ‘investor’ and whether an SOE investment 
is a protected ‘investment’ are still controversial questions. 
 
What is clear now is that the issue of whether SOEs are qualified for international 
investment protections, especially whether an SOE can resort to the ICSID 
arbitration, is likely to be subject to increasing scrutiny and debate. With the 
worldwide increase in sovereign investments and state protectionist measures against 
                                                             
222 For more discussion see Ch 4. 
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these investments, sovereign investors may increasingly use international investment 
arbitration to seek protection in the future.223 In 2015, for example, the Ukrainian 
state-owned bank, Oschadbank, filed a claim worth UAH 15 billion against Russia 
for losses caused by the Crimea annexation under the Ukraine-Russia BIT.224 This 
arbitration is described as ‘the first of a possible wave of BIT claims’ by Ukrainian 
SOEs against Russia.225 Likewise, BUCG’s success in the jurisdiction decision may 
inspire other Chinese SOEs to bring claims at ICSID in the face of expropriatory or 
adverse regulatory measures taken by host states.  
 
If so, whether SOEs are qualified for investment protections would be inevitably 
discussed by international tribunals. However, the problem is that most of the old 
generation BITs, including both the Ukraine-Russia BIT and the China-Yemen BIT, 
are silent on whether an SOE is a qualified investor, whilst it is uncertain whether 
and how the tribunal would consider the SOE as ‘a national of a Contracting State’ 
under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention even on the same basis of a ‘Broches test’. 
Hence, there is a risk that SOEs are dismissed to bring a claim against host states in 
international arbitrations. 
 
When the investment treaties are silent on SOEs, arbitrators would have considerable 
discretion to determine whether SOEs enjoy international investment protections. 
Some scholars thus doubt that international investment arbitration is a feasible way 
to ‘de-politicise’ investment disputes brought by investors with a connection to their 
government against another government.226 However, it is not uncommon in recent 
years that foreign governments are actively engaged in economic activities. In such a 
case, a proper examination of whether the state or SOE is a qualified investor for 
                                                             
223 Burgstaller (n 8) 177. 
224 ‘Oschadbank files claim worth UAH 15 bln against Russia for losses caused by Crimea annexation – 
Yatseniuk’ Interfax-Ukraine (8 July 2015) <http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/276618.html> accessed 5 
April 2017. The case is still pending. 
225 After Oschadbank brought the case to PCA, Ukrainian Prime Minster Arseniy Yatseniuk publicly urged ‘all 
other Ukrainian state-run companies to follow the example of state-owned Oschadbank of Ukraine to make 
Russia accountable and recover losses caused by the illegal annexation of Crimea from Russia’, Luke Eric 
Peterson, ‘In the first of a possible wave of BIT claims by Ukraine state-owned entities against Russia, an 
UNCITRAL tribunal is finalized’ IAReporter (14 August 2016) <http://tinyurl.com/zshatgl> accessed 9 
September 2017. 
226 Poulsen, ‘States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal Fictions’ (n 8) 17–8. 
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treaty protections, i.e., whether it exercises commercial or governmental functions, 
should focus on the specific instance of its behaviours, rather than ownership. To 
some extent, excluding sovereign investors from investment protections - especially 
international arbitrations merely on the basis of state ownership - will be a disguised 
form of ‘politicising’ the investment dispute. 
 
Nonetheless, it is still advisable to revise investment treaties to make them clear on 
SOE investments. In other words, whether or SOEs are qualified for investment 
protections should ultimately be determined by contracting states through the 
language adopted in investment treaties concluded by them. Obviously, a clear and 
explicit inclusion of SOEs would guarantee their international protections. This 
implication is of great importance to countries with large interests in SOE 
investments. In addition, some treaties have expressly included not only SOEs but 
also states as qualified investors, which could provide an additional guarantee for 
SOEs to be covered by investment protections. 
 
Although SOE investments should be qualified for investment protections in 
principle, it is also necessary to set limitations to prevent SOEs from misusing or 
abusing treaty protections. The definition of investment can play a role in achieving 
this goal. Regardless of the divergence in arbitral practice, an inclusion of 
‘characteristics of investment’ in the definition addresses the economic or 
commercial nature of an investment, which can be used to distinguish genuine 
investment by SOEs in commercial capacity from other activities by SOEs in a 
governmental capacity. Moreover, the ‘in accordance with host state’s law’ 
requirement in the definition of investment has an important implication for securing 
national legal regime and protecting national interests. With this limitation, a host 
state will have more discretion in regulating SOE investments, and the tribunal can 
dismiss the jurisdiction over the claim by SOE investor that has failed to comply 
with national regulations. 
 
The debate on whether an SOE is qualified as ‘investors’ is essentially a reflection of 
the current changing landscape of international investment law. As noted in Chapter 
1, SOEs as a relatively new actor in international investments were not considered to 
be a problem when Western countries designed the BITs and investor-state 
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arbitrations for protecting their private investors and investments against host states’ 
adverse conduct. Given that most SOEs are from emerging economies such as China, 
Western countries may have to face a dilemma where SOEs can challenge their 
regulatory measures at international tribunals, and their domestic policies are likely 
to be subject to closer scrutiny by tribunals. As a result, some Western countries are 
reluctant to admit SOEs as qualified investors and have attempted to exclude SOEs 
from investor-state arbitrations. Meanwhile, concerns may also arise that given SOEs 
- or even state - can file a case against another state, the investment arbitration may 
spoil the ‘equality of arms’ in the investor-state arbitration procedures as the SOE 
investors are not as weak as private investors but are privileged in and backed by 
their home government. If so, it seems necessary to reconsider the rights and 
obligations between the SOE and the state to strike a proper balance. I will return to 
these discussions in Chapter 6. 
 
As a conclusion of this chapter, it is pressing for policymakers to review the 
international investment regime, especially updating the old generation treaties to 
deal with challenges by SOEs. Hence, states are advised to rethink and carefully 
redefine the key terms in relation to SOEs to achieve further clarity and ensure they 
reflect the common intent of the treaty parties in this respect. Additionally, if states 
have allowed sovereign investors to pursue international investment arbitration, they 
may need to further consider whether there is a call for any adjustment of substantive 
treaty protections, because SOEs are likely to challenge host states’ restrictive 
measures in breach of international obligations such as NDT and FET. The following 
chapters will discuss whether or not it is necessary to further clarify relevant 
substantive provisions under investment treaties in order to strike a proper balance 
between the protection and the regulation of SOE investments.   
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CHAPTER 3:  
ADMISSION OF FOREIGN SOES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the issue of admission of foreign SOEs. While states may 
need foreign SOE capital for economic development and prosperity, they have also a 
perceived need to control the admission of foreign SOEs to protect important 
national interests.1 As noted, an increasing number of states have adopted various 
approaches, inter alia, tightened investment screening, to control admission of 
foreign SOEs, especially in critical infrastructure or strategic industries.2 Many cases 
and debates arise accordingly. In the context of international investment law, host 
states still retain considerable discretion to control the admission of foreign SOEs. In 
most treaties concluded by European countries, the admission clause indicates that 
the host state can unilaterally decide upon the admission of foreign investors in 
accordance with its legislation.3 However, the US, followed by Canada, Japan and 
some other countries, has extended the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
investors to pre-establishment phase.4 In such a case, a host state discretion to control 
the admission of foreign SOEs is subject to its international commitments to market 
access, including pre-establishment non-discriminatory treatment, where an SOE 
investor may challenge domestic regulatory measures on the admission in 
international investment arbitration.  
 
                                                             
1 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Second Edi, OUP 2015) 217. 
2 ibid; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016 - Investment Nationality: Policy Challenges (UN Publication 
2016) xxxi. (‘… [S]tate ownership is seen as an increased risk for a transaction being undertaken for other than 
purely economic motives. This is especially the case if the acquisitions relate to energy, infrastructure services or 
other industries with ‘security dimension’’). See also Ch 1.   
3 For example, Article 2 (1) of the Germany-Antigua and Barbuda BIT (1998) provides that, ‘[e]ach Contracting 
State shall in its territory promote as far as possible investments by investors of the other Contracting State and 
admit such investments in accordance with its legislation’. Salacuse (n 1) 218–221; Rudolf Dlozer and Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Second Edi, OUP 2012) 89–90. 
4 For instance, Article 3 of the 2012 US Model BIT provides that, ‘[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of the 
other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory’. For further discussion on non-discriminatory treatment of SOEs see 
Ch 4. 
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The admission of foreign SOEs is a significant but tricky issue at both national and 
international levels. Not surprisingly, host states favour retaining maximum 
flexibility of policy discretion to control the admission of foreign SOEs, while SOE 
investors are expecting to be guaranteed more freedom of accessing to foreign 
markets based on the non-discrimination standard of treatment. However, SOEs play 
different roles in different economies where varying foreign investment policies may 
create different admission requirements for foreign SOEs. In this regard, host states 
are neither willing to provide an unlimited ‘open market’ to foreign SOEs nor 
willing to close the door to them. As a result, a conflict may arise between expanding 
investment liberalisation and restricting admission for national interests. In this 
context, it is crucial for states to balance the need for foreign SOE investments and to 
protect certain national interests, i.e., to decide whether and to what extent to open 
markets to foreign SOEs. But, the problem is how to strike the right balance. In any 
event, states negotiating investment treaties must be aware that commitments on 
admission will create international obligations that may constrain the policy 
discretion to regulate foreign SOEs.  
 
This chapter will explore how states regulate the admission of foreign SOEs under 
both domestic legal framework and international investment treaties. Section two 
will focus on domestic regulations, especially different mechanisms for FDI 
screening on national security grounds and other national interest considerations in 
selected countries, to compare and analyse their applications for SOE transactions. 
While domestic legislation plays a dominant role in controlling the admission, it 
does not mean that investment treaties have no effect on the admission of foreign 
SOEs. Section three will review admission clauses under IIAs to explore whether 
and to what extent IIAs guarantee the right of foreign SOEs to access the host state 
market, especially whether or not recent developments of IIAs contribute to 
expanding the admission of foreign SOEs and promoting investment liberalisation. 
 
3.2 Comparative Analysis of Domestic FDI Reviews: Restricting the 
Admission of Foreign SOEs? 
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While inbound foreign investments are subject to a wide-ranging regulatory scheme 
in host states,5 a special, and perhaps also the most remarkable and problematic 
domestic legal regime for foreign SOEs on admission is the mechanism for FDI 
screening, inter alia, on national security grounds. For the purpose of this thesis, this 
section will review relevant rules in five selected economies that are concerned with 
SOE investments, including the US, Canada, Australia, the EU and China, and 
discuss their implications for foreign SOEs to enter in these markets. 
 
3.2.1 US: CFIUS Review on National Security 
 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has the 
authority to review foreign investments that might ‘have major implications for the 
United States national interests’.6 CFIUS was created by President Ford in 1975,7 in 
response to US Congressional concerns over the growing investments in American 
portfolio assets by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
members as well as the potentially political - rather than economic - motivations 
driving those investments.8 However, caused by national security concerns over a 
proposed purchase of Fairchild Semiconductor by Fujitsu, the Congress made a 
significant shift for CFIUS in 1988 by passing the Exon-Florio Amendment (also 
referred to Section 721 of the Defence Production Act). 9  The Exon-Florio 
                                                             
5 For an overview of the US regulatory regime for inbound FDI, see e.g., David N Fagan, ‘The US Regulatory 
and Institutional Framework for FDI’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Investing in the United State: Is the US Ready for 
FDI from China? (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009). For Chinese and US regulatory rules, see also US Chamber of 
Commerce, ‘China’s Approval Process for Inbound Foreign Direct Investment: Impact on Market Access, 
National Treatment and Transparency’ (2012) 
<https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/020021_China_InboundInvestment_Cvr.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
6 CFIUS is an interagency committee chaired by the Department of the Treasury and comprised of eight other 
voting members (the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Energy; the US 
Trade Representative; and the White House Office of Science and Technology); two permanent non-voting 
members (the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Labor); and several other White House 
offices that act as observers and, on a case-by-case basis, participate in CFIUS reviews, see Organisation for 
International Investment, ‘Understanding the CFIUS Process’ 
<http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/OFII_CFIUS_Primer.pdf> accessed September 2017. For more 
information of CFIUS see James K Jackson, ‘The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS)’ (2017) Congressional Research Service <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017.  
7  Executive Order 11858, May 7, 1975, 40 FR 20263. 
8  Jackson (n 6) 1. 
9  Pub. L. 100–418, Title V, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107 (23 August 1988); 50 USC App §2170 (2007). David Sanger, 
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Amendment, as a part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, 
transformed the CFIUS review from a limited administrative review to a broad legal 
screening mechanism in the US for foreign investments, and granted the President 
far-reaching authority to block foreign acquisitions which result in ‘foreign control 
of persons engaged in interstate commerce’. 10  A few years later, the Byrd 
Amendment required the Committee to perform investigations in transactions 
concerning ‘an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government’; it 
also required the President to provide Congress with a written report on the findings 
and conclusions of the CFIUS investigation.11 The new CFIUS review architecture 
was formalised by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
(FINSA) in response to the DP World controversy.12 In 2006, CFIUS and President 
Bush approved a purchase of major US port operations by the DP World, but the 
decision was then subject to great congressional and public criticism concerning the 
potential risk of terrorist attacks in the US.13 The FINSA codified pre-existing 
CFIUS practices and established the congressional oversights system.14 Under the 
FINSA, CFIUS shall ‘immediately conduct an investigation’ of the effects of certain 
transactions on US national security and ‘Congress more explicitly identified itself 
                                                                                                                                                                            
‘Japanese Purchase of Chip Maker Canceled after Objection in U.S.’ The New York Times (Tokyo, 17 March 
1987) <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/17/business/japanese-purchase-of-chip-maker-canceled-after-
objections-in-us.html> accessed 12 September 2017. 
10 Pub. L. 100–418, Title V, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107 (23 August 1988); 50 USC App §2170 (2007). José Alvarez, 
‘Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of 
Exon-Florio’ (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 4. 
11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2315 (23 
October1992). David Zaring, ‘CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service’ (2009) 83 Southern California 
Law Review 81, 94. 
12 Simpson Thacher, ‘Reform of the CFIUS Process In the Wake of Dubai Ports World’ (10 August 2007) 
<http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-content/publications/pub624.pdf?sfvrsn=2> 
accessed 12 September 2017; Backer 76. 
13 The American public and many members of Congress criticised DP World for creating a national security risk 
because of ‘the UAE’s history as an operation and financial base for the hijackers who carried out the 911 attack’, 
see Thacher (n 12);  Deborah M Mostaghel, ‘Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National 
Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?’ (2007) 70 Albany Law Review 583, 606. 
14 Alan P Larson and others, ‘Lessons Form CFIUS for National Security Reviews of Foreign Investment’ in Karl 
P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and Wouter PF Schmit Jongbloed (eds), Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy 
Reactions (OUP 2012) 422; Paul Rose, ‘Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007: An Assessment 
of Its Impact on Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises’ in Fabio Bassan (ed), Research 
Handbook on SWFs and International Investment Law (EE Publishing 2015) 166. 
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as the monitor of the Committee’ where CFIUS must ‘promptly provide briefings’ 
upon request by Congress.15 
 
All ‘covered’ foreign investment transactions, including any merger, acquisition or 
takeovers that might result in ‘foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the US’,16 are subject to the CFIUS review.17 Here, the term ‘covered 
transactions’ is broad to cover foreign government-controlled transactions.18 The 
process (Figure 3.1) begins either by parties to a proposed or completed transaction 
submitting a voluntary notice, or by the President or any member of CFIUS initiating 
a review.19 The Treasury Department Regulations indicated that it would clearly be 
appropriate to notify CFIUS when the acquisition was involved with ‘products or 
key technologies essential to US defence’.20 After receiving formal notification, 
CFIUS would have 30 days to review the transaction to ‘determine the effects of the 
transaction on the national security of the United States’.21 Under the following 
conditions, CFIUS is required to conduct a 45-day investigation and take any 
necessary actions: (1) CFIUS determines that the transactions threaten to impair the 
national security of the US and that the threat had not been mitigated during or prior 
to a review of the transaction; (2) the foreign person is controlled by a foreign 
government; or (3) the transactions would result in the control of any critical 
infrastructure by a foreign person and could impair national security, and that such 
impairment had not been mitigated. 22  Regardless of the CFIUS decision in 
investigation, the President would have almost unlimited authority to take action to 
‘suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national 
                                                             
15 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 248 [50 USC App. 2170], (b) (2); 121 Stat. 256 [50 USC App. 2170(g)], (g) (1). 
Zaring (n 11).  
16 31 CFR Ch VIII (7–1–09 Edition), § 800.224 (2008). 
17 For essential elements of the ‘covered transactions’ see 31 CFR Ch VIII (7–1–09 Edition), § 800.226 (2008). 
18 A ‘foreign government-controlled transaction’ is a covered transaction that ‘could result in the control of a US 
business by a foreign government or a person controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government’, see 31 
CFR Ch VIII (7–1–09 Edition), § 800.214 (2008). 
19 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 247 [50 USC App. 2170] (26 July 2007), (b) (1) (C) & (D). Jackson (n 6) 13. 
20 31 CFR Ch VIII, Pt. 800, App. A - Preamble to Regulations on Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by 
Foreign Persons (21 November 1991) <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title31-vol3/xml/CFR-2007-
title31-vol3-part800.xml#seqnum800.702> accessed 12 September 2016. 
21 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 247 [50 USC App § 2170] (26 July 2007), (b) (1) (A). 
22 ibid, (b) (2) (A). See also Jackson (n 6) 13. 
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security of the United States’.23 In any event, the President must announce his 
decision ‘not later than 15 days’ after the completion of the investigation. 24 
Importantly, the President’s determinations are not subject to judicial review.25 
 
Figure 3.1 Steps of a CFIUS foreign investment national security review      
Source: Jackson JK, ‘The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)’ (2017) 11 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf>. 
 
According to the legislation, foreign SOE transactions may be subject to greater 
scrutiny by CFIUS. First, any foreign government-controlled transaction is subject to 
                                                             
23 Congress directed that the President must consider two conditions before blocking or pending foreign 
transaction, namely, that other laws are inadequate or inappropriate, and that he has ‘credible evidence’ that a 
foreign transaction will impair national security; but, these conditions are very vague and limited. Pub. L. 110-49, 
121 Stat. 255 [50 USC App § 2170] (26 July 2007), (d) (1); Jackson (n 6) 14. 
24 ibid, (d) (2). 
25 This is also addressed in the Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 
F3d 296, 325 (DC Cir 2014). See Jackson (n 6) 27. 
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a 45-day investigation.26 Although the FINSA provides that an investigation can be 
exempted if the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the lead agency jointly 
determine that the transaction in question will not impair the national security, such 
an exception is somewhat unclear and inapplicable in most cases.27 Meanwhile, 
whether or not the covered transaction is controlled by a foreign government is a 
factor that CFIUS has to consider for national security in the 30-day review.28 Hence, 
most (if not all) of the foreign SOE transactions are subject to a full CFIUS 
investigation.  
 
More importantly, the term ‘foreign government-controlled’ is broadly defined to 
include not only control (of a US business) by ‘a foreign government’, but also 
control by ‘a person [that] is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government’.29 In this context, any foreign transactions resulting in the control of US 
businesses by, among others, foreign government agencies, SOEs, government 
pension funds, SWFs, or even private enterprises influenced or favoured by a foreign 
government, are likely subject to a full CFIUS review. For example, in the Huawei - 
3Leaf case, US officials were concerned that Huawei, a private company, might be a 
state-favored enterprise due to its close ties to the Party and the Chinese government. 
In this sense, any powerful private company could potentially be a state-favored 
company subject to a full CFIUS review.30 Moreover, the key term ‘control’ to 
covered transactions is also broadly defined to include both majority and dominant 
minority interests in any entity.31 Also, ‘ten percent or less of the outstanding voting 
interest in a US business’ also constitutes ‘control’ of the transaction, unless it is 
                                                             
26 Jackson (n 6), 14. 
27 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 249 [50 USC App § 2170], (26 July 2007), (b) (2) (D). Some argue that it is unclear 
how this exception will mesh with the established process, see James K Jackson, ‘The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS)’ (2016) 20 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf> accessed 
12 September 2017. 
28 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 253, §721 (f), [50 USC App § 2170(f)] (26 July 2007). 
29 31 CFR § 800.214. 
30 Daniel CK Chow, ‘Why China Wants A Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States’ (2015) 33 Boston 
University International Law Journal 101, 116.  
31 The term ‘control’ means the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a 
majority or a dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation, proxy 
voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other 
means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but without limitation, 
to determine, direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding the following matters, or any other similarly 
important matters affecting an entity, 31 CFR § 800.204 (a). 
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‘solely for the purpose of passive investment’. 32 Thus, the standard of ‘control’ 
required by CFIUS is very low, and foreign SOEs must be aware that even relatively 
small ownership of the US firm could be subject to a full CFIUS investigation.33    
 
Second, while there is no precise definition of national security,34 the CFIUS statute 
includes an open-ended list of factors that the President and CFIUS members must 
consider in determining if a particular transation threatens to impair national 
security.35 Factors for consideration include: 
 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;  
(2) capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, 
technology, materials, and other supplies and services;  
(3) control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens 
as it affects the capability and capacity of the US to meet the requirements of 
national security;  
(4) potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates 
missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; and transactions 
identified by the Secretary of Defense as ‘posing a regional military threat’ to 
the interests of the United States;  
(5) potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological leadership in 
areas affecting U.S. national security;  
(6) whether the transaction has a security-related impact on critical 
infrastructure in the United States;  
(7) potential effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major 
energy assets;  
(8) potential effects on United States critical technologies;  
(9) whether the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction; 
(10) in cases involving a government-controlled transaction, a review of (A) 
the adherence of the foreign country to nonproliferation control regimes, (B) 
                                                             
32 31 CFR § 800.302(b), § 800.223. 
33 Rose (n 14) 159. 
34 Notably, the amended Sec 721 clarified that ‘[t]he term “national security” shall be construed so as to include 
those issues relating to ‘homeland security’, including its application to critical infrastructure’, Pub. L. 110-49, 
121 Stat. 247 [50 USC App § 2170] (26 July 2007), (a) (5).  
35 Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 253, § 721 (f) [50 USC App § 2170(f)] (26 July 2007). See also Section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 7-8 <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/Section-721-Amend.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
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the foreign country’s record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, (C) 
the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military 
applications;  
(11) long-term projection of the United States requirements for sources of 
energy and other critical resources and materials; and  
(12) such other factors as the President or the Committee determine to be 
appropriate.36 
 
According to the list, if a transaction is controlled by a foreign government, it is 
strongly presumed to threaten or impair US national security. In reviewing foreign 
government-controlled transactions, CFIUS considers all relevant facts and 
circumstances, among others: 
 
- the extent to which the basic investment management policies of the 
investor require investment decisions to be based solely on commercial 
grounds;  
- the degree to which, in practice, the investor’s management and investment 
decisions are exercised independently from the controlling government, 
including whether governance structures are in place to ensure independence;  
- the degree of transparency and disclosure of the purpose, investment 
objectives, institutional arrangements, and financial information of the 
investor; and  
- the degree to which the investor complies with applicable regulatory and 
disclosure requirements of the countries in which they invest.37 
 
Although the government stated that ‘the fact that a transaction is foreign 
government-controlled does not, in itself, mean that it poses a national security 
risk’,38 CFIUS may in practice conduct closer scrutiny of foreign government-
controlled transactions considering the above additional facts and circumstances.  
 
Moreover, the concept of ‘national security’ was defined to include various issues 
relating to ‘homeland security’, including its application to critical infrastructure.39 
                                                             
36 ibid. See also Jackson (n 6) 18. 
37 Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (8 December 
2008). 
38 ibid. 
39 The Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. 111-67, § 721 [50 USC App § 2170] (30 September 2009), (a) (5). 
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Furthermore, ‘critical infrastructure’ is defined broadly as ‘any systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the degradation or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national 
security, including, but not limited to, national economic security and national public 
health or safety’.40  As stipulated in section 721 and other regulations, CFIUS 
determines whether or not a transaction involves critical infrastructure on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the importance of the particular assets involved in the 
transaction.41 Some sectors are likely candidates for consideration as components of 
the national critical infrastructure,42 including telecommunications, energy, financial 
services, water, transportation sectors,43 and the ‘cyber and physical infrastructure 
services critical to maintaining the national defence, continuity of government, 
economic prosperity, and quality of life in the United States’. 44  In 2013, the 
Department of Homeland Security identified 16 sectors as critical to the US 
infrastructure through a Presidential Policy Directive to strengthen the security and 
resilience its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.45  
 
Jackson argues that the additional factors for national security consideration added 
through the FINSA, inter alia, the effects on critical infrastructure or critical 
technologies, actually ‘incorporate economic considerations into the CFIUS review 
process’ in a way that was specifically rejected by the previously legislations, and 
refocus CFIUS’s reviews and investigations on considering ‘the broader rubric of 
economic security’.46 In this context, CFIUS review of foreign SOE transactions will 
be very uncertain and unpredictable, considering that foreign SOE transactions have 
                                                             
40 ibid (2). 
41 Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567 (8 December 
2008). 
42 Jackson (n 6) 16. 
43 42 USC §5195c (b) (2). 
44 42 USC §5195c (b) (3). 
45 Sectors include: (1) chemical; (2) commercial facilities; (3) communications; (4) critical manufacturing; (5) 
dams; (6) defense industrial base; (7) emergency services; (8) energy; (9) financial services; (10) food and 
agriculture; (11) government facilities; (12) healthcare and public health; (13) information technology; (14) 
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; (15) transportation systems; (16) water and wastewater systems. See 
‘Presidential Policy Directive - Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience’ The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary (12 February 2013) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil> accessed 12 September 
2017. 
46 Jackson (n 6) 19. 
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raised both economic and national security concerns. For example, some arguably 
consider that activities of foreign SOEs are not motivated primarily by competitive 
commercial gains, but at acquiring information concerning the national security 
interests of a foreign government. Thus, CFIUS may face challenges in determining 
the potential threat that any single SOE transaction might hold for the US economy 
or US national security.47 Also, the DP World transaction sparked a wide-ranging 
discussion over the economic impact of foreign investments which suggested a 
problematic issue of the national economic security implications of foreign SOE 
investments.48 Although there is little economic evidence to date to conclude that a 
foreign SOE investment has a measurable impact on the US economy,49 it is still 
unclear and disputable whether the potential economic distortions by foreign SOE 
investments will pose a threat to national security or homeland security. 
 
Notably, CFIUS determinations on national security implications of foreign SOE 
transactions might be politicised by the scrutiny of the President and the Congress. 
For example, even if the Committee decides there is no national security risk, the 
President has almost unlimited authority to take ‘such action for such time as the 
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that 
threatens to impair the national security of the United States’.50 As noted by the 
Department of the Treasury, national security is to be ‘interpreted broadly and 
without limitation to particular industries’. Ultimately, whether or not a transaction 
threatens national security ‘rests within the President’s discretion’.51 In this regard, 
the unlimited discretion of the President increases the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of CFIUS reviews for foreign SOEs considering that the President is 
free at will to delay or block a foreign SOE transaction.  
 
In Ralls v. CFIUS, a Chinese company, Ralls, filed a case with the US District Court 
challenging President Obama’s decision to block its transaction on national security 
grounds, including an alleged deprivation of Rall’s property interests in violation of 
                                                             
47 ibid 37. 
48 ibid 2; Jackson (n 27) 32. 
49 Jackson (n 6) 39. 
50 ibid 28. 
51 31 CFR Ch VIII (7–1–07 Edition), Pt. 800, App. A, 1088. 
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the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US Consitution.52 The District 
Court dismissed Ralls’ due process claim on the ground that Ralls had no property 
interest protected by the US Consitution.53 Ralls appealed the decision in the Appeals 
Court of the District of Columbia in 2014. Although under Section 721 the 
President’s decisions ‘shall not be subject to judicial review’, the Appeals Court 
firstly addressed that ‘a statutory bar to judicial review precludes review of 
constitutional claims only if there is ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that Congress 
so intended’.54 According to the Appeals Court, the statutory bar was to preclude the 
review of a President’s decision on suspending or prohibiting a transaction, rather 
than a review of a constitutional claim ‘challenging the process preceding such 
Presidential action’.55 Secondly, the Appeals Court found that Ralls did not waive its 
protected property interests, although it failed to submit a voluntary notice ‘before 
the transaction [was] completed’. 56  Thirdly, the Court held that, ‘due process 
requires… that an affected party is informed of the official action, be given access to 
the unclassified evidence on which the official actor relied and be afforded an 
opportunity to rebut that evidence’, but Rall was not given any of these procedural 
protections at any point.57 Accordingly, the Court concluded that ‘the Presidential 
Order deprived Ralls of constitutionally protected property interests without due 
process of law’.58  The case has attracted a strong international reaction as a 
‘landmark judgement’ to lead to ‘big changes’ in how the US conducts national 
security reviews of foreign investments.59 However, as noted by scholars, providing 
acquirers with an opportunity to review and rebut evidence does not suggest in any 
way that there will be corresponding changes in the outcomes of CFIUS reviews.60 
                                                             
52 Ralls v. CFIUS, 758 F3d 296, 325 (DC Cir 2014). See also Jackson (n 6) 27-9. 
53 ibid 307. 
54 ibid 308. 
55 ibid 311. 
56 ibid 316-7. 
57 ibid 320. 
58 ibid 325. 
59 See e.g., Frank Ching, ‘US court overrules investment ban’ The China Post (6 August 2014) 
<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/china-post/frank-ching/2014/08/06/414119/us-court.htm> accessed 
12 September 2017; William Mauldin and Brent Kendall, ‘Appeals Court Faults Government Order Prohibiting 
Ralls Corp. Wind Farm Deal’ The Wall Street Journal (15 July 2014) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-
court-faults-government-order-prohibiting-ralls-corp-wind-farm-deal-1405439077> accessed 12 September 2017. 
60 Mark Feldman, ‘China’s Outbound Foreign Direct Investment: The US Experience’ (2017) 13 International 
Journal of Public Policy 304, 316. 
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Moreover, the FINSA established a congressional oversight system where CFIUS is 
required to brief certain congressional leaders upon request and to report annually to 
Congress on any reviews or investigations.61 Feldman argues that US Congress in 
fact have played a central role in a few transactions by Chinese acquirers and 
members of the Congress can - and indeed have - considered factors beyond the 
scope of national security when evaluating proposed foreign transactions.62 As a 
result, political controversy may develop between the Congress and CFIUS. The DP 
World transaction revealed a different viewpoint of some members of Congress 
regarding the role of foreign investment in the economy and the impact on national 
security, which resulted in the amendment of the CFIUS process.63 In this regard, it 
is possible for CFIUS to strengthen the scrutiny of foreign SOE transactions further, 
especially considering that the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, a congressional panel, recently urged to ban all Chinese SOE 
transactions.64 
 
3.2.2 Canada: Security Review in addition to ‘Net Benefit’ Test 
 
Foreign investments in Canada are subject to the Investment Canada Act (ICA) 
which requires a review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians (‘net 
benefit’ review). It also includes investments in Canada by non-Canadians that could 
be injurious to national security (national security review).65 A net benefit review 
occurs when acquisitions of control of a Canadian business exceed certain prescribed 
financial thresholds. An acquisition by a non-Canadian of one-third or more of the 
voting rights of a Canadian business is presumed to be an acquisition of control 
unless there is proof that the acquired shares do not give the investor ‘control-in-
fact’.66 The review threshold for private investors in 2015 was C$600 million in 
enterprise value of assets while that for SOE investors was C$375 million in book 
                                                             
61 Jackson (n 6) 20. 
62 Feldman (n 60) 310. 
63 Jackson (n 6) 8. 
64 See also US - China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘2016 Annual Report To Congress’ (2016) 
<https://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2016-annual-report-congress> accessed 12 September 2017.For more 
discussion see Sec. 3.2.6. 
65 Investment Canada Act, RSC, 1985, c 28 (1st Supp.), s 2; 2009, c 2, s 445. The national security review was 
added in 2009 amendments. 
66 RSC, 1985, c 28 (1st Supp.), s 28; 1993, c 35, s 5; 1995, c 1, s 50; 2009, c 2, s 455; 2013, c 33, s 144. 
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value of assets.67 Acquisitions that do not exceed relevant thresholds or investments 
to establish new Canadian businesses (other than cultural businesses) are merely 
subject to notification.68 The reviewable investments will be assessed by relevant 
factors till the Minister is satisfied that the investment is likely to be of ‘net benefit’ 
to Canada.69 
 
During the past decade, the Canadian government has strengthened regulations for 
acquisitions by foreign SOEs through ICA amendments. First, the definition of SOE 
has been expanded to cover a broad range of government-related entities, including 
foreign governments acting as investors in their own right as well as individuals 
acting on behalf of a government. 70  Second, the review threshold for SOE 
investments is much lower than that for private sectors.71 Moreover, the Minister 
may determine that a Canadian business is controlled in fact by the acquisition of a 
foreign SOE even where the one-third or more threshold is not met.72 Third, when 
assessing whether acquisitions by foreign SOEs are of net benefit to Canada, the 
                                                             
67 Notably, the review thresholds here are for direct acquisitions except of cultural businesses, and the threshold 
of $C600 million is only for WTO investors. For non-WTO investor, the threshold is C$5 million of a direct 
acquisition and C$50 million of an indirect acquisition. 
68 RSC, 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), s 12; 1995, c 1, s 50. 
69 The factors for ‘net benefit’ consideration include: 
(a) the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including, 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on 
the utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada;  
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian business or new 
Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the Canadian business or new 
Canadian business forms or would form a part;  
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, 
product innovation and product variety in Canada; 
(d) the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries in Canada;  
(e) the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and cultural policies, taking 
into consideration industrial, economic and cultural policy objectives enunciated by the government or 
legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the investment; and  
(f) the contribution of the investment to Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.  
RSC, 1985, c 28 (1st Supp.), s 21; 1995, c 1, s 50; 2009, c 2, s 452; 2013, c 33, s 138; 2014, c 39, s 188. 
70 2009, c 2, s 446. Previously, the SOE Guideline provides that ‘an SOE is an enterprise that is owned, 
controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly by a foreign government’, see <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-
lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2> accessed 5 March 2017. 
71 To be specific, the review threshold for private sector investments is $1 billion while that for SOE investments 
is $379 million, see <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/h_lk00050.html> accessed 28 August 2017. 
72 2009, c 2, s 455(4). 
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Minister shall focus on the ‘governance’ and ‘commercial orientation’ of the SOEs.73 
To be specific, the Minister will examine:  
 
(1) the corporate governance and reporting structure of the foreign SOE, 
including whether the SOE adheres to Canadian standards of corporate 
governance (including, for example, commitments to transparency and 
disclosure, independent members of the board of directors, independent audit 
committees and equitable treatment of shareholders), and to Canadian laws 
and practices, including adherence to free market principles;  
(2) the effect of the SOE investment on the level and nature of economic 
activity in Canada, including the effect on employment, production and 
capital levels in Canada; how and the extent to which the foreign SOE is 
owned, controlled by a state or its conduct and operations are influenced by a 
state;  
(3) whether the Canadian business to be acquired by foreign SOE will likely 
operate on a commercial basis, including where to export; where to process; 
the participation of Canadians in its operations in Canada and elsewhere; the 
impact of the investment on productivity and industrial efficiency in Canada; 
support of on-going innovation, research and development in Canada; and the 
appropriate level of capital expenditures to maintain the Canadian business in 
a globally competitive position.74  
 
According to the legislation, the burden of proof of net benefit is on foreign SOEs 
who are expected to address in their plans and undertakings the inherent 
characteristics of SOEs (specifically that they are susceptible to state influence) and 
to demonstrate their strong commitment to transparent and commercial operations.75 
Furthermore, foreign SOEs are encouraged to submit specific undertakings relating 
to certain aspects of the business, including the appointment of Canadians as 
independent directors on the board of directors; the employment of Canadians in 
senior management positions; the incorporation of the business in Canada; and the 
listing of shares of the acquiring company or the Canadian business being acquired 
                                                             
73 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ‘Guidelines - Investment by state-owned enterprises 
- Net benefit assessment’ (Modified on 19 Dec 2016) <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-
lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2> accessed 6 March 2017. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
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on a Canadian stock exchange.76 Recent transactions show that foreign SOEs have 
made commitments mirroring the examples in the SOE Guidelines.77 In 2012, the 
government clarified that free enterprise principles and industrial efficiency are 
considered in reviews of foreign SOE acquisitions, and it will find the acquisition of 
control of a Canadian oil sands business by a foreign SOE to be of net benefit to 
Canada on ‘an exceptional basis’ only.78 
 
In 2009, the amended ICA introduced a separate process of national security review 
that allows the Minister and the Governor in Council to review the foreign 
investment if there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe that investment by a non-
Canadian could be injurious to national security’.79 However, the term ‘national 
security’ was not defined, and little practical guidance was provided to foreign 
investors until the government issued Guidelines on the National Security Review of 
Investments in December 2016.80 In particular, the Guidelines provided a non-
exhaustive list of factors for national security consideration by the Minister or 
Governor in Council, including but not limited to: 
 
1) The potential effects of the investment on Canada's defence capabilities and 
interests; 
2) The potential effects of the investment on the transfer of sensitive technology 
or know-how outside of Canada; 
3) Involvement in the research, manufacture or sale of goods/technology 
identified in Section 35 of the Defence Production Act; 
4) The potential impact of the investment on the security of Canada's critical 
infrastructure. Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, facilities, 
technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, 
                                                             
76 ibid. 
77 For example, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen in 2012, Du, ‘The Regulation of Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises in National Foreign Investment Laws: A Comparative Analysis’ 129. 
78 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ‘Statement Regarding Investment by Foreign State-
Owned Enterprises’ (Modified on 7 Dec 2012) <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81147.html> 
accessed 6 March 2017. 
79 2009, c 2, s 453; 2013, c 33, s 140. 
80 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ‘Guidelines on the National Security Review of 
Investments’ (Modified on 19 Dec 2016) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81190.html> accessed 6 
March 2017. 
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security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning 
of government;81 
5) The potential impact of the investment on the supply of critical goods and 
services to Canadians, or the supply of goods and services to the Government 
of Canada; 
6) The potential of the investment to enable foreign surveillance or espionage; 
7) The potential of the investment to hinder current or future intelligence or law 
enforcement operations; 
8) The potential impact of the investment on Canada's international interests, 
including foreign relationships; and, 
9) The potential of the investment to involve or facilitate the activities of illicit 
actors, such as terrorists, terrorist organisations or organised crime.82 
 
Also, the Governor in Council has the authority to take any measures against foreign 
investment for national security reasons, including permitting the investment to 
proceed with or without conditions or prohibiting the investment or, if already made, 
requiring the divestiture of the investment. 83  Since 2009, some proposed and 
implemented investments have raised national security issues, but very few were 
blocked by the federal government on national security concerns.84 In 2015, it was 
reported that the Canadian government blocked a Chinese SOE to build fire-alarm 
systems in Quebec under a national security review because the factory was too 
close to the headquarters of the Canadian Space Agency.85 However, some argue that 
the Canadian government does not presume that an SOE investment, even in the 
natural resources sectors, will necessarily create national security issues.86 
                                                             
81 For more information on Canada's critical infrastructure, see Public Safety Canada, ‘National Strategy for 
Critical Infrastructure and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure’ (2009) 
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx>  accessed 6 March 2017. 
82 Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ‘Guidelines on the National Security Review of 
Investments’ (Modified on 19 Dec 2016) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81190.html> accessed 6 
March 2017. 
83 ibid. See also Douglas C. New and Grant LoPatriello, ‘Investment Canada Issues National Security Review 
Guidelines’ Lexology (21 December 2016) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8c736ba5-e93f-
46dc-9d32-765f1e10d9cc> accessed 6 March 2017.  
84 George N Addy and others, ‘Investment Canada Act: Guide for Foreign Investors in Canada’ (2016) Davies 35 
<https://www.dwpv.com/en/Insights/Publications/2016/Investment-Canada-Act-Guide-for-Foreign-Investors-in-
Canada-2016-Edition?mode=pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
85 Jeff Gray, ‘Ottawa’s national security review a warning to foreign investors’ The Global and Mail (July 1, 2015) 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/ottawas-national-security-
review-a-warning-to-foreign-investors/article25219593/> accessed 6 March 2017. 
86 Du (n 77) 130. 
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Nonetheless, national security review in Canada is more vague and unpredictable in 
comparison with CFIUS review. To some extent, foreign SOEs are likely to trigger 
national security concerns, and the review decision might be subjectively affected by 
political preferences. In 2015, for example, the federal government ordered O-Net, a 
Chinese developer of optical networking components, to divest of the Canadian firm 
due to national security concerns.87 O-Net filed an application for judicial review, 
and in 2016 the Federal Court ordered to set aside the Cabinet order and conduct a 
‘fresh’ review of the investment.88 The government did not publicly state why it 
agreed to re-review the transaction, but some noted that the decision was made just 
after the Prime Minister visited China.89 
 
3.2.3 Australia: ‘National Interest’ Test 
 
In Australia, the regulatory framework of foreign investments mainly includes the 
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Regulation 2015 and Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy. Under the current 
regime, the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIBR) reviews foreign investment 
proposals on a case-by-case basis and advises the Treasurer on national interest 
implications.90 According to the Policy, all foreign government investors must get 
approval before acquiring a direct interest in Australia (generally at least 10 per cent, 
or the ability to influence, participate in or control), starting a new business or 
acquiring an interest in Australian land, regardless of the value of the investment.91 
                                                             
87 The reason for government’s concern about national security was not disclosed, but some experts speculated 
that sales by ITF Technologies Inc., to the Canadian Military might have been a factor, see Carolynne 
Burkholder-James, ‘O-Net a Bellwether Case for Foreign Investment Review’ The Canadian Bar Association (22 
Feb 2016) <https://www.cba.org/Publications-Resources/CBA-Practice-Link/Business-and-
Corporate/2016/foreigninvestment> accessed March 6, 2017. 
88 Sandy Walker (Denton), ‘Back to the drawing board: Canadian Government divestiture order in national 
security case set aside and new review to take place’ Lexology (16 November 2016) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29a2885d-c4e1-4950-a57a-758ca35a2710> accessed 6 March 
2017. 
89 Steven Chase, ‘Montreal firm targeted in Chinese takeover did research with Canadian government’ The Globe 
and Mail (13 Jan 2017) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/montreal-firm-targeted-in-chinese-
takeover-did-research-with-canadian-government/article33613518/> accessed 6 March, 2017. 
90 Treasurer, ‘Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy’ (last updated 1 July 2017), 1, 
<https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/82/2017/06/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy.pdf accessed> 28 
August 2017. 
91 ibid 5. 
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Moreover, a ‘foreign government investor’ is defined widely as a foreign 
government or separate government entity, a corporation or trustee of a trust, or a 
general partner of a limited partnership in which: (1) a foreign government or 
separate government entity holds a substantial interest of at least 20%; or (2) foreign 
governments or separate government entities of more than one foreign country (or 
parts of more than one foreign country) hold an aggregate substantial interest of at 
least 40%.92 Accordingly, all major foreign investment involving Chinese SOEs are 
subject to a national interest review by the FIBR. 
 
As indicated, Australia’s foreign investment review framework attempts to balance 
the need to welcome foreign investment and the need to protect the national interest. 
However, the legislation does not define what the national interest is. Instead, it is 
the Treasurer who has the power to decide in each case whether a particular 
investment would be contrary to the national interest.93 When assessing the national 
interest, the Government will consider a range of factors, typically including (1) 
national security; (2) competition; (3) other Australian Government policies 
including tax; (4) impact on the economy and the community; (5) character of the 
investor.94  
 
When the proposed investment involves a foreign government investor, the 
Government additionally considers whether the investment is commercial in nature 
or pursuing broader political or strategic objectives in the national interest test. This 
includes whether or not the prospective investor’s governance arrangements could 
facilitate actual or potential control by a foreign government including through the 
investor’s funding arrangements.95 Proposed SOE investment operating on a fully 
arm’s length and commercial basis is less likely to raise national interest concerns.96 
The Government does not have a policy of prohibiting SOE investments that are not 
operating on a fully arm’s length and commercial basis, but it looks at the overall 
proposal carefully to determine whether such investments are contrary to the national 
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interest.97 Mitigating factors that assist in the national interest determination include 
the existence of external partners or shareholders in the investment; the level of non-
associated ownership interests; the governance arrangements for the investment; 
ongoing arrangements to protect Australian interests from non-commercial dealings; 
and whether or not the target will be, or remain, listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange or another recognised exchange.98 Also, the Government will consider the 
size, importance and potential impact of the foreign government investment in 
considering whether or not the proposal is contrary to the national interest.99 
 
3.2.4 EU: Member States’ Control and EU Regulations 
 
While the freedom of establishment is a fundamental principle in the EU internal 
market, member states are allowed to scrutinise foreign investments and restrict the 
access of foreign investors from third countries under the EC Treaty.100 Moreover, 
even in the intra-EU, member states can restrict the establishment of foreign 
investments on the grounds of public security, public policy and public health.101 
Article 346 of the EC Treaty further provides that member states may ‘take measures 
it considered necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security 
which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
materials’.102 Also, the EU Merger Regulation provides that member states may take 
‘appropriate measures’ to protect ‘legitimate interests’ other than competition, 
including ‘public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules’. 103 
Traditionally, the EU does not establish a comprehensive review mechanism on 
national security grounds like the CFIUS but leave member states to scrutinise 
                                                             
97 ibid. 
98 ibid 10-11. 
99 ibid 11. 
100 Article 49 of TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) provides that ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals 
of a Member State in the territory of another Member States shall be abolished… Freedom of establishment shall 
include the right to set up and manage undertakings, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals’, 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47. 
101 Article 52 of TFEU (ex Article 46 TEC) provides that, ‘1. The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken 
in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health’, ibid. 
102 Article 346 of TFEU (ex Article 296 TEC), ibid. 
103 Article 21 of the EU Merger Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1. 
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foreign investments and restrict the access of foreign investors for public security or 
other legitimate interests, regardless of public or private ownership. 
 
Germany, for example, introduced a national security screening mechanism in 2004 
that required investors from countries other than Member states of the EU and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) notify the government of the acquisition 
of any business engaged in manufacturing or developing war weapons or armaments, 
or producing cryptographic equipment, in cases where the foreign investor directly 
or indirectly owns 25% or more equity.104 In 2009, Germany amended its Foreign 
Investment Act to apply to a transaction by foreign investors of at least 25% voting 
rights of a German company, regardless of the size and sector, where the Ministry is 
required to review whether or not the investment threatens public order or public 
safety.105 Although the new legislation does not explicitly discriminate between 
private and public foreign investors, it has been assumed to target foreign sovereign 
investments given that it was created against non-German SWF investments.106 The 
new amendment did not define national security and public order, but it addressed 
that it would merely apply to ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to one of the 
fundamental interest of society’.107 A US Statement considers that the amendment 
has raised some uncertainties over which transactions should trigger the notification 
requirement.108 While some argue that the amended legislation might violate basic 
freedoms of capital movement and establishment, the Economic Minister Michael 
Glos insisted that the review process would be applicable in ‘extremely rare’ cases 
and would not affect ‘the majority of foreign investments’.109 In 2013, the Capital 
Investment Code replaced the German Foreign Investment Act, which brought no 
substantive changes to the notification requirement.110 
                                                             
104 US Department of State, ‘2016 Investment Climate Statements- Germany’ (2016) 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2016/eur/254367.htm> accessed 12 September 2017. 
105 Thomas Jost, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and the German Policy Reaction’ in Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and 
Wouter PF Schmit Jongbloed (eds), Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (OUP 2012) 458, cited 
sec. 7, para. 2 nr. 6 AWG. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid 459. 
108 US Department of State, ‘2016 Investment Climate Statements- Germany’ (n 104). 
109 Julien Chaisse, ‘The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the European Union: Can the Supranational 
Level Limit the Rise of National Protectionism?’ in Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and Wouter PF Schmit 
Jongbloed (eds), Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (OUP 2012) 493. 
110 US Department of State, ‘2016 Investment Climate Statements- Germany’ (n 104). 
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In 2005, France issued the Decree 2005-1739, which created an authorisation 
procedure for foreign investments in certain sectors of activity that could affect 
public policy, public security or national defence.111 Although there is no generalised 
screening of foreign investment, the French law stipulates that acquisitions in 
sensitive sectors are subject to prior notification, screening and approval by the 
Finance Minister.112 Between 2005 and 2015, 17 areas were recognised as sensitive 
sectors.113 In such cases any foreign investors that acquire control of more than 33% 
ownership of a firm, or involve any part of such a company that has established 
headquarters in France must be subject to review.114 Also, the review decision is 
contestable before the administrative law courts.115  
 
In the UK, there is no formalised investment review body for foreign investments on 
national security interests, but an ad hoc investment review process does exist and is 
led by the relevant government ministry with regulatory responsibility for the sectors 
in question.116 Moreover, under the Industry Act 1975, the UK Government is 
entitled to prohibit or restrict a foreign acquisition concerning ‘important 
manufacturing undertakings’ or on national interest considerations.117 Also, under the 
                                                             
111 European Commission (EC), ‘Free Movement of Capital: Commission Scrutinises French Law Establishing 
Authorisation Procedure for Foreign Investments in Certain Sectors’ IP/06/438 (Brussels, 4 April 2006) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-438_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 12 September 2017. 
112 US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statements for 2016- France and Monaco’ (2016) 
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2016investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254363#
wrapper> accessed 12 September 2017. 
113 There are eleven strategic sectors, including: gambling; private security services; research, development and 
production of certain pathogens or toxic substances; wiretapping and communications interception equipment; 
testing and certification of security for IT products and systems; goods and services related to the information  
security systems of companies managing critical infrastructure; dual-use (civil and military) items and 
technologies; encryption services; the activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets; research, 
production or trade of weapons, ammunition, and explosive substances intended for military purposes; and any 
business supplying the Defense Ministry with any of the above goods or services. In May 2014, six new areas 
were added to the sensitive sectors list, including energy infrastructure; transportation networks; public water 
supplies; electronic communication networks; public health protection; and installations/works vital to national 
security. For the legal text see <http://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/4183_Textes-de-reference> accessed 8 July 
2017, ibid. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid. 
116 US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statements for 2016- United Kingdom’ (2016) 
<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=254431> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
117 The ‘important manufacturing undertaking’ means an undertaking which is wholly or mainly engaged in 
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Enterprise Act 2002, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) is obliged to make references 
to the Competitive Commission (CC) about mergers that might result in a substantial 
lessening of competition within the UK.118  But, the Secretary of State of the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills may intervene with OFT and review 
transactions in certain public interest cases.119 The interests of national security, 
including public security in accordance with Article 21 (4) of the EC Merger 
Regulation, and transactions in the media are specified considerations.120 In the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the CC and the OFT merged into the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMS) that is now the responsible regulatory 
body for competition in the UK.121 
 
Notably, in September 2017, the European Commission proposed to establish a 
framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the EU.122 Whereas the 
Commission confirmed ‘openness to foreign investment remains a key principle for 
the EU and a major source of growth’, at the same time it recognised that ‘there have 
been some concerns about foreign investors, notably state-owned enterprises, taking 
over European companies with key technologies for strategic reasons’, and that EU 
investors often do not enjoy the same rights to invest in the country from which the 
investment originates. The proposed regulation provides legal certainty to ensure EU 
wide coordination and cooperation by establishing a framework for the screening of 
FDI in the Union on grounds of security or public order, without prejudiced to the 
sole responsibility of the member states for maintenance of national security.123 In 
screening a foreign investment on the ground of security or public order, member 
states and the Commission may consider the potential effects on critical 
infrastructure, critical technologies, the security of supply of critical inputs, or access 
                                                                                                                                                                            
manufacturing industry and appears to the Secretary of State to be of special importance to the UK or to any 
substantial part of the UK, Industry Act 1975, c 68, s 12, s 13. 
118 Enterprise Act 2002 c. 40, s 22. 
119 Enterprise Act 2002 c. 40, s 42. 
120 Enterprise Act 2002 c. 40, s 58.  
121 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c 24. 
122 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union’ COM(2017) 487 final, 13 
September 2017. 
123  ibid, 20. Article 3 provides: 1. Member States may maintain, amend or adopt mechanisms to screen foreign 
direct investments on the grounds of security or public order, under the conditions and in accordance with the 
terms set out in this Regulation. 2. The Commission may screen foreign direct investments that are likely to 
affect projects or programmes of Union interest on the grounds of security or public order. 
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to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information. More 
importantly, the regulation expressly provides that member states and the 
Commission may take into account ‘whether the foreign investor is controlled by the 
government of a third country, including through significant funding’ in determining 
whether a FDI is likely to affect security or public order.124  
 
Accordingly, both member states and the Commission may scrutinise foreign 
investments and restrict the access of foreign investors for national security or public 
security, regardless of public or private ownership. Meanwhile, some European 
countries also maintain a so-called ‘gold share’ policy to restrict foreign 
participations in privatised companies and strategically sensitive sectors.125 In France, 
for example, the 1993 privatisation law allows the government to maintain a golden 
share, including prior authorisation for acquisitions of more than a certain percentage 
of a firm’s capital when privatising national companies in order ‘to protect national 
interests’. 126  Likewise, after the approval of Hinkley new project, the UK 
government requires a special share in all future nuclear new-build projects. Further, 
the government will reform the approach to the ownership and control of critical 
infrastructure to ensure that the full implication of foreign ownership is scrutinised 
for the purpose of national security.127  
 
However, any regulations by member states are subject to EU law, and national 
restrictions on market access might be challenged as a violation of the EU 
fundamental freedom of establishment. For example, the European Commission 
scrutinised the French Decree 2005-1739, i.e., authorisation procedure for foreign 
investments in certain sectors of activities. Such scrutiny could act as a disincentive 
to investment from other member states and create a restriction on EU companies, 
                                                             
124 ibid, Article 4. 
125 Muchlinski PT, Multinational Enterprises and The Law (OUP 2007) 189-91. See also Ch 1. 
126 A ‘golden share’ gives the government the right to: require prior authorization from the Ministries of Finance 
and Economy for any investors acting in concert to own more than a certain percentage of a firm’s capital; name 
up to two non-voting members to the firm's board of directors; and block the sale of any asset to protect ‘national 
interests’, see US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statements for 2016- France and Monaco’ (n 112). 
127 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Government confirms Hinkley Point C project 
following new agreement in principle with EDF’ (15 September 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-confirms-hinkley-point-c-project-following-new-agreement-
in-principle-with-edf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
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directly or indirectly owned by third country investors, in contradiction with EU 
Treaty rules on the free movement of capital and the right of establishment.128 In case 
law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also ruled that golden share measures 
represent a restriction on the free movement of capital and freedom of 
establishment.129 Nonetheless, the practice is not always consistent. For example, the 
European Commission accepted a 2006 French law that allows the government on 
energy security grounds to keep a golden share in GDF following its merger with 
Suez.130 In some cases, the ECJ has strictly interpreted the derogation of the freedom 
of establishment on public security or public interest grounds. This includes a 
requirement of the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting 
fundamental freedom, and the restrictions should not extend beyond the principle of 
‘proportionality’.131 In Commission v. Greece, for instance, the Court found that the 
prior authorisation scheme for the acquisition of voting rights in certain strategic 
public limited companies was contrary to EU fundamental freedoms; it considered 
that the national scheme was applicable without any (not even a potential) risk being 
created and could not guarantee that all real and serious threats to a legitimate public 
interest might be identified in advance.132 But, in Commission v. Portugal, the Court 
agreed with Portugal that the threat to the fundamental interest of society ‘does not 
have to be immediate’.133 Nevertheless, it is a fact that the principles and exceptions 
                                                             
128 European Commission, ‘Free Movement of Capital: Commission scrutinises French law establishing 
authorisation procedure for foreign investments in certain sectors’ (n 111). 
129 Commission (EC), ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Special Rights in Privatised Companies in the 
Enlarged Union – a Decade Full of Developments’ (Brussels, 22 July 2005) 11 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/docs/privcompanies_en.pdf> accessed 4 March 2016. For more information 
of cases concerning ‘golden shares’, see <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/framework/court/index_en.htm> 
accessed 3 March 2016. 
130 See Gaz de France/Suez (Case COMP/M.4180) Commission Decision C [2006] 5419 final. The French 
government has likewise reserved the right to retain a golden share in any restructuring of Areva, the French 
nuclear and renewable energy company, see  US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statements for 2016- 
France and Monaco’ (n 112). 
131 See e.g., Case C 268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, para 59; Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v Dimotiki Etairia 
Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, para 24; Case C-114/97 Commission of the European 
Communities v Kingdom of Spain ECLI:EU:C:1998:519, paras 44- 6. 
132 Case C-244/11 European Commission v Hellenic Republic ECLI:EU:C:2012:694, paras 70-1. See also Case C
‑274/06 European Commission v Kingdom of Spain ECLI:EU:C:2008:86, para 50 and Case C‑207/07 European 
Commission v Kingdom of Spain ECLI:EU:C:2008:428, para 53. 
133 In Case C-543/08 European Commission v Portuguese Republic ECLI:EU:C:2010:669, the Portuguese 
Republic argued: 
86. …Given that each Member State is obliged to guarantee the security of a regular and 
uninterrupted supply of electricity and natural gas, the Portuguese Republic can legitimately equip 
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to the freedom of establishment are merely applicable to the EU internal market. In 
other words, member states retain considerable policy discretion to review foreign 
investments and restrict the access of foreign investors from third countries for 
national security or public interests, regardless of public or private ownership. Until 
now, no case involving foreign SOEs has been blocked on grounds of national 
security.  
 
Nevertheless, with the increase of FDI by SOEs in recent years, the European 
Commission has strengthened the monitoring of Chinese SOEs’ M&As in Europe on 
grounds of competition policy.134 Under the EU Merger Regulation, the European 
Commission has the jurisdiction to review foreign transactions qualified as 
‘concentrations’ (i.e., widely covered mergers, acquisitions of control and the 
creation of full-function joint ventures) with an EU dimension (i.e., meeting certain 
turnover thresholds).135 A foreign transaction falling under the Merger Regulation 
should be formally notified to the Commission and cannot be implemented unless 
and until the Commission declares it compatible with the internal market.136 For SOE 
transactions, a problematic issue is whether or not the turnover of other SOEs should 
be taken into account when calculating the turnover of an SOE transaction. 
According to the EUMR and Recital 22, the Commission shall take into account 
SOEs ‘making up an economic unit with independent power of decision’.137 In 
practice, the Commission adopts a two-step approach: first, whether the SOEs have 
independent decision-making power, including in deciding strategy, business plans 
and budget; second, the possibility for the state to coordinate commercial conduct by 
imposing or facilitating coordination, such as the degree of interlocking directorships 
                                                                                                                                                                            
itself with the means required to guarantee the fundamental interest of security of supply even if 
there is no imminent threat. In that regard, since the risk of serious threats to the security of energy 
supply cannot be excluded and since such threats are by definition sudden and, in the majority of 
cases, unforeseeable, it is the duty of the Member State concerned to ensure that adequate 
mechanisms are put in place to enable it to react rapidly and effectively to guarantee that the 
security of that supply is not interrupted. [emphasis added] 
134 Du (n 77) 132. 
135 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 1 and Article 3. 
136 The EC Merger Regulation, Article 4 and Article 7. 
137 The EC Merger Regulation Article 5 (4); Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C95/1, paras 192 
& 194. See also EDF / CGN / NNB GROUP OF COMPANIES (Case M.7850) Commission Decision C [2016] 
1596 final, para 30. 
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or the existence of safeguards to prevent the sharing of commercially sensitive 
information between SOEs.138  
 
Between 2011 and 2015, the European Commission applied the EUMR to takeovers 
and joint venture transactions involving Chinese SOEs. 139  Most recently, the 
European Commission published its decision clearing the joint acquisition of NNB 
companies by EDF and a Chinese State-owned energy company CGN.140 In the 
decision, the European Commission considered that the Central State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) has an influence on the 
CGN’s major decision making, and that the CGN does not enjoy autonomy from the 
state in deciding major matters like strategy, business plan, senior manager 
appointment or budget.141 Moreover, the Commission concluded that within the 
energy sector and in particular the nuclear industry, the Chinese State via Central 
SASAC could require or facilitate coordination between Chinese SOEs.142 As a result, 
the European Commission concluded that the CGN and other Chinese SOEs in the 
energy industry should not be deemed to have an independent power of decision 
from Central SASAC, and that the turnover of all these companies should be 
aggregated.143  
 
It seems to have become a general practice that the European Commission presumes 
that all Chinese SOEs in the same sector are one economic unit, ‘the China Inc.’, and 
then assesses the competition implications, even in a worst scenario approach, i.e., 
taking into account all Chinese SOEs, including central SOEs and regional SOEs, in 
the same sector.144 Although the previous cases do not create a binding precedent for 
                                                             
138 Ibid, paras 31-2. See also EDF/ SEGEBEL (Case COMP/M.5549) Commission Decision C [2009] 9059, paras 
92-3; CNRC/Pirelli (Case COMP/M.7643) Commission Decision C [2015] 4608 final, para 8 et seq; 
DSM/SINOCHEM/JV (Case COMP/M.6113) Commission Decision C [2011] 3641 final, paras 10-3. 
139 Kyriakos Fountoukakos et al, ‘European Commission Seeks Harmonization on Merger Control Reviews of 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (18 July 2013, retrieved 1 October 2015) 
<http://careers.herbertsmith.com/insights/legal-briefings?page=25> accessed 5 March 2017.  
140 EDF/CGN/NNB Group of Companies (Case M.7850) Commission Decision C [2016] 1596 final. 
141 ibid, paras 37-42. 
142 ibid, paras 43-48. 
143 ibid, para 49. 
144 For example, in the CGN/EDF decision, the European Commission left the question whether local SASAC 
shall be considered as forming a single market as the turnovers of Chinese SOEs controlled by Central SASAC 
meet the thresholds of the Merger Regulation, ibid, para 50. See also Du (n 77) 135. 
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future transactions involving SOEs, and considering that the Commission shall 
conduct the merger review on a case-by-case assessment, the European 
Commission’s decisions do suggest that Chinese SOEs may be forced to file for EU 
merger clearance, regardless of their size in Europe.145 
 
Notably, the main concern of an antitrust review is whether or not transactions 
involving foreign SOEs potentially affect fair competition, rather than whether the 
foreign acquirer is owned by a foreign government. Nevertheless, the EU merger 
rule could constitute an extra barrier of market access for Chinese SOEs. For 
example, the notification process may be particularly burdensome for Chinese SOEs, 
since the information required to be submitted might be gargantuan and the 
preparation time for notification and assessment would potentially be longer than 
usual.146 
 
3.2.5 China: FDI Regime Reform and FTZ Review 
 
The establishment of China’s foreign investment legal regime began in the 1980s. It 
is based on three central laws: The China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise 
Law, the China-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law, and the Foreign-
Invested Enterprise Law. Accordingly, foreign investors are required to obtain 
approvals for their investment projects from multiple government agencies, which 
review the foreign investment on a case-by-case basis.147 In respect of market access, 
China sets limits on foreign control via the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment in Industries (the ‘Foreign Investment Catalogue’), most recently revised 
in March 2015, and maintained by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Investment is ‘restricted’ 
                                                             
145 Michelle Price, ‘Chinese state-owned companies face greater scrutiny of EU deals after ruling’ Reuters (12 
Jun 2016) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-eu-m-a-idUSKCN0YZ00U> accessed 27 Feb 2017. For 
more discussion see Bill Batchelor and Tom Jenkins, ‘EU merger decision shines light on state-owned 
enterprises’ International Law Office (18 August 2016) 
<http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Competition-Antitrust/European-Union/Baker-McKenzie-
LLP/EU-merger-decision-shines-light-on-state-owned-enterprises> accessed 27 Feb 2017. 
146 Du (n 77) 136; Adrian Emch, ‘EU merger control complications for Chinese SOE transactions’ Kluwer 
Competition Law Blog (27 May 2017) <http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2016/05/27/eu-merger-control-
complications-for-chinese-soe-transactions/> accessed 10 March 2017. 
147 For further discussion on China’s approval process, see US Chamber of Commerce (n 5). 
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and ‘prohibited’ in sectors that China deems sensitive to national security or that do 
not meet the goal of China’s economic development plan. According to the NDRC, 
the 2015 Catalogue reduced the number of restricted industries from 79 to 38. 
Prohibited industries were reduced from 38 to 36, with manufacturing, infrastructure, 
real estate, energy, e-commerce and information technology, logistics and finance 
among the beneficiaries.148 Notably, in June 2017, the NDRC and the MOFCOM 
released the 2017 version of the Catalogue, which introduced a national negative list 
to guide foreign investment and reduced the restrictive measures from 93 to 63.149 
 
Moreover, foreign investors are required to obtain approvals for their investment 
projects and for the purpose of establishing an enterprise in China. In 2004, the State 
Council issued its Decision on Investment Regime Reform and the Catalogue of 
Investment Projects Subject to Government Ratification (the ‘Ratification 
Catalogue’), All proposed foreign investment projects in China must be submitted 
for ‘review and ratification’ by the NDRC or provincial or local Development and 
Reform Commissions. 150  In the 2013 Ratification Catalogue, however, the 
government narrowed the scope of NDRC ratification under which foreign 
investments unlisted in the catalogue require only ‘filing for record’ with the local 
NDRC.151  Most recently, the government released 2015 Ratification Catalogue, 
replacing the 2014 edition and continuously reducing the number of projects 
requiring ratification from central government and delegated ratification authority to 
local government.152 
 
While China’s FDI regime is criticised for being restrictive and inefficient and for 
favouring national champions,153 it has made some significant developments in 
                                                             
148 For the official text of the 2015 Foreign Investment Catalogue, see 
<http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/wzs/201503/20150317134821983.pdf> accessed 7 March 2017. 
149 For the official text of the 2017 Catalogue, see <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-
06/28/5206424/files/e4489bbd621542a480ff4c45c42fa202.pdf> accessed 28 August 2017. 
150 NDRC, Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System, No.20 [2004] of the State 
Council, 16 July 2004. For the 2004 Catalogue of Investment Projects subject to Government Ratification, see 
<http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/gdzctz/tzfg/200510/t20051010_44895.html> accessed 21 July 2016. 
151 For the official text of 2013 Ratification Catalogue, see 
<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/201404/20140400545285.shtml> accessed 7 March 2016. 
152 For the official text of 2016 Ratification Catalogue, see  
<http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/20/content_5150587.htm> accessed 7 March 2016. 
153 See e.g., US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statement for 2016- China’ (2016) 
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recent years to reform the FDI regime and expand market access to foreign investors. 
In November 2013, the Chinese Communist Party issued a decision to broaden 
foreign investment access in China and extend national treatment to the pre-
establishment phase based on a ‘negative list’, and to set up more free trade zones 
like the Shanghai pilot free trade zone (FTZ).154 In April 2015, the State Council 
published a revised ‘Negative List’ to regulate trade and investment in all four FTZs, 
including Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong and Fujian, which reduced the number of 
excluded items to 122 from 190 in the 2013 List.155 On 5 June 2017, the State 
Council released an updated foreign investment negative list for 11 FTZs, cutting 10 
categories and 27 measures in the fields of aviation manufacturing, waterway 
transportation, banking services and education.156 According to the State Council’s 
circular, fields not covered by the new negative list included national security, public 
order, public culture, financial regulation and government purchases following 
existing regulations. Meanwhile, a foreign investment permit is necessary for the 
non-prohibited investment sectors on the list.157 
 
Most importantly, in January 2015, the MOFCOM invited comments for a Draft 
Foreign Investment Law, which unifies regulations and abolishes the case-by-case 
approval of foreign investment in favour of a system that would treat the FDI the 
same as domestic investment, except for those in sectors detailed in a ‘negative 
list’. 158  The Draft Law, if adopted, would significantly change the regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                            
<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 12 
September 2017.  
154 For an English version of the Third Plenum decision, see  
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm> accessed 6 March 
2017. 
155 For the official text of 2015 Negative List, see <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
04/20/content_9627.htm> accessed 8 March 2017. 
156 For the official text of 2017 Negative List, see <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-
06/16/content_5202973.htm> accessed 28 August 2017. China now has 11 FTZs in Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Tianjin, Chongqing, Henan, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang.  
157 The State Council of China, ‘China introduces new negative list for FTZ foreign investment’ (16 June 2017) 
<http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/06/16/content_281475687826506.htm> accessed 28 August 
2017. 
158 For the Draft Foreign Investment Law (in Chinese) see 
<http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201501/20150100871010.shtml> accessed 8 March 2017.  
For an unofficial English version see 
<https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Draft%20Foreign%20Investment%20Law%20of%20the%2
0People%27s%20Republic%20of%20China_JonesDay_0.pdf> accessed 7 March 2017. 
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landscape for the foreign investor and constitute a milestone in the deregulation of 
foreign investments. In September 2016, the National People’s Congress passed its 
Decision to Amend Four Laws including the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law 
of the People's Republic of China, which replaced the prior approval-filing with a 
record-filing for foreign investment, unless the project concerned falls within the 
scope of the negative list.159 Instead of publishing a nation-wide negative list, on 8 
October 2016, however, the State Council authorised the NDRC and the MOFCOM 
to jointly release Bulletin 22/2016 as a temporary arrangement. This provided special 
administrative measures for access of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) subject to 
the 2015 Foreign Investment Catalogue.160 On the same date, MOFCOM published 
the Interim Measures for the Recordation Administration of the Formation and 
Modification of Foreign-Funded Enterprises, implementing the MOFCOM record-
filing procedures.161  
 
In addition, proposed foreign M&As are subject to an anti-monopoly review by the 
MOFCOM. Further, Article 31 of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law requires a separate 
national security review in cases where a foreign M&A of domestic enterprise poses 
national security concerns.162 Article 12 of the MOFCOM’s Rules on M&As of 
Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investment stipulates that parties are required to 
report the transaction to MOFCOM if a foreign investor obtains actual control, via 
mergers or acquisitions, of a domestic enterprise in a major industry which has or 
may have an impact on national economic security.163 In February 2011, China 
                                                             
159 The four foreign investment laws include Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China, Sino-Foreign 
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160 For the official document see <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/f/201610/20161001404973.shtml> 
accessed 8 March 2017. 
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accessed 8 March 2017. For more discussion on MOFCOM FIE record-filing measures, see Practical Law China, 
‘MOFCOM Finalises FIE Record-filling Measures’ (12 Oct 2016) 
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162 For the official text of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China see 
<http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm> accessed 8 March 2017. 
163 For the full text of Regulations for M&As of Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors, see 
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/200610/20061003434565.html> accessed 8 
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released the State Council Notice Regarding the Establishment of a Security Review 
Mechanism for Foreign Investors Acquiring Domestic Enterprises which established 
an interagency Joint Conference. This was led by the NDRC and the MOFCOM, 
with the authority to review and block foreign mergers or acquisitions of domestic 
firms that it believes pose a threat to national security of China. It assessed impacts 
on national defence, national economic stability, fundamental ‘social orders’ and the 
research and development capability of key technologies in relation to national 
security by foreign transactions.164  
 
In January 2015, China introduced a formal national security review mechanism in 
its Draft Foreign Investment Law, where foreign investors, governmental review 
agencies and third parties (such as other governmental agencies, industry 
associations and companies in the same industry) can invoke a national security 
review.165 Like the CFIUS review, the Draft included a similarly non-exhaustive list 
of elements relating to national security, including (but only as one factor) whether 
or not the foreign investment is controlled by a foreign government.166 In April 2015, 
China released the Interim Measures on the National Security Review of Foreign 
Investment in pilot FTZs. 167  However, some US business associations have 
expressed their concerns about China’s ‘overly broad’ definition of national security, 
specifically including economic security, which they describe as ‘heavily skewed in 
favour of protecting national interests that fall outside the widely accepted scope of 
essential national security concerns’ and ‘likely to have a significant adverse impact 
                                                                                                                                                                            
March 2017. 
164 MOFCOM, ‘The State Council Notice Regarding the Establishment of a Security Review Mechanism for 
Foreign Investors Acquiring Domestic Enterprises’ (2011) 
<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/f/201102/20110207403117.html> accessed 21 July 2016. 
165 See Article 1 of Chapter 4 of the Draft Foreign Investment Law (n 158). 
<http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201501/20150100871010.shtml> accessed 21 July 2016. 
166 Draft Foreign Investment Law, Ch 4, Article 10. The elements include: a) impacts military security, b) impacts 
on research and development capabilities of key technologies in relation to national security, c) impacts on the 
technological leadership in the fields in relation to national security, d) impacts on dual-use items subject to 
import and export and technical diffusion, e) impacts on critical infrastructures and technologies, f) impacts on 
information and network security, g) impacts on long-term demands for energy, food and other key resources, h) 
whether the foreign investment is controlled by foreign governments; i) impacts on national economic stabilities; 
j) impacts on social public interests and public order; and k) other elements that the Joint Conference considered 
necessary. 
167 For the official text of Interim Measures see 
<http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/201506/20150601018472.shtml> accessed 25 July 2016. 
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on the flow of foreign investment into China’.168 Until now, there are no publications 
concerning the implementation of national security reviews in the pilot FTZs, and 
the formal national security review mechanism is still under consideration in the 
Draft Foreign Investment Law. Thus, China’s approach to national security remains 
unclear. 
 
While China’s FDI regime does not discriminate foreign investors on the basis of 
ownership,169 it has been criticised for favouring domestic firms, especially national 
SOEs.170 The December 2006 Guiding Opinions Concerning the Advancement of 
Adjustments of State Capital and the Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises 
called on China to consolidate and develop its state-owned economy, including 
enhancing its control and influence in ‘vital industries and key fields relating to 
national security and national economic lifelines’.171 The document defined ‘vital 
industries and key fields’ as ‘industries concerning national security, major 
infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries that provide essential 
public goods and services, and key enterprises in pillar industries and high-tech 
industries’.172 In 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
called for comprehensive reform of SOEs, improvements in the mechanisms for 
managing all types of state assets, and more investment of state capital in major 
industries, and key fields that comprise the lifeline of the economy and are vital to 
national security.173 While stating that public ownership plays a dominant role in 
China’s economic system, the Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues 
                                                             
168 US Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce in China, and American Chamber of 
Commerce in Shanghai, ‘Joint Submission to the State Council on the Trial Measures for the National Security 
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169 But according to the Draft Foreign Investment Law, ‘whether the foreign investment is controlled by foreign 
governments’ is a factor for national security consideration by the Joint Conference, see the Draft Foreign 
Investment Law, Ch 4, Article 10. 
170 US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statement for 2016- China’ (n 153). 
171 For the official text of the Guiding Opinion see <http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzjg/xcgz/200612180138.htm> 
accessed 8 March 2017. 
172 ibid.  
173 ‘Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress’ China.org.cn (8 November 2012) 
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540.htm> accessed 8 March 2017. 
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Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform called for a ‘mixed ownership’ 
economic structure which would allow for private and state-owned businesses to co-
exist in the domestic economy, and proposed greater balance between private and 
state-owned businesses.174 The Decision’s resolution was that state-owned capital 
investment operations should serve state strategic goals and invest more in key 
industries and areas that are vital to national security and are the lifeblood of the 
economy. The 2013 Third Plenum reform pronouncements suggest that China will 
attempt to reform SOEs by improving SOE management structures, emphasising the 
importance of SOEs meeting financial goals and taking steps to bring private capital 
into sectors traditionally monopolised by SOEs.175 In 2015, China issued the Guiding 
Opinions on Deepening the Reform of SOEs where the State Council instituted a 
system for classifying SOEs as public services or commercial enterprises, allowing 
the government to reduce support for commercial enterprises competing with private 
firms and instead channel resources toward public service SOEs.176 In practice, the 
government is still working on its SOE reform, and the terms of the implementation 
have yet to be clarified.177 
 
3.2.6 Concluding Observations 
 
What can we learn from the review of domestic policies and legal regimes on foreign 
investors and what are their implications for the access of SOE investors? On the one 
hand, national security and other national interests have become a significant part of 
national investment policies where more countries have adopted or amended 
legislation to strengthen the review of foreign investments on the grounds of national 
security and related concerns (Table 3.1).178  Although the mechanism for FDI 
screening seldom targets foreign SOEs, the process is intended to address host states’ 
concerns over SOE investments, such as national security and anti-competition 
concerns, and to restrict access to certain strategic industries under foreign state 
                                                             
174 For the full text of the Decision see <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm> 
accessed 8 March 2017. 
175 US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statement for 2016- China’ (n 153). 
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ownership. In this regard, national investment reviews, especially the national 
security review, pose potential obstacles for SOE investors. 
 
On the other hand, domestic approaches to the regulation and review of foreign 
investments entail diverging entry conditions for different countries in respect of 
similar, or even identical, economic activities.179 As noted, the US and Canada have 
established independent and comprehensive national security reviews, while 
Australia approves foreign investments through a national interest test where 
national security is a crucial factor for consideration. Meanwhile, the US, Canada 
and Australia have imposed stricter rules on SOE investors, such as a required 45-
day investigation in the US, a lower threshold of review in Canada and a mandatory 
review for all SOE investments in Australia. In contrast, EU regulations do not 
distinguish foreign investments on the basis of ownership. Recently, both the 
member states and the European Commission may scrutinise foreign investments for 
national security or public order where whether the foreign investor is controlled by 
the government is a factor to be considered in determining the effect of FDI on 
security or public order. In spite of member states’ control, the EU further regulates 
foreign investments on grounds of competition policy. China has recently relaxed its 
regulations on foreign investments in the Draft Foreign Investment Law, inter alia, 
adopting a negative list for foreign investment and providing a detailed national 
security review similar to the US. China has also published the relevant rules in pilot 
FTZs. Therefore, SOE investors may face not only different but also additional 
barriers to entry into certain countries. 
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Table 3.1 FDI regulatory approaches for national security and related reasons in selective 
countries 
 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2016 
X = Existing restriction.  
 
Beyond these apparent differences, however, there are three observations on 
domestic regulations that may have implications for SOE investors. Firstly, while 
many countries have addressed foreign investment screening on the grounds of 
national security or related national interests, they have never provided a precise or 
exhaustive definition of what ‘national security’ or ‘national interest’ is.180 The US 
and Canada, for example, have attempted to clarify the key term by providing a list 
of factors for national security consideration, but the list is an illustrative one, and 
the concept of national security is still broad and undefined. This is to say that other 
factors may also be considered a threat to national security, and the host state will 
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retain considerable discretion in determining the issue. Another problem here is 
whether a national security review shall take into account economic interests. As 
mentioned earlier, additional factors for national security considerations, added 
through Pub. L. 11-49, have incorporated economic elements into the Exon-Florio 
process, and refocused CFIUS’s reviews on considering the ‘broader rubric of 
economic security’.181 Furthermore, the 2012 Report of the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission suggested adding a ‘net economic benefit’ test to the 
existing national security test that CFIUS administers.182 Hence, some countries in 
practice take into account whether or not a foreign transaction in question has any 
negative impact on national economy, even though there is no explicit reference to 
economic criteria in domestic tests. These facts indicate that host governments may 
decide the admission on grounds of broader economic considerations. In such a case, 
foreign SOEs may be subject to a closer scrutiny as they are sparking concerns over 
economic and security implications. In this regard, host states may restrict or block 
foreign SOE transactions on grounds of economic interests in national security 
reviews. 
 
Secondly, screening of FDI for national security and other national interests is, to a 
great extent, intended to restrict or exclude foreign ownership in the critical 
infrastructure and in strategically important industries. As the notions of national 
security and national interest have evolved during past years, the vital industries 
concerned have been expanded to encompass not only traditional security and 
national defence activities (e.g., military and military-related businesses), but also to 
cover a wide range of critical infrastructures (e.g., electricity, water and gas 
distribution, health and education services, transportation, communications), and 
vital strategic sectors (e.g., natural resources).183  As a result, national security 
stretches beyond military security and comprises various policy concerns, such as 
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economic, energy, environment, food and cyber security, and so on.184 Although such 
concerns do not target foreign SOEs, it is unsurprising that host governments are 
reluctant to allow another foreign government to access its key or sensitive sectors. 
For example, the ChemChina - Syngenta deal has raised concerns on food and 
national security because the food and agriculture sectors are part of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.185 As more sectors are characterised as critical industries or of 
strategic importance to national security and related national interests, acquisitions 
by foreign SOEs in these sectors are likely to be subject to tight scrutiny. For 
instance, the UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May in July 2016 delayed approving the 
Hinkley Point C project due to security concerns about Chinese SOE’ involvement 
in sensitive sectors.186 Also, the US Intelligence Community warned that there may 
be a coordinated effort by foreign countries to acquire US ‘critical technology 
companies’ and in December 2016, US President Obama blocked a takeover of 
German semiconductor company Aixtron by a Chinese company with government 
ties.187  
 
Thirdly, investments by Chinese firms, especially SOEs, are raising concerns. As a 
result, Chinese SOEs, and maybe broadly all Chinese investors, are facing tougher 
foreign investment reviews. The Financial Times reported that between 2015 and 
2016 nearly $40 bn in planned Chinese acquisitions were delayed by Western 
countries due to concerns over competition and security issues.188 The US, for 
example, has been reviewing a growing number of foreign investments for national 
security reasons, with investments from China the leading targets (Table 3.2).189 In 
                                                             
184 See e.g., National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom, November 2015; ‘Presidential Policy Directive - Critical Infrastructure Security 
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2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a report on 
the ‘counterintelligence and security threat posed by Chinese telecommunications 
companies doing business in the United States’ where the Committee offered 
recommendations to CFIUS.190 These included recommendations that: 
 
- The CFIUS must block acquisitions, takeovers, or mergers involving Huawei and 
ZTE given the threat to US national security interests. 
- Committees of jurisdiction in the US Congress should consider potential 
legislation to better address the risk posed by telecommunications companies 
with nation-state ties or otherwise not clearly trusted to build critical 
infrastructure.191 
 
Table 3.2 Country of foreign investor and industry reviewed by CFIUS, 2012-2014 
Source: Annual Report to Congress, CFIUS, February 2016 
 
Moreover, in the 2012 Report of the US - China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, US industries, lawmakers and government officials expressed growing 
worries about the ‘potential economic distortions and national security concerns 
arising from [China’s] system of state-supported and state-led economic growth’; 
economic concerns center on the possibility that state-backed Chinese companies 
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choose to invest ‘based on strategic rather than market-based considerations’ and are 
free from the constraints of market forces because of generous state subsidies.192 
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that Congress amend the CFIUS review 
to (1) require a mandatory review of all controlling transactions by Chinese state-
owned and state-controlled companies investing in the United States; (2) add a net 
economic benefit test to the existing national security test that CFIUS administers; 
and (3) prohibit investment in a US industry by a foreign company whose 
government prohibits foreign investment in that same industry.193 Although CFIUS 
makes decisions on a case-by-case basis, the US policy toward Chinese investments 
may become more aggressive in the future. For example, immediately following the 
election of US President Donald Trump, the US - China Economic and Security 
Review Commission recommended Congress ‘authorising the CFIUS to bar Chinese 
SOEs from acquiring or otherwise gaining control of US companies’, particularly 
considering the ‘high risk’ of Chinese SOEs posing a detriment to US national 
security.194 In particular, the 2016 report stated that: 
 
…All Chinese companies’ economic activity - not just the activity of state -
owned firms - is conducted in support of the state’s goals and policies. This is 
particularly true for Chinese firms operating in strategic sectors… The CCP 
continues to use SOEs as the primary economic tool for advancing and 
achieving its national security objectives. Consequently, there is an 
inherently high risk that whenever an SOE acquires or gains effective control 
of a US company, it will use the technology, intelligence, and market power 
it gains in the service of the Chinese state to the detriment of US national 
security.195 (emphasis added) 
 
As mentioned already, in December 2016, President Obama blocked the Aixtron 
transaction. 196  After that, twenty-two House lawmakers wrote to the Treasury 
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Secretary to urge Obama to reject the Lattice Semiconductor deal backed by 
investors in China.197 
 
Although Chinese investments have so far been subject to a less harsh regulatory 
processes in European countries, the FDI regime may become tougher in the future. 
As mentioned earlier, transactions by Chinese SOEs may face lengthy and 
burdensome merger regulations in the EU. In October 2016, the German government 
withdrew approvals for a €670m takeover of computer chip manufacturer Aixtron by 
a group of Chinese investors on public security concerns.198 In April 2017, the EU 
approved the Syngeta acquisition by a China SOE, ChemChina, for $43 billion in 
cash of antitrust issue, but required the SOE to divest ‘a significant part’ of its 
Adama unit’s pesticide business.199 In June, President Macron of France, together 
with allies in Germany and Italy, called for the creation of an EU mechanism to 
control foreign takeovers of important industries, which reflected pressure to curb 
takeovers by Chinese state-based companies in Europe.200 
 
While domestic regulators do not expressly prohibit an investment simply because it 
originates from an SOE, they retain almost unlimited discretion to do so, relying on a 
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flexible and vague legal test.201 As a result, foreign SOEs would face a very uncertain 
and unpredictable review when making an investment in certain countries. 
Furthermore, a foreign investment review that lacks transparency and predictability 
would provide leeway for investment protectionism. On the one hand, while many 
countries allow foreign investors to contest security-related review decisions, 
including administrative or judicial reviews, appeal processes are seldom used by 
foreign investors, and it is unlikely that national courts would override any review 
decision based soley on its merits.202  
 
On the other hand, as the concept of ‘national security’ is vague and subject to 
expansion, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish whether the relevant 
review decision is based on national security or other national interests, or on matters 
relating to protectionism. For example, Berlin’s withdrawal of a clearance certificate 
to the Aixtron deal has been characterised as an ‘emerging push for protectionism’ in 
Germany against Chinese companies.203 Importantly, it is questionable whether and 
to what extent such foreign state ownership threatens national security. At least to 
date, there is little economic evidence to indicate that the nationality of a foreign 
investor - or whether or not the foreign investor is a private entity or an entity owned 
or controlled by a foreign government - has a measurable impact either on the market 
performance of the firm or on the US economy.204  For most economists, the 
distinction between domestic- and foreign-owned firms, whether the foreign firms 
are privately owned or controlled by a foreign government, is sufficiently small that 
they would argue that it does not warrant placing restrictions on the influx of foreign 
investments.205 Meanwhile, restricting or discriminating against SOE investments or 
investments from certain countries for national security reasons may discourage SOE 
investors and other foreign investors to invest in the host market. For example, after 
Australia blocked China’s SOE from taking a $7.6bn controlling stake in an 
electricity distribution network on national security grounds, a spokesman for 
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MOFCOM, Shen Danyang, said the ruling was protectionist and would ‘seriously’ 
reduce the appetite of Chinese companies to invest in Australia.206 
 
3.3 Admission Provisions in Investment Treaties: Removing Barriers for 
SOE Investments?  
 
As mentioned above, host states may take various measures to restrict the admission 
of foreign SOEs, and it is a sovereign right for states to regulate such admission. 
Meanwhile, international investment treaties may also affect the admission of 
foreign investment. 207  For instance, some countries may decide to accept 
international obligations to guarantee access for foreign investors to their territory. 208 
As a result, host states’ measures in respect of the entry of foreign SOEs, such as 
national security reviews or prior approval by the local government, are potentially 
unlawful under the applicable investment treaty if contracting states commit to 
admission rights for foreign investors. Accordingly, an international investment 
treaty may provide admission rights to foreign SOEs, while preventing the host state 
from discriminating against foreign investors on the basis of their ownership. This 
section will thus explore investment treaty practice on market access and discuss the 
implications for the admission of foreign SOEs. 
 
3.3.1 Traditional Admission Clause: In Accordance with Host State Legislations 
 
From the perspective of international law, states are in no way compelled to admit 
foreign investments.209 Accordingly, states retain discretion to decide whether or not 
to grant foreign investors a right of admission. However, treaty practice in this 
respect reveals distinct approaches. The vast majority of BITs, especially those 
concluded by European countries, do not grant a right of admission but limit 
themselves to standards and guarantees for those investments which the host state 
has unilaterally decided to admit.210 Typical provision of this type reads that, ‘[e]ach 
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Contracting State shall in its territory promote as far as possible investments by 
investors of the other Contracting State and admit such investments in accordance 
with its legislation’.211 
 
Under such an admission clause, host states are allowed to retain control over the 
access of foreign capital; to screen investments to ensure their compatibility with the 
state’s national security, economic development, and public policy goals; and to 
determine the condition under which foreign investment will be permitted, if at all.212 
In other words, host states are free to restrict or prohibit the entry of a foreign SOE 
subject to its laws and legislations. Moreover, in respect of admission conditions, the 
host state is under no obligation to grant foreign SOEs the same treatment that it 
grants to its own nationals or investors of third parties, regardless of public or private 
ownership. Accordingly, if a contracting state only admits foreign investments in 
accordance with local laws, any requirements under the domestic legal regime for 
foreign SOEs, such as foreign investment reviews or restrictions on industrial sectors, 
must be met, even if the state creates additional barriers to foreign SOEs. Also, the 
host states retain the freedom to revise its laws on admission and to create new 
barriers to foreign SOEs after the investment treaty has entered into force.213 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some treaties stipulate ‘in accordance with laws and 
regulations’ in the definition of ‘investment’.214 Nonetheless, it is necessary to 
address here that if a treaty stipulates ‘in accordance with local law’ only in the 
admission clause, the SOE investor may still invoke an investment arbitration. 
Furthermore, its post-establishment breach of local laws does not affect the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, although the tribunal may deny substantial protections to the SOE 
investment. 
 
Whenever the requirement of ‘in accordance with host state laws’ appears in a treaty, 
it can be understood that both the SOE investor and its investment are subject to 
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domestic regulations. Accordingly, if a foreign SOE fails to get approval from the 
host state before establishing an investment, or does not pass the foreign investment 
review, it shall not be granted substantial guarantees contained in the relevant treaty. 
Conversely, if an SOE investor meets with the host state regulations, it shall be 
accorded the relevant guarantees, such as non-discrimination treatment and fair and 
equitable treatment, as included in the treaty. Nevertheless, such guarantees only 
apply to the post-establishment phase under the traditional admission clause. 
 
Thus, under a traditional admission clause, the treaty does not remove obstacles to 
the admission of foreign SOEs; instead, it recognises that the host government 
retains unlimited discretion to restrict or block a foreign SOE’ entry into its territory, 
or to create extra requirements for foreign SOEs in respect of admission. As a result, 
many countries take measures against foreign SOEs to restrict admission because 
such restrictive measures are not subject to the post-establishment investment treaties. 
 
3.3.2 US Approach of Admission Clause: Pre-establishment Non-discriminatory 
Treatment 
 
The US, followed by Canada and Japan, has adopted a different approach to 
regulating the admission of foreign investment in their treaties. These treaties grant 
foreign investors the right of admission, typically based on NT and MFN. For 
example, the 2012 US Model BIT stipulates that: 
 
Article 3: National Treatment  
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.  
Article 4: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment  
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-
Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
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conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.215 
 
Accordingly, the host state shall, theoretically, treat foreign investors at least as 
favourably as it treats domestic investors or third-party investors at both pre-
establishment and post-establishment stages, regardless of state ownership. 
Consequently, if not provided for otherwise, restrictive measures by host 
governments over the entry of foreign SOEs may constitute a breach of NT or MFN 
or both. 216 Moreover, the US 2012 Model BIT goes beyond the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) on performance requirement which bans 
technology transfer and other localisation requirements designed to benefit local 
investors.217 The ban on performance requirements could remove barriers relating to 
localisation requirements for foreign investors, regardless of whether they are 
publicly or privately owned, in connection to admission, acquisition and expansion. 
 
The ECT adopts a unique approach which recognises the possibility of non-
discriminatory treatment on admission but does not oblige contracting parties to 
grant this treatment to potential investors.218 Article 10 of the ECT provides that: 
 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to accord to Investors of other 
Contracting Parties, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, the 
Treatment described in paragraph (3).  
(3) For the purposes of this Article, ‘treatment’ means treatment accorded by 
a Contracting Party which is no less favourable than that which it accords to 
its own Investors or to Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third 
state, whichever is the most favourable.219 (emphasis added) 
 
Accordingly, while contracting parties shall use their best effort to grant non-
discrimination treatment, i.e., the most favourable treatment, to investors making 
investments, such a commitment is not legally binding at the pre-establishment 
                                                             
215 US 2012 Model BIT, Article 3 and Article 4. Similar provisions also see e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, Article 5 and 6; NAFTA, Article 1102 and 1103; etc. 
216 For more discussion on non-discriminatory treatment of foreign SOE investments see Ch 4. 
217 US 2012 Model BIT, Article 8 (Performance Requirements). Similar provisions see NAFTA, Article 1106. 
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stage.220 Nevertheless, any contracting parties of the ECT are allowed to conclude a 
supplementary treaty to commit non-discriminatory treatment upon admission 
(Article 10 (4)). In addition, each contracting party shall endeavour (1) to limit the 
minimum exceptions to the non-discriminatory treatment (Article 10(5) (a)); (2) to 
progressively remove existing restrictions affecting investors making investments 
(Article 10 (5) (b)); and may (3) at any time declare voluntarily its intention not to 
introduce new exceptions to the non-discriminatory treatment on making of 
investments (Article (6) (a)). While these provisions attempt to remove restrictions 
on the entry of foreign investments on a ‘soft’ commitment, they are not ordinarily 
found in other treaties.221 
 
Some argue that countries may find it is easier to grant MFN than NT upon 
admission since they may wish to give special preference to national investors to 
strengthen national enterprises in particular sectors or because they believe domestic 
investors cannot compete on an equal footing with foreign firms.222 In other words, a 
pre-establishment MFN commitment may be designated to retain the state’s 
discretion on market access even if the host state does not discriminate against 
foreign SOEs in comparison with other foreign investors. The China-Korea BIT, for 
example, provides that each contracting party shall accord to investors of the other 
contracting party and their investments the MFN treatment, ‘including the admission 
of investment’.223 Under this context, the Korean government shall not discriminate 
against a Chinese SOE investment in the foreign investment screening, but it is still 
allowed to prohibit the Chinese SOE from accessing critical industries or strategic 
sectors. Nevertheless, if Korea has approved a foreign investment in a certain sector, 
it cannot block a Chinese SOE investor from accessing the same sector. Therefore, a 
host state may also be reluctant to extend the MFN commitment to the pre-
establishment phase, as that may make it possible for foreign SOEs to obtain market 
access. Also, contracting states should be cautious when initiating stricter screening 
procedures for SOE investors if they have committed to pre-establishment MFN 
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clauses in investment treaties. A lower threshold of review or a mandatory 45-day 
national security investigation may impose a discriminatory treatment on the entry 
condition of SOE investors from the contracting party, compared to that of a private 
investor from a third party. 
 
As noted, the purpose of pre-establishment non-discriminatory treatment clauses is 
to equalise competition conditions for market entry among potential investors, 
regardless of public or private ownership.224  Consequently, a pre-establishment 
investment treaty would eliminate barriers to market access since all investors are 
subject to the same treatment on market access unless indicated otherwise. This is 
true whether or not they are domestic - or foreign-owned firms and whether or not 
the foreign firms are privately owned or owned by a foreign government. Therefore, 
a pre-establishment treaty would level the playing field between domestic and 
foreign investments, whether or not they are publicly- or privately- owned, and 
would prohibit host states from imposing at the admission stage discriminatory 
measures for foreign SOEs.  
 
In practice, however, no state would necessarily wish to grant an unlimited right of 
admission to foreign investors, especially when they are backed by home 
governments. For one thing, host states may wish to exclude projects that entail the 
control of critical infrastructure or strategic sectors for national security or national 
interest considerations. For another, some countries fear that foreign SOEs may 
distort market competition as they are backed by home governments. In such cases, 
host states may not wish to grant NT (and MFN) for foreign SOEs prior to admission. 
To avoid a breach of international obligation, some states adopt a ‘positive list’ to 
identify sectors that are open to the investors of the other party; while some states 
adopt a ‘negative list’ to identify certain sectors that are closed.225 Moreover, many 
treaties provide exception clauses, including general exceptions and specific 
exceptions, to exempt states from international obligations.226 Accordingly, host 
states can use a positive or negative list to restrict access for foreign SOEs in certain 
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sectors or exclude the applicability of non-discriminatory obligations to certain 
matters or in exceptional conditions. 227  The exception to non-discriminatory 
treatment for foreign SOEs will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
In addition, pre-establishment non-discriminatory commitments in investment 
treaties do not prevent or prohibit host governments from controlling the admission 
of foreign SOEs to host state markets. For instance, some treaties explicitly allow 
host governments to take restrictive measures for essential security interests or other 
public policy, such as Article 18 of the 2012 US Model BIT228 and Article 10 of the 
2004 Canada Model FIPA,229 where restrictions on admission for foreign SOEs 
might be justifiable on the grounds of national security or other national interest 
considerations. 230  Furthermore, some treaties guarantee the policy discretion of 
Contracting Parties to screen foreign investments and exclude the applicability of 
ISDS for government decisions following the review. For example, the China-
Canada FIPA provides that ‘a decision by Canada following a review under the 
Investment Canada Act’ and ‘a decision by China following a review under the Laws, 
Regulations and Rules relating to the regulation of foreign investment’ shall not be 
subject to the dispute settlement provisions.231 Under the China-Australia FTA, 
Australia reserves its right to screen all direct investments, new business proposals 
                                                             
227 For example, Article 16 of the Canada-Kuwait BIT (2011) provides that NT and MFN shall not apply to: 1) 
non-conforming measures; 2) any measures that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors or 
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preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential 
security interests’. 
229 Article 10 (1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA provides that, ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; (b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
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231 Annex D. 34 of the China-Canada FIPA (2012). Similarly, Article 9.11 (4) of the China-Australia FTA 
provides that, ‘[m]easures of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives 
of public health, safety, the environment, public moral or public order shall not be the subject of a claim under 
the investor-State dispute settlement’. 
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and acquisitions of interests in land by Chinese SOEs, regardless of transaction 
size.232  
 
Nevertheless, if an investment treaty does not explicitly provide exceptions and 
reservations, any measure restricting a foreign SOE’s admission may constitute a 
violation of pre-establishment non-discrimination commitments and is likely to be 
subject to closer scrutiny by international tribunals. 
 
3.3.3 Recent Practice: Towards Pre-establishment Protections for Foreign SOEs? 
 
While most investment treaties do not include admission provisions or only admit 
foreign investments in accordance with host states laws and legislation, recent years 
have witnessed some countries’ ambitions to expand market access by adopting pre-
establishment non-discriminatory treatments in investment treaty negotiations.  
 
The EU, in particular, has explicitly committed to market access and performance 
requirements in the CETA with Canada, and has accepted a pre-establishment 
national treatment obligation on the basis of a ‘negative list’ of sectors that remain 
subject to tighter controls.233 Accordingly, both the EU and Canada has significantly 
expanded market access for foreign investments, regardless of whether they are 
publicly or privately owned; and the host state cannot take restrictive measure on 
admission except for sectors explicitly listed in Annex I and Annex II. Moreover, 
through Annex I, both EU and Canadian businesses, regardless of whether 
ownership is public or private, will benefit from any future liberalisation if the 
measures are relaxed or eliminated vis-à-vis third country investors in the future. 
Also, Canada agreed to liberalisation in some key sectors such as postal services, 
telecoms and maritime transport without transition periods, while the EU guaranteed 
to Canadian investors its current level of liberalisation in areas like mining, certain 
services related to energy, environmental services and certain professional 
                                                             
232 China-Australia FTA (2015), Annex III: Investment and Services Schedules of Australia and China. 
233 Comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada (2014), Article 
8.4(Market access), Article 8.5 (Performance requirements), Article 8.6 (National treatment), Article 8.7 (Most-
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services. 234  Besides, both the EU and Canada have taken on obligations on 
performance requirements that prohibit technology transfer and other localisation 
requirements.235 
 
However, it is hard to say that SOE investors can benefit from such market access. 
The CETA explicitly allows the Canadian government to screen acquisitions of 
Canadian companies by EU investors for both ‘net benefit’ and national security, and 
to apply a lower threshold for review of EU investors that constitute SOEs.236 Also, 
the CETA safeguards the flexibility of the EU and member states to introduce 
discriminatory measures or quantitative restrictions in the future by specifying 
certain areas or sectors in the reservations of Annex II. These include, among others, 
public monopolies and exclusive rights for public utilities and public services such 
as education, health, social services and water supply where the EU and member 
states have no obligation to privatise any of these sectors under the CETA.237 As a 
result, the Canadian government retains discretion to prevent and block an EU 
investment involving SOEs in a foreign investment review. Further, the EU and 
member states can maintain restrictive measures or take new measures to restrict or 
exclude foreign control of certain sectors, whether they are state-owned or not. 
 
Nevertheless, the CETA indicates that the EU has started filling the gap in ‘entry’ or 
‘admission’ through both multilateral and bilateral agreements at the EU level 
covering investment market access and investment liberalisation, notably by 
ensuring non-discriminatory treatment upon entry of investors from a third country, 
and vice versa.238 The EU is currently negotiating stand-alone investment agreements 
or FTAs (including investment chapters) with China, Myanmar, India, Singapore, 
Japan, the US, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Malaysia and Vietnam, which are 
likely to adopt the same approach to improve market access by granting pre-
establishment national treatment on the basis of certain reservations listed in the 
                                                             
234 European Commission (EC), ‘CETA – Summary of the final negotiating results’ (February 2016) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/tradoc_152982.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
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Annexes.239 Accordingly, the EU is removing barriers to market access for foreign 
investors from third countries, but member states still retain discretion to restrict or 
prohibit market access for foreign investors in certain sectors. These include critical 
infrastructure or, under certain conditions, national security or the maintenance of 
public order. In this context, the ‘negative list’ is of great significance to foreign 
SOE investors since it explicitly provides reservations on market access 
commitments, including whether the contracting states reserve the right to adopt new 
or restrictive measures in the future. Although such a list may restrict admission for 
SOE investors, it clarifies the protection commitments and reserved measures or 
sectors, which could in turn improve the stability and transparency of the domestic 
framework of foreign investments. Therefore, if a treaty that applies for both pre-
establishment and post-establishment phases does not explicitly include such 
reservations, any restrictions on the admission for foreign SOEs by the contracting 
state may constitute a violation of international obligations. 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable practice on foreign investment admission is the on-
going Chinese BIT talks with the US and the EU. As stated by some government 
officials and academic scholars, the US-China BIT is an opportunity to expand 
market access reciprocity for investors.240 In 2013, Chinese government committed 
to negotiating a BIT with the US government that will accept pre-establishment 
national treatment obligation on the basis of a ‘negative list’ approach of reserved 
sectors and industries.241 To date, the negotiating parties have changed negative lists 
three times.242 Likewise, in the context of the China-EU BIT talks, the EU Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht has made clear that ‘the EU-China investment agreement is 
not about investment protection only, but also about market access for European 
companies’.243 The European Parliament has likewise emphasised that the China-EU 
                                                             
239 For example, the Agreed text of the EU-Vietnam FTA of January 2016, Chapter 8: Trade in Services, 
Investment and E-Commerce, Article 2- Article 6, see 
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Negotiations on Bilateral Investment Agreement’ (16 July 2013) 
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BIT negotiations would be opened only on condition that China has given formal 
approval for market access.244 To date, the two sides have engaged in twelve rounds 
of negotiations and reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and comprehensive 
scope for the EU-China investment agreement.245 Although the final texts of both 
BITs remain to be seen, it is clear that both the US and the EU expect to increase 
market access for their businesses in China through a pre-establishment national 
treatment provision and versa vice.246  
 
China’s regulatory approach to foreign investment admission has been criticised as 
opaque and restrictive (Figure 3.2). In particular, some scholars argue that China’s 
reluctance to include liberal national treatment and investor-state arbitration 
provisions in its earlier BITs likely stemmed from its preference to retain sovereignty 
to screen and regulate FDI and to discriminate against foreign investors in favour of 
domestic industries and companies, especially but not exclusively SOEs.247 Hence, 
China has never granted pre-establishment national treatment and MFN to investors 
in its past BITs. Even in the recent China-Canada FIPA, China only committed to 
extending national treatment to the expansion of investment in sectors ‘not subject to 
a prior approval process’ under the relevant sectoral guidelines and applicable 
legislation.248 Hence, if the Chinese BITs with the US or the EU could agree to a pre-
establishment national treatment on a negative list, it will become a symbol of the 
emerging new generation of BIT practice, or the ‘Global BIT 2.0’.249 Accordingly, 
all investors from the US or the EU would enjoy market access equal to that afforded 
to Chinese firms, including Chinese SOEs, unless explicitly excluded by the negative 
lists. Furthermore, given that China has committed to pre-establishment MFN 
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treatment in the Canadian BIT and the Australian FTA,250 investors from Canada and 
Australia may also benefit from treatment equal to what China accords to its 
domestic firms, including SOEs, unless explicitly excluded in the treaties.251  
 
 
Figure 3.2 FDI regulatory restrictiveness in selective countries, 2015 
Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictive Index database 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm> 
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To a great extent, the degree of market access depends on the length of negative list. 
As mentioned earlier, while China has cut the restrictive measures and categories in 
the new negative list for FTZs, both the US and the EU wish China to shorten the list 
as much as possible to obtain more market access.252 The US Trade Representative 
said that China’s latest offer in bilateral investment talks was a ‘serious effort’, but 
still ‘a fair distance away from being accepted’.253 Likewise, the European Chamber 
welcomed the reduction of the negative list in Chinese pilot FTZs, but also proposed 
further elimination of the remaining barriers and speedy roll-out access on a 
nationwide basis for the service sector.254 It is unclear whether the lists in FTZs and 
the Draft Law will be replicated in China’s BIT negative list. But, the preparations 
and negotiations for the negative list are likely to take a significant amount of time, 
since the contracting parties have to assess whether and to what extent each sector 
and industry is internationally competitive and should be opened up to international 
investors. 255  The laborious task in China might involve taking stock of non-
conforming measures at both the central level and the local level while, for the EU, 
market access commitment might affect both the EU level and member state level, 
with the latter then being further divided into central government and local levels.256 
Working out solutions to such challenging and complex issues requires not only a 
tremendous amount of time but also intelligence and perhaps innovations.257  
 
Some scholars consider that Chinese investors, especially SOEs, would be the major 
beneficiaries from pre-establishment protections in potential BITs, and they raise 
concerns about the reciprocity of market access and the efficiency of a high standard 
BIT.258 However, it is questionable if Chinese investors, especially SOEs, could truly 
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benefit from increased market access because host states still retain considerable 
discretion to control the access of foreign investments at a national level. For 
example, the US regulatory regime for the FDI is relatively closed and more 
restrictive than in many other developed countries (Figure 3.2), especially 
considering that it does not permit a judicial review of the CFIUS ruling. In fact, a 
main concern of the Chinese government in negotiating the BIT with the US is the 
ambitious CFIUS review against Chinese SOEs and even all Chinese investments. 
Some worry that pre-establishment non-discriminatory treatment in the potential US-
China BIT could enable Chinese SOEs (as major investors) to bring a claim before 
an international tribunal if they are displeased with a CFIUS ruling.259 But, it has 
been also argued that the national security exception clause appears ‘broad enough’ 
to allow US regulators sufficient bandwidth to protect its essential security 
interests, 260  although the issue is questionable and never tested in practice. 
Furthermore, the ISDS mechanism under US BITs does not affect host states’ right 
to regulate, and it is uncertain whether the tribunal will override the CFIUS 
decision.261 Likewise, if the potential China-EU BIT follows the CETA provisions, 
the EU’s negative lists may be not shorter than China’s reservations, including 
reservations for both EU and its member states at all levels of governments.262 
Furthermore, if the potential China-EU BIT follows Annex II of CETA which 
permits the EU and the member states not only to maintain existing discriminatory 
measures but also to adopt discriminatory measures in the future, Chinese investors 
would face much more difficulty and uncertainty when investing in Europe.263 
Although the legal regimes of the EU and its member states are neutral on the 
ownership of investments, the above reservations in negative lists could provide 
leeway for discriminatory treatment of Chinese SOEs. 
 
Nevertheless, it is still necessary to note that the trend towards market access 
commitments in investment treaties does, to some extent, remove barriers for foreign 
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investments, regardless of whether they are publicly- or privately- owned.264 In 
particular, it improves the stability and transparency of domestic legal regimes for 
foreign investments, in particular by reducing the ability of host states to take 
discriminatory measures against foreign investors in unlisted sectors, without 
violating relevant commitments on market access. Also, since under such treaties, 
international law guarantees protection of market access, it is possible for investors 
to challenge a host government’s discriminatory measure in an international 
investment arbitration. 265  Although this challenge is debatable and untested in 
practice, it might, at least theoretically, restrict or prevent host government from 
making arbitrary and discriminatory decisions in foreign investment reviews since 
the use of political pressure or administrative denials could constitute a violation of 
the MFN or NT provisions, or both.266 In addition, since China has never granted 
pre-establishment national treatment on the basis of negative list in its investment 
treaties, such a market access commitment in a BIT with the US and the EU might 
expand the market access for other foreign investors through MFN clauses. It might 
also serve as an important model for other bilateral and multilateral investment 
agreements, including the RCEP, the TTIP and the potential Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).267 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
In sum, with the rise of FDI led by SOEs, an increasing number of countries are re-
evaluating, and often tightening, their oversight regimes on the admission of foreign 
investment. As a result, host states may use various approaches to control the entry 
of foreign SOEs, including restricting or excluding foreign control in critical 
infrastructure and strategic sectors or conducting foreign investment screenings 
based on national security considerations and other national interests. Our review of 
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domestic approaches to the screening of foreign investments shows that SOE 
investors are likely to face significantly different admission conditions in different 
countries in respect of similar or even the same economic activities. Recent 
developments in national security review processes in some countries indicate that 
SOE investors, especially those from China, are likely to be subject to closer scrutiny 
in the future. Given that the concept of ‘national security’ is unclear and expanding 
in national practice, SOE investors may face less certainty and predictability when 
accessing a foreign market. Also, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish 
whether national regulations for SOE investors serve national security and other 
national interests, or serve protectionism.  
 
In the context of international investment law, host states have unlimited discretion 
to decide upon access granted to foreign SOEs. Most IIAs do not provide pre-
establishment obligations, or merely admit foreign investment ‘in accordance with 
host states’ laws and legislations’. Accordingly, such IIAs in fact allow states to 
restrict the admission of SOEs, rather than to remove domestic obstacles to the 
admission of SOEs. As a result, most treaties only cover protections for the post-
establishment phase, providing leeway for states to restrict or prohibit foreign SOEs’ 
market access, which may leave room for investment protectionism. 
 
However, the US investment treaties typically grant market access commitments 
especially including a pre-establishment national treatment provision on the basis of 
a ‘negative list’. Accordingly, foreign investors, whether publicly- or privately- 
owned, shall be subject to equal conditions upon admission as that for domestic 
investors including domestic SOEs, unless explicitly provided otherwise. As a result, 
this treaty practice could remove barriers to market access for foreign investors since 
a host state might violate international obligations if it restricts or discriminates 
against foreign investors in relation to market access. Considering that other major 
economies such as China, the EU, Canada, Japan and India are also moving toward 
extending treaty protections to the pre-establishment phase, it can be argued that the 
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world is moving toward an era of ‘Global BIT 2.0’, that is, a new generation of BITs 
that combines investment protection with investment liberalisation.268  
 
The national and international practice on the admission of foreign SOEs confirms 
two divergent trends in investment policy and law regime in recent years.269 At the 
national level, while some countries have liberalised entry conditions for foreign 
investors in a variety of industries, an increasing number of restrictions or 
regulations are being introduced to control the admission of foreign investors, 
including SOEs, for national security, strategic industries and competitiveness 
reasons. 270  At the international level, new generation IIAs embrace investment 
liberalisation by providing pre-establishment protections for foreign investors and 
promoting investment liberalisation. Many reasons may contribute to such a 
disparity between national and international trends. On the one hand, with the 
development of economic globalisation, both developing and developed countries 
wish their firms to enjoy improved market access on the basis of pre-establishment 
national treatment in foreign markets. But on the other hand, economic globalisation 
is not perfect and host states wish to preserve certain regulatory space to prevent 
potential risks. In addition, the disparity between national and international practice 
in respect of admission confirms that the investment regime has become more 
complex and divergent. 
 
These trends have different implications for SOE investors and states. For SOE 
investors, they may have to face tougher screening or protectionist measures by host 
states at the national level. But internationally, the emerging trend of including pre-
establishment protections may be helpful for SOE investors, as it extends the scope 
of protections and permits investors to bring claims before international arbitral 
tribunals if the host state takes any restrictive measures against them in relation to 
admission. In 2007, a Singaporean SOE, Temasek, considered international 
arbitration procedures after exhausting local procedures in Indonesia where the 
Indonesian antitrust authorities required Temasek to sell its stakes in the two largest 
                                                             
268 Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang, ‘Market Access Provisions in the Potential EU Model BIT: Toward a “Global 
BIT 2.0”?’ (2014) 15 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 422, 453. 
269 See also Ch 1. 
270 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017- Investment and Digital Economy xi. 
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mobile phone operators. 271  Although this case concerns neither admission nor 
establishment of investment, and the company eventually did not submit an 
international arbitration claim against Indonesia, 272  it at least has indicated a 
possibility of the international arbitration option. As argued by some scholars, with 
the worldwide increase in sovereign investments and a growth in national 
protectionist measures against SOE investments, SOE investors may increasingly 
use international investment arbitration to seek protection in the future.273  
 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent foreign SOEs can 
benefit from the pre-establishment protection. On the one hand, states may use 
negative lists to reserve restrictive measures or exclude foreign ownerships in certain 
sectors; on the other hand, states may exempt SOEs from pre-establishment 
obligations by invoking general or specific exceptions specified in the treaty. Also, it 
is questionable whether a breach of pre-establishment commitment by host states, 
such as an adverse decision in a CFIUS review, would be subject to international 
investment arbitration. 274  As a result, host states may still retain considerable 
discretion to control the admission of foreign SOEs. 
 
Undoubtedly, increased market access reciprocity will benefit investors from both 
contracting parties. Also, there is strong evidence that liberal admission rules 
promote bilateral foreign investments. 275  Therefore, states should promote the 
opening of domestic sectors to foreign investments, instead of taking restrictive 
measures for protectionist ends. Meanwhile, it is necessary for states to evaluate the 
                                                             
271 John Aglionby, ‘Indonesian watchdog targets Temasek’ Financial Times (20 November 2007) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2d8a5c84-970b-11dc-b2da-
0000779fd2ac.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4c6E130jK> accessed 22 March 2017; Nicole 
McCormick, ‘Temasek loses appeal on Indon price fixing claims’ Telecom Asia. Net (25 May 2010) 
<http://www.telecomasia.net/content/temasek-loses-appeal-indon-price-fixing-claims> accessed 22 March 2017.  
272 Janeman Latul and Saeed Azhar, ‘Temasek to pay Indonesia fines after failed anti-monopoly appeal’ Reuters 
(Jakarta, 18 Jan 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-temasek-idUSL3E7CI0AJ20110118> accessed 
22 March 2017. Some scholars argue that this is because the Singapore-Indonesia BIT (2006) does not explicitly 
recognise Temasek as ‘investor’, see Chaisse and Sejko 88. See also Ch 2.  
273 Burgstaller 177. 
274 As mentioned earlier, CETA provides only claims arising out of host state’s breach of the chapter on 
investment protection may be subject to investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. But similar provisions are 
not provided in other treaties. 
275 Axel Berger and others, ‘Do Trade and Investment Agreements Lead to More FDI? Accounting for Key 
Provisions Inside the Black Box’ (2013) 10 International Economics and Economic Policy 247. 
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international competitiveness of each domestic sector and industry and be cautious in 
designing a negative list to reduce risks of breaching international obligations.  
 
Notwithstanding, host states’ regulations on foreign SOE investments should strike 
an proper balance between promoting and protecting SOE investments and 
addressing host states’ right to regulate SOE concerns on national security risks and 
competition distortions. In this process, host states’ measures will affect foreign SOE 
investment at both pre-establishment and post-establishment stages. As most treaties 
provide substantive protections for post-establishment phase, host states’ restrictive 
measures are likely to violate relevant obligations and be scrutinised in international 
arbitrations. Next chapter will discuss these issues in detail. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
TREATMENT STANDARDS OF SOE INVESTMENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the substantive protections to SOE investments under 
international investment treaties. While treaties differ, almost all provide substantive 
protections for investors against discrimination and uncompensated expropriation in 
host states.1 Furthermore, numerous treaties also require host states to guarantee 
certain standards of treatment to foreign investors and investments through fair and 
equitable treatment (FET), umbrella clauses, full protection and security, etc. If a 
host state breaches its commitments on obligations of substantive protections to 
foreign investors, the investor may file claims for monetary compensation at 
international tribunals. Whereas most debates centre on whether the state ownership 
disqualifies SOEs as protected investors, the issue of substantive protections to SOE 
investments seems more important since it touches upon the main body of the 
international investment regime.  
 
One may then ask why SOEs, rather than any other foreign investors, are of 
particular interest in the substantive protections offered by IIAs, i.e., the standards of 
treatment. As noted in Chapter 1, SOEs are often viewed differently from private-
owned enterprises due to their political nature and non-commercial motivations in 
activities. Therefore, some have considered that SOE investors should not be 
accorded the same treaty protections as that accorded to private investors since they 
have enjoyed preferences or competitive advantages in their home countries. Also, to 
address host states’ concerns over SOE investments, SOE investors may be subject 
to greater transparency obligations or stricter screening in respect of admission. In 
such cases, SOEs are treated differently from other enterprises by host states, but the 
questions is whether the SOE can challenge national rules before investment 
tribunals claiming the host state violates international obligations. 
                                                             
1 This is a main reason why developed countries designed the BIT and the investor-state arbitration mechanism at 
the beginning, see also Ch 1. 
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As noted in Chapter 2, foreign SOEs are in principle qualified for investment 
protections, and recent cases have indicated that SOE investors can file claims 
against host states at international tribunals if states fail to meet substantive 
protections. In this scenario, the tribunal will have to examine whether a host state’s 
regulatory measure against the SOE violates any international obligations and may 
request the state to compensate the SOE investor for liability.2 Since host states’ 
conduct against SOEs are subject to substantive treatments stipulated in IIAs,3 the 
state’s right to regulate SOE investments may be restricted by its obligations on 
substantive protections. Furthermore, the risk of investment arbitration may also 
discourage states from taking measures to address their concerns over SOE 
investments.4  
 
As key provisions in investment treaties, standards of treatment have long been 
discussed and debated by tribunals and scholars.5 As will be elaborated later, since 
treatment provisions are often formulated broadly in vague terms, arbitral tribunals 
have a great degree of discretion in the interpretation and application of key treaty 
provisions. In addition to the uncertainty and unpredictability in arbitral practice, the 
unique characteristics of SOEs may generate problematic issues in the application of 
treatment standards under IIAs. For example, whether the state ownership plays a 
                                                             
2 Anne van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State 
Liability: A Functional and Comparative View’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010). 
3 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Second Edi, OUP 2015) 228. 
4 Some scholars have argued that investment treaties may discourage state from adopting legitimate regulatory 
measures in practice- the concern has been named ‘regulatory chill’, see e.g., Christian Tietje and Freya Baetens, 
‘The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ 
(2014) 7 <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
5 See, for example, August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008); Stephan W Schill, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010); Wenhua Shan, Norah Gallagher and 
Sheng Zhang, ‘National Treatment for Foreign Investment in China: A Changing Landscape’ (2012) 27 ICSID 
Review 120; Jean Kalicki and Suzana Medeiros, ‘Fair, Equitable and Ambiguous: What Is Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in International Investment Law?’ (2007) 22 ICSID Review 24; Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, 
Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009); Andrew D 
Mitchell, David Heaton and Caroline Henckels, Non-Discrimination and the Role of Regulatory Purpose in 
International Trade and Investment Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016); Konrad von Moltke, ‘Discrimination 
and Non-Discrimination in Foreign Direct Investment: Mining Issues’ (2002); Nicholas DiMascio and Joost 
Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ 
(2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 48. 
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role in assessing the “in like circumstance” requirement of non-discriminatory 
treatment standards in some treaties, and whether SOE investors have weak 
legitimate expectations under fair and equitable treatment since they have used to the 
stricter screenings.  
 
This chapter, therefore, discusses whether and to what extent investment treaties 
offer SOEs substantive protections. For the purpose of this research, the first section 
focuses on the ‘relative’ standards of protections, i.e., the non-discriminatory 
treatment of SOEs, including national treatment (NT) and most-favoured-nation 
treatment (MFN). The second section moves to ‘absolute’ standards of protections- 
especially the FET of SOEs. Each section considers both treaty practice and arbitral 
tribunals’ interpretations to examine how SOEs should be treated in the host state’s 
jurisdiction and how to strike a balance of rights and obligations between SOE 
investors and host states. The last section summarises the main findings and provides 
implications for future treaty negotiations. 
 
4.2 Non-discriminatory Treatment of SOE Investors 
 
Non-discriminatory treatment (NDT), including both NT and MFN, is a ‘relative’ 
standard of investment protections in IIAs, which requires host states to treat foreign 
investors and investments no less favourably than they treat domestic investors and 
investments (i.e., NT) and other foreign investors and investments (i.e., MFN).6 As a 
core investment protection, NDT attempts to level the playing field among all 
economic actors with the assumption that such equality of treatment will foster 
competition and economic growth.7 However, such equality is not easy to achieve 
since states may have different standpoints and interests in foreign investments. For 
instance, countries such as China did not provide NT in its earlier treaties.8  
 
NDT of SOEs may be more complex and controversial. As noted in previous 
chapters, SOEs are often viewed differently from private investors due to state 
                                                             
6 Salacuse (n 3) 274. 
7 ibid. 
8 Gallagher and Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice 160. 
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ownership. Consequently, some may argue that treatment of foreign SOEs should 
not be equal to that of domestic investors as they have received many benefits from 
their home governments. Also, the rise of SOEs as a global investor has attracted 
increasing concerns including national security and competitive neutrality concerns. 
Regardless of whether such concerns are reasonable or not, some countries have 
taken or wish to take restrictive measures against foreign SOEs to respond to 
challenges and potential risks.9 A question arises as to whether or not the different or 
restrictive treatment of foreign SOEs constitutes a violation of nondiscrimination 
commitment under investment treaties. 
 
Indeed, while NDT has become a critical issue in investment policies and treaty 
practice, little research discusses the NDT of foreign SOEs under IIAs. A possible 
reason is that states (especially developed states) have traditionally attached more 
importance to protecting private investors and investments. However, the situation 
now has changed. SOEs from emerging economies are active investors while 
developed countries are worried about the negative effects of SOE investments, 
which may result in a different attitude towards NDT of SOEs at the international 
level. Hence, this section will focus on whether and to what extent NDT applies to 
SOE investments. 
 
4.2.1 Applying NDT to SOEs 
 
A. General rule 
 
Most investment treaties contain general NDT provisions that aim at maintaining a 
level playing field among investors, whether nationally or internationally. However, 
such provisions do not specifically differentiate between foreign investors of 
different ownership backgrounds. NT and MFN normally require host states to treat 
foreign investors and their investments in a way that is no less favourable than the 
                                                             
9 For instance, Canadian policies in respect of  sovereign investments, for example, have changed concerning the 
treatment of foreign SOE investment in the country’s Western oil sands, see A Edward Safarian, ‘The Canadian 
Policy Response to Sovereign Direct Investment’ in Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and Wouter PF Schmit 
Jongbloed (eds), Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (OUP 2012) 431–52; Angela Avery, Peter 
Glossop and Paula Olexiuk, ‘Foreign Investment in Canada’s Oil and Gas Sector: New and Emerging 
Challenges’ (2013) 51 Alberta Law Review 343. See also Ch 1 and Ch 3. 
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treatment accorded to domestic (or third party) investors and their investments.10 For 
instance, Article 3 of the China-Germany BIT (2003) provides: 
 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities 
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
Party treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the investments and 
associated activities by its own investors.  
(3) Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities 
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
Party to treatment less favourable than that accorded to the investments and 
associated activities by the investors of any third State. 
 
In this context, foreign SOEs shall be granted NT and MFN as long as they qualify 
as investors and their investments are covered by the treaty at issue. As noted in 
Chapter 2, whilst most IIAs are silent as to whether SOEs qualify as ‘investors’, 
there are more treaties specifically including rather than excluding them.11 Hence, 
SOEs shall, in principle, enjoy NDT under current IIAs despite their silence on SOEs. 
 
Notably, some earlier treaties, especially those concluded by the United States, 
provided that ‘each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it maintains or 
establishes accords the better of national or most favoured nation treatment in the 
sale of its goods or services in the Party’s territory’.12A similar provision is also 
included in NAFTA Article 1503 (State Enterprises).13 Such provisions do not deal 
with SOEs as foreign ‘investors’, but domestic SOEs (of the host state) that provide 
goods or services to foreign investors. As such, there is no question of whether or not 
such SOEs should enjoy NDT, but rather whether investment treaties should 
guarantee NDT to foreign investors to which domestic SOEs provide goods or 
                                                             
10 See e.g., Rudolf Dlozer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Second Edi, OUP 
2012) 198, 206; Gallagher and Shan (n 8) 139. See also Article 1102 (NT) and 1103 (MFN) of the NAFTA. 
11 Yuri Shima, ‘The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-Controlled Investors: A Fact 
Finding Survey’ (OECD Publishing 2015) 2015/01 11–3 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7svp0jkns-
en%0AOECD> accessed 12 September 2017. See more in Ch 2. 
12 For example, Article II (2) (c) of the US BITs with Moldova, Ecuador, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements 462. 
13 NAFTA, Article 1503 (3) provides that ‘each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it maintains or 
establishes accords non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods or services to investments in the Party’s 
territory of investors of another Party’. Similar provisions are adopted in FTAs of the US with Chile, Australia, 
Peru and Columbia.  
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services. Such a provision is omitted in later BITs and FTAs of the US, but has 
resurfaced in some recent FTAs such as the US-Singapore FTA.14 
 
B. Qualifiers and exceptions 
 
However, the application of NDT to SOEs is not without conditions and exceptions. 
To the contrary, NDT rules under most treaties are subject to certain qualifications 
and exceptions, which undoubtedly apply to SOE investors. First, NDT of SOEs 
under most investment treaties applies only after the SOE investment has been made 
in the host state (post-establishment). In this respect, traditional investment treaties, 
especially those negotiated by EU member states merely provide post-establishment 
non-discriminatory treatment that leaves host states free to impose a discriminatory 
requirement on the admission of foreign SOEs.15 In contrast, US treaties normally 
extend non-discrimination treatment to both pre-establishment and post-
establishment stages.16 As noted in Chapter 3, many recent treaty practices have 
broken away from traditional policy by accepting pre-establishment national 
treatment with a ‘negative list’ of reserved sectors, such as the CETA and Chinese 
BIT negotiations with the EU and the US.17 Even if a pre-establishment national 
treatment commitment has been made, the host country may still use a ‘negative list’ 
or a ‘positive list’ to limit national treatment and protect certain national industries or 
                                                             
14 See Article 12.3.2 (d) of the US-Singapore FTA. The reason for omitting such a provision is because the same 
protection in this regard has already been provided by the general NT and MFN provisions, see Vandevelde (n 
12).  
15 For example, Article 3 (2) of the UK-Egypt BIT provides:  
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or of nationals or companies of 
the other Contracting Party to treatment favorable than that which it accords to investments or returns 
of its nationals or companies or to investments or returns of nationals or companies of any third State. 
(2) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards their management, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to 
treatment less favorable that which it accords to its own nationals or companies or to national 
companies of any third State.  
Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 199. See also Ch 3. 
16 For example, Article 1102 (1) of the NAFTA provides that, ‘[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of another 
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments’. 
17 Shan and Zhang, ‘Market Access Provisions in the Potential EU Model BIT: Toward a “Global BIT 2.0”?’ 441. 
See more in Ch 3. 
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activities.18 Hence, foreign SOEs may be treated differently in host countries under 
different treaty practices, and the precise scope of non-discriminatory treatment of 
foreign SOEs has to be determined by provisions in the specific treaty. For example, 
the US ‘negative list’ rarely limits foreign ownership to a certain percentage of an 
investment, while Chinese practice does so across many sectors.19 Nonetheless, even 
under a post-establishment investment treaty, the host state may still deny offering 
NDT to SOEs if the SOE investment does not comply with national laws and 
legislations. 
 
The second contextual qualifier of NDT for SOEs is the ‘in like circumstances’ 
phrase. US treaties, for instance, traditionally specify that NDT provisions only 
apply ‘in like situations’ or ‘in like circumstances’.20 In this context, only ‘in like 
circumstances’ will treatment less favourable to foreign SOEs than that accorded to 
comparators by a host state trigger non-discrimination obligations. Some argue that a 
comparative context is implicitly required by NT and MFN even if there is no 
explicit language to this effect.21 However, investment treaties with an ‘in like 
circumstances’ phrase make it clear that the likeness of the circumstances is a 
mandatory component of analysis.  
 
                                                             
18 The ‘positive list’ approach is typical in GATS type treaties and the ‘negative list’ approach is typical in the 
NAFTA or US treaties, UNCTAD, National Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (UN Publication 1999) 68. It is the same in MFN clauses, see UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreement II (UN Publication 2010) 42. 
19 See USCBC, ‘Summary of US Negative Lists in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2014) 
<https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/Negative%20list%20summary.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
Notably, China has announced its intention to reduce foreign investment restrictions, and to adopt a negative-list 
approach that promises a higher degree of openness, Xinhua, ‘China to reduce foreign investment restrictions’ 
China Daily (Beijing 5 March 2015) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-
03/05/content_19731187.htm> accessed 12 September 2017. 
20 See e.g., 1994 US Model BIT, Article II.1. In recent years US practice has changed the reference from ‘in like 
situation’ to ‘in like circumstance’, see Article 3 of the 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs. Scholars consider that the 
change from ‘in like situations’ to ‘in like circumstances’ indicates that for the US Government there is a nuance 
between these two versions that deserves attention, Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 198. The reference to ‘in like 
circumstances’ can also be found in other treaties, e.g., Mexico-Iceland BIT, Article 3 (2)-(3); Canada-Uruguay 
BIT, Article IV; Japan-Vietnam BIT, Article 2; NAFTA, Article 1102, 1103; etc. 
21 This was also argued by some delegations during the MAI negotiations, UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment (n 18) 26. Also, Vandevelde considers that national and MFN treatment are assumed to be compared 
only to the treatment of comparable investments, thus even where a phrase such as ‘in like circumstances’ or ‘in 
like situation’ does not appear in the provision, such a limitation should be treated as implicit, Vandevelde, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 340–1. 
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Regardless of whether the ‘in like circumstances’ condition is expressly stated or 
implied, it may restrict the application of NDT to SOEs to a certain context. In other 
words, the ‘in like circumstances’ requirement may provide a safeguard to host states 
to exclude SOE investors from NDT protections on the basis of different ownership. 
Here a key issue is whether the ownership is a criterion of ‘likeness’. However, most 
treaties are silent on the meaning of ‘in like circumstances’ or ‘in like situations’. To 
that extent, the scope of the comparator is still ambiguous, leaving it uncertain 
whether different treatment could be accorded to SOEs and other investors on the 
basis of their ownership structure. It is noted that several recent treaties have 
attempted to set criteria of ‘in like circumstances’ to clarify the NDT standard and 
provide more guidance to tribunals in identifying an appropriate comparator.22  
 
Most notably, the recent draft Model BIT of India highlights that ‘whether the 
investment is public, private, or state-owned or controlled’ is one of the important 
elements to be considered for assessing ‘like circumstances’. 23  Although such 
clarification may not aim to discriminate against foreign SOEs - perhaps more likely 
to protect domestic SOEs due to the large amounts of interests of SOEs in India24 - it 
manifests that the treatment accorded to an SOE investor can be different from that 
accorded to a non-SOE investor since they are not ‘in like circumstances’. However, 
                                                             
22 For example, Article 4 (2) of the Azerbaijan–Croatia BIT (2007) provides:  
For greater certainty, the concept of ‘in like circumstances’ requires an overall examination, on a case-
by-case basis, of all the circumstances of an investment, including, inter alia: i. its effects on third 
persons and the local community; ii. its effects upon the local, regional or national environment; iii. 
The sector the investor is in; iv. The aim of the measure of concern; v. the regulatory process generally 
applied in relation to a measure of concern; and vi. other factors directly relating to the investment or 
investor in relation to the measure of concern. The examination shall not be limited or biased towards 
any one factor.  
Similar provision see also Article 17 of the COMESA Investment Agreement (2007, not in force). 
23 According to the draft Indian model BIT (2015), the requirement of ‘like circumstances’ recognises that states 
may have various legitimate reasons for distinguishing between investments including, but not limited to, (a) the 
goods or services consumed or produced by the Investment; (b) the actual and potential impact of the Investment 
on third persons, the local community, or the environment, (c) whether the Investment is public, private, or state-
owned or controlled, and (d) the practical challenges of regulating the Investment, see Article 4.1 of the Indian 
2015 Model BIT 
<https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%
20Investment%20Treaty.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
24 According to Forbes Global 2000, the majority of 260 largest companies are from China and India; the market 
value of SOEs in India amounts to 225 of GNI and the Country SOE Share (CSS) is 58.9, Przemyslaw Kowalski 
and others, ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’ (OECD 2013) 147, 21 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en> accessed 12 September 2017. 
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such provisions are exceptional in treaty practice, and most IIAs do not provide any 
further clarification, in which the issue of whether an SOE investor and a non-SOE 
investor are comparable ‘in like circumstances’ has to be determined by investment 
arbitral tribunals. 
 
Finally, the scope of NDT to SOEs may also be qualified by various express 
exceptions and reservations in IIAs, including general exceptions and other specific 
exceptions. Many IIAs provide general exceptions, typically on the basis of public 
health, order and morals, and national security, which apply to all provisions of the 
investment treaty including NDT.25 Other treaties tend to provide ‘essential security 
interests’ as an exception to IIA obligations,26 which enables states to continue to 
review and prohibit or suspend foreign acquisitions or mergers because of their 
possible threat to national security.27 There are also treaties that provide specific 
exceptions of NDT, especially exceptions for specific industrial sectors or types of 
measures.28 Chapter 5 will further discuss treaty exceptions in detail. 
 
As a result, the extent of the NDT treatment of SOE investors is subject to various 
general and specific exceptions and restrictions. Host states may not grant SOE 
investors NDT at all times and in all circumstances. Although most (if not all) 
restrictions or exceptions of NDT do not specifically target SOE investors, some 
may be of exceptional importance to SOE investors, such as the ‘in like 
circumstances’ requirement and national security exceptions, because they may 
provide a ground for host states to differentiate SOE investors from non-SOE 
investors without a violation of NDT obligations. Nonetheless, to ascertain whether 
                                                             
25 For example, Article 2102 of NAFTA, Article 24 of ECT, Article XIV of the GATS. UNCTAD, National 
Treatment (n 18) 44; UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (n 18) 46. 
26 See e.g., Article 18 of the US 2012 Model BIT. 
27 Richard C Levin and Susan Erickson Martin, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and Investment Disputes’ (1996) 
Law & Business Review of the America 82, 82. 
28 Specific industrial sectors typically include petroleum, hydrocarbon and cultural industries, while specific 
types of measures typically include taxation measures, government subsidies and grants, government 
procurement, etc. For example, US 2012 Model BIT Article 14 (4) & (5), NAFTA Article 1108 (7), Canada-Peru 
BIT Article 16. See UNCTAD, National Treatment (n 18) 45; Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Gert Wehinger, ‘Open 
Capital Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Pension Funds, and State-Owned Enterprises’ in RA Fry, WJ 
McKibbon and J O’Brien (eds), Sovereign Wealth: The Role of State Capital in the New Financial Order 
(Imperial College Press 2011) 189–91. 
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and to what extent an SOE investor can enjoy NDT treatment, it is essential to take 
all relevant provisions into account. 
 
4.2.2 Addressing Host States’ Concerns under NDT Rules 
 
While SOE investments may bring huge benefits regarding growth, employment, 
and transfer of technology to the host economy,29 they may have potentially negative 
effects on national security or competitive neutrality which need to be prevented or 
mitigated by measures of the host states.30 Therefore, an ideal NDT provision design, 
as with other rules under IIAs, should be able to promote and protect SOE 
investments while addressing the legitimate concerns of the host states.31 
 
As noted above, traditional investment treaties tend to be rather short and focused on 
investment protection with little attention paid to the need to preserve the regulatory 
space of host states. As a result, they typically offer NDT protection to all kinds of 
investments including SOE investments with few or no safeguarding restrictions 
such as the ‘in like circumstances’ requirements or other general or specific 
exceptions. However, many recent treaty practices have attempted to address the 
legitimate concerns of host states by the inclusion of a series of important restrictions 
and exceptions.  
 
Chapter 1 has indicated that the most significant concerns relating to SOE 
investments are twofold: national security and competitive neutrality, both of which 
can be addressed in some of the recent investment treaties. More specifically, 
national security concerns related to SOE investors can be addressed by security 
exceptions, including national or essential security exceptions, or other exception 
                                                             
29 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 - Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan (UN Publication 2014) 21–
2; Hans Christiansen and Yunhen Kim, ‘State-Invested Enterprises in the Global Marketplace : Implications for a 
Level Playing Field’ (2014) 14, 47 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvfvl6nw-en%0AOECD> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
30 See e.g., Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed (eds), Sovereign Investment: 
Concerns and Policy Reactions (OUP 2012) 16–21; Antonio Capobianco and Hans Christiansen, ‘Competitive 
Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options’ (2011) 1 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfgjdhg6-en> accesed 12 September 2017, 5. 
31 See also Ch 1. 
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clauses under recent IIAs.32 Although these exceptions apply to all foreign investors, 
they can sufficiently address national security risks concerning SOE investors. For 
example, the 2012 US Model BIT has an essential security interests exception, which 
stipulates that: 
 
nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to preclude a Party from applying 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 
the protection of its own essential security interests.33  
 
Also, more and more treaties now contain a general exception clause to stipulate that 
it be ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ or ‘necessary for the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’.34 With such exceptions, host states 
may prohibit or restrict certain SOE investments on grounds of national security 
without breaching the NDT obligation. Chapter 6 will discuss this in detail. 
 
The competitive neutrality (CN) concern is a more complex issue. To start with, no 
consensus has been reached on the concept and contents of CN per se.35 Although it 
is agreed that the concept aims to prevent SOEs from gaining competitive 
advantages merely on the basis of their state ownership status, it is far from clear 
what kind of behaviour relating to SOEs should be prohibited or restricted and 
how.36 Indeed, no state has achieved or has intended to achieve absolute competitive 
neutrality in their domestic market. As a matter of fact, developed states actually 
own the bulk of SOEs in terms of sales, assets and market valuation.37 Indeed, SOEs 
are essential for states to achieve certain goals, strategic, security, industrial or 
                                                             
32 Although national security exceptions were included in traditional IIAs only sporadically, their inclusion has 
been much more frequent in recent treaties, UNCTAD, World Investement Report 2015 - Reforming International 
Investment Governance 141. 
33 Article 18 of the 2012 US Model BIT. 
34 For example, Article 9.8 of the Australia-China FTA, Article 22 of the Japan-Uruguay BIT, Article 17 of the 
Canada-Côte d’Ivoire BIT, etc. ibid 112–3; UNCTAD, WIR 2014 (n 29) 116–7. 
35 According to the OECD report, competitive neutrality implies that no business entity is advantaged (or 
disadvantaged) solely because of its ownership. In Australian law, competitive neutrality requires that 
government business activities should not enjoy net competitive advantages over their private sector competitors 
simply by virtue of public sector ownership. Capobianco and Christiansen (n 30) 3, 5. Currently the study on 
competitive neutrality in international law context is still at the fact-finding stage.  
36 Kowalski and others (n 24) 37–42. 
37 ibid 21. 
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otherwise.38 As a result, it is unrealistic to expect all anti-CN measures to be 
prohibited or restricted in investment treaties. Like the concept of state sovereignty, 
that of competitive neutrality is an essentially contested concept, the specific 
contents of which are subject to continuous debates and bargains.  
 
Nevertheless, to a certain extent, competitive neutrality concerns can still be 
addressed by two main aspects of the NDT rules under some recent IIAs, namely, the 
‘in like circumstances’ requirement and the public policy exception. 
 
A. Competitive neutrality and the ‘like circumstances’ qualification  
 
It might be argued that state ownership may change the ‘likeness’ of circumstances 
and on this basis, the host state may have a basis for treating foreign SOE investors 
differently from others. As mentioned above, very few treaties have attempted to 
clarify ‘in like circumstances’, and only the new Indian draft Model BIT has referred 
to ‘ownership’ as one of the important elements to be considered when determining 
‘like circumstances’.39 However, it does not give any further indications as to how 
state ownership might change the circumstances.  
 
In practice, tribunals have presumed to identify entities in like circumstances and the 
primary approach used is the ‘competitive relationship’ test.40 The argument here is 
that the relative standards aim to ensure a level playing field as well as to prohibit 
discrimination among competitors.41  Most early cases, including S.D. Myers v. 
Canada, Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Feldman v. Mexico, and ADF v. US, regarded 
certain forms of ‘competition’ as a condition of ‘likeness’ in an NT inquiry.42 In the 
S.D. Myers case, the tribunal considered that the concept of ‘like circumstances’ 
invites an examination of whether or not a non-national investor is in the ‘same 
                                                             
38 Capobianco and Christiansen (n 30) 8–9. 
39 See Article 4.1 of Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (n 23). 
40 Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘The National Treatment Obligation’ in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration Under 
International Investment Agreement: A Guide to the Key Issue (OUP 2010) 422. 
41 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (n 21) 341. 
42 Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, the Global Financial 
Crisis and International Economic Law’ (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 859, 885. 
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sector’ as the national investor.43 The ‘sector’ has a wide connotation that includes 
the concepts of ‘economic sector’ and ‘business sector’. 44  From a business 
perspective, it was clear that SDMI and Myers Canada were in ‘like circumstances’ 
with Canadian operators because they were in a competitive relationship.45 In Pope 
& Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal focused on the relevant business and economic 
sector to find the appropriate comparator.46 In Feldman, the tribunal’s view was that, 
‘…the “universe” of firms in like circumstances is those foreign-owned and 
domestic-owned firms that are in the same business…’47 
 
Notably, some tribunals took a broader or narrower interpretation in establishing the 
existence of ‘like circumstances’ without examining the role of the competitive 
relationship. For example, in Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal adopted a much 
broader approach by ruling that a foreign investor involved in oil exports was ‘like’ 
domestic companies exporting non-oil-related goods such as flowers and seafood 
products. The tribunal explained that, ‘the purpose of national treatment is to protect 
investors as compared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing 
exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is undertaken’.48 In contrast, 
the later Methanex tribunal adopted a much narrower approach requiring 
identification of an ‘identical’ comparator to the foreign investor.49 However, both 
the broader and narrower interpretations prove to be rare in arbitral practice, and 
tribunals have largely returned to a competition-based reading of ‘in like 
circumstances’ in an NT inquiry.50 For example, in ADM v Mexico, the tribunal 
reaffirmed the competitive relationship test in identifying the in like circumstances 
given that the investor and the comparators ‘compete face to face in the same 
                                                             
43 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2012, para 250. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid 251. 
46 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, 
para 78. 
47 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award,16 December 
2002, para 171.  
48 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final 
Award, 1 July 2004, para 173. 
49 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction 
and Merits, 3 August 2005, Part IV-Ch- B, para 17. 
50 Aaken and Kurtz (n 42). 
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market’.51 The tribunal also held that, ‘when no identical comparators exist, the 
foreign investor may be compared with less like comparators, if the overall 
circumstance of the case suggests that they are in like circumstances’. 52 
 
The UPS v. Canada case is of particular relevance on this issue. In this case, UPS 
alleged that Canada’s Publications Assistance Program (PAP) violated national 
treatment under NAFTA because it only applied to Canada Post (CP), an SOE of 
Canada. The majority held that UPS and CP were not in like circumstances given 
that CP was the only company that could deliver post to every address in Canada due 
to its statutory obligations to do so.53 The dissenting arbitrator, however, considered 
that the two companies were indeed in like circumstances, as UPS claimed that it 
was able to achieve universal or virtually universal delivery.54 In this case, both the 
majority and the dissenting arbitrator did not waste time in analysing the fact that CP 
was an SOE, and the implications of this SOE status. Rather, they concentrated on 
the actual conditions under which the two companies competed against each other. 
 
The aforementioned cases, particularly the UPS case, show that tribunals tend to 
focus their analyses on the competitive relationship between the foreign investor and 
the comparator domestic investor. No tribunal seems to have paid much attention to 
the ‘ownership’ of the companies concerned. However, the ‘ownership’ element 
actually played a role in the UPS case, albeit indirectly. CP enjoyed the subsidy 
under the PAP program mainly because CP was able to carry out universal delivery, 
and the reason that it could do so was because as an SOE it had been required to do 
so for a long period. The majority in the case effectively acknowledged that SOEs 
undertook special obligations to the state, and consequently it was legitimate that 
they enjoyed certain special benefits from the state. Foreign investors, since they did 
                                                             
51 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, para 201. Likewise, in CPI v. Mexico, the tribunal 
concluded that the ‘in like circumstances’ requirement was satisfied on the basis that Mexican sugar producers 
operated in the same business or economic sectors as CPI and their products were in direct competition with one 
another, Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision 
on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, para 120. 
52 ADM (n 51), paras 197-202. 
53 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Merits, 24 May 2007, 
para 173. 
54 ibid, Dissenting Opinion, paras 94, 133. 
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not wish to undertake the same obligations to the state, were not in ‘like 
circumstances’ as such SOEs, and hence could not claim the same benefits. 
Essentially, it was Canadian policy and practice on an SOE in a given industry that 
justified the discriminatory treatment to foreign investors. In other words, the 
‘ownership’ element could somehow play a role in the determination of ‘like 
circumstances’. However, it remains to be seen how this might work out in a case 
where a host state might invoke the ‘like circumstances’ qualification to justify its 
discriminatory measures against foreign SOE investors. What is certain is that the 
‘ownership’ element will be considered under a treaty that expressly includes 
ownership as an element of ‘like circumstances’, as in the new draft Indian Model 
BIT. 
 
B. Competitive neutrality and public policy 
 
Whereas traditional IIAs typically do not contain express public policy exceptions, 
an increasing number of new treaties do include them. The formulation of such 
exceptions is often modelled on Article XX of GATT or Article XIV of GATS.55 
These provisions aim to balance investment protection with other public policy 
objectives and to reduce states’ exposure to investor challenges of such measures.56 
In practice, some tribunals have addressed that reasonable public policy can justify 
different or discriminatory treatment.57 In this context, different treatment of SOE 
investors on the basis of CN concerns can be justified in investment law context if 
CN is a rational public policy objective.  
 
However, IIA jurisprudence does not provide clear guidance on what amounts to a 
‘legitimate’ public policy goal to justify differentiation. In Pope & Talbot, for 
example, the tribunal held that rational policies were ‘not motivated by the 
preference of domestic over foreign owned investments’. 58  In Occidental, the 
tribunal did not discuss the motive of a government policy (a tax regulation), but 
                                                             
55 See e.g., Article 10 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT, Article 83 of the Japan-Singapore FTA (2002), Article 
200 of the China-New Zealand FTA (2008). Newcombe and Paradell (n 5) 500. 
56 UNCTAD, WIR 2015 (n 32) 140. 
57 See e.g., UPS (n 53), paras 98, 119; Pope & Talbot (n 46), para 76; Gami Investments, Inc. v The Government 
of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Award, 15 November 2004, para 114. 
58 Pope & Talbot (n 46), para 79. S.D.Myer (n 43) para 298. 
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stated that ‘the purpose of national treatment in this dispute…is to avoid exporters 
being placed at a disadvantage in foreign markets because of the indirect taxes paid 
in the country of origin’.59 In Saluka v. the Czech Republic, the tribunal looked at a 
range of different criteria in assessing whether differential treatment of IPB was 
justified by state financial assistance by the Czech Republic.60Nevertheless, some 
investment arbitration awards have provided indications on how tribunals might 
assess the rationales for differentiation.61 For example, the Pope & Talbot tribunal 
held that differences in treatment should have ‘a reasonable nexus to rational 
government policies’. 62  Likewise, the tribunal in GAMI stated that different 
treatment must be ‘plausibly connected with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring 
that the sugar industry was in the hands of solvent enterprises) and…applied neither 
in a discriminatory manner nor as a disguised barrier to equal opportunity’.63 With 
regard to the governmental implementation of public policy, some tribunals have 
noted that political considerations (such as politics and nationalistic reasons) 
decrease the reasonableness of a host state’s conduct;64  while an inclusion in 
domestic law may strengthen the rationale of such conduct.65 Also, a dissenting 
opinion in UPS addressed that states must articulate ex ante rationales to justify their 
actions rather than rationalise ex post facto its discriminatory conduct.66 A separate 
statement commented that: 
 
                                                             
59 Occidental (n 48) para 175. 
60 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras 327-347. 
61 Suzanne A Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in A New Generation of International Investment Agreements’ 
(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1059; Aaken and Kurtz (n 42) 888. 
62 Pope & Talbot (n 46) para 78. In this context, the tribunal also suggested recognising that the fundamental 
purposes of NAFTA, as expressed in its Article 102, might need to supplement the test. 
63 GAMI (n 57), para 114. 
64 See e.g., Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and Others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/8, Award, 1 March 2012, para 265; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, 
para 233; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, para 118; 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, 
para 500. 
65 For example, in ADF v. United States, the tribunal noted that ‘something more than simple illegality or lack of 
authority under the domestic law of State is necessary to render an act or measures inconsistent with FET’, ADF 
Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, 9 January 2003, para 190. In 
Noble Venture v. Romania, the tribunal observed that the process of privatisation was not arbitrary given it was 
the only solution to the company’s insolvency and was conducted in accordance with Romanian law, Noble 
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, para 182. 
66 Newcombe and Paradell (n 5) 180. 
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Canada [host state] may be free to adopt any reasonable design to implements 
its policy…  But it is not free to assert for the first time during a dispute 
resolution proceeding an ex post rationalisation that would limit the 
availability of a government benefit to a single [domestic] recipient.67 
 
To ensure the regulatory authority of states and to avoid an overly discretionary 
review by arbitration tribunals regarding the grounds of differential treatment, some 
new IIAs have adopted express public policy exceptions. Such inclusions explicitly 
allow for measures - which might otherwise be challengeable under the agreement - 
to be taken by host states under specified circumstances without a breach of NDT 
standards. In so doing, states can have an important effect in increasing certainty and 
predictability about the scope of the IIA’s obligations.68 For example, the Norwegian 
2015 Model BIT provides that: 
  
[T]he Parties agree/ are of the understanding that a measure applied by a 
government in pursuance of legitimate policy objectives of public 
interest such as the protection of public health, human rights, labour 
rights, safety and the environment, although having a different effect on 
an investment or investor of another Party, is not inconsistent with 
national treatment and most favoured nation treatment when justified by 
showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not 
motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned investment.69 
 
However, governments should remain very cautious in regulating SOE investment 
given that the distinction between arbitrary conduct and legitimate regulations can be 
very vague. Government conduct targeted at SOEs is still potentially deemed as 
arbitrary if based on a political and discriminatory motive. To avoid possible risks, 
the transparency and certainty of government measures with regard to SOEs may be 
called upon to refrain from arbitrary conduct of states and to protect the ‘legitimate 
expectations’ of SOE investors. 
 
                                                             
67 UPS (n 53), Award on Merits and Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, 24 May 2007, para 124. 
68 UNCTAD, WIR 2014 (n ) 140. 
69 Article 3 of the Norwegian 2015 Model BIT. 
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Also, the risk of arbitration has to be noted. As Jan Paulsson stated, ‘arbitration 
without privity is a delicate mechanism. A single incident of an adventurist arbitrator 
going beyond the proper scope of his jurisdiction in a sensitive case may be 
sufficient to generate a backlash’.70 In this context, host states may not be willing to 
delegate too much flexibility to investment arbitrators to determine what legitimate 
regulation of sovereign investors is.71  Although one may argue that the most 
effective response would be the development of a ‘prudent and sound investment 
practice’ on these questions,72 it is necessary for governments to consider what 
measures they could take to ensure that sensible domestic regulation of SOEs is not 
undermined by one or more ‘adventurist arbitrators’.73 One way forward might be to 
expressly include competitive neutrality in the list of public policy objectives, 
making sure that this element must be considered as an exception.  
 
4.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment of SOE Investments 
 
We now turn to the most important international investment protection - fair and 
equitable treatment.74 As an ‘absolute’ standard of investment protections, FET 
obliges the host state to provide foreign investments with certain standards - here is 
fair and equitable - treatment, without reference to how they treat other investments 
or entities.75  In contrast to NT and MFN, a violation of FET does not need 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. Hence, different treatment on the basis of 
other factors such as ownership that do not breach NDT may constitute a violation of 
FET. However, the precise contents and parameters of this standard remain 
ambiguous and controversial.76 As a result, tribunals have considerable discretion in 
                                                             
70 Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Without Privity’ (1995) 10 ICSID Review 232, 257. 
71 Poulsen, ‘Investment Treaties and the Globalisation of State Capitalism: Opportunities and Constraints for 
Host States’ 86. 
72 Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ 636–7. 
73 Poulsen (n 71) 80. 
74 Scholars have noted that FET is the most frequently and successfully invoked standard of treatment under 
investment treaties, Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel, The Political 
Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime (OUP 2017) 92–3; Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 137. 
75 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 93; UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II (UN Publication 2012) 6. 
76 The two concepts included in the FET standard, namely ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’, are ‘inherently subjective and 
therefore lacking in precision’, UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (Volume I) (UN 
Publication 2004) 212; Kalicki and Medeiros (n 5) 25.  
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determining the standard, which has resulted in a lack of uniformity in arbitral 
practice. 
 
Despite the inherent problems of FET, problems may arise where foreign SOEs are 
involved. For instance, Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 have indicated that some countries 
have strengthened regulations on foreign SOEs. In such cases, foreign SOEs may 
wish to enjoy (at least) FET protections in host states, while the state may be 
concerned that FET obligations unduly constrain their right to regulate foreign SOEs. 
Furthermore, FET protection can afford foreign SOEs effective protection against 
the arbitrary and discriminatory conduct of host states. While international 
investment and trade laws generally permit the state to take measures to regulate 
foreign investments, they are opposed to economic protectionism. However, the 
undefined and broad formulation of FET may make it difficult to distinguish 
legitimate regulation from investment protectionism. The following part, therefore, 
will focus on FET and its application to SOE investments. 
 
4.3.1 SOE Investments and FET Provisions 
 
Since the first reference to ‘equitable’ treatment found in the 1948 Havana Charter 
for an International Trade Organisation, FET has been widely adopted in current 
international agreements.77 However, the formulation and language of FET in IIAs 
varies significantly. The typical formulation of the FET standard of investment 
treaties provides that ‘each contracting party shall in any case accord investments 
fair and equitable treatment’.78 Some treaties combine FET with other standards, 
including the guarantee of protection and security,79 the obligations of MFN and 
                                                             
77 Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 130–2. Some Asian countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Singapore are 
reluctant to include the FET standard in their BITs in the beginning. But, in recent years, even countries which 
traditionally were in favour of NT over FET have incorporated the FET standard in their BIT. Nevertheless, Latin 
American countries, which have embraced the Calvo doctrine since the beginning of the XXth Century have 
firmly avoided the terms ‘fair and equitable’, OECD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law’ (OECD Publishing 2004) 2004/3, 5 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
78 See e.g., Article 4 (1) of the Argentina-Spain BIT provides that ‘each Party shall accord in its territory fair and 
equitable treatment to investments made by investors of another Party’. See also Article 2 (1) of the Germany-
Botswana BIT (2000). Such provisions are typical in German and Austrian BITs, see e.g., 1994 Austria Model 
BIT, etc. 
79 See e.g., Article II (2) of the Cambodia-Cuba BIT (2001), which provides that, ‘Investments of investors of 
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NT,80 and the duty to refrain from arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.81 Some 
treaties clarify that FET should be accorded at all times,82  while others do not 
contain such language.83 
 
In the majority of treaty provisions, the FET standard is accorded to ‘investment’ or 
‘covered investment’ rather than ‘investor’, without any distinction of ownership. 
Hence, whatever specific language has been adopted in the treaty, SOE investments 
shall normally be granted FET protections by the host state. One exception is when 
the SOE investment is not a covered investment under the treaty. For example, if the 
treaty provides protection of investments in accordance with local laws and an SOE 
investment does not comply with the national requirement, the SOE investor may not 
be able to enjoy FET. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
either contracting party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy adequate 
protection and security in the territory of the other contracting party’. See also Article 2 (2) of the Germany 
Model BIT (1998); Article 9 (1) of the Japan-Vietnam BIT (2003); Article 3 (a) of the US-Ecuador BIT (1993); 
etc. 
80 See e.g., Article 3 (2) of the Switzerland Model BIT (1986), which provides that: 
[E]ach contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment within its territory of the investments 
of the nationals or companies of the other contracting party. This treatment shall not be less favourable 
than that granted by each contracting party to investments made within its territory by its own nationals 
or companies of the most favoured nation, if this latter treatment is more favourable. 
See also Article 4 (2) of the Switzerland-Chile BIT (1999); Article 4 of the Bangladesh-Iran BIT (2001); Article 
3(1) of the Malaysia-Chile BIT (1992); Article II (2) of the US-Argentina BIT (1991); Article II (3) of the US-
Turkey BIT (1985); etc. 
81 See e.g., Article 2 (2) of the Lebanon-Hungary BIT (2001) provides:  
[I]nvestments and returns of investors of either contracting party shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other contracting 
party. Each contracting party shall refrain from impairing by unreasonable or discriminatory measures 
the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, sale or liquidation of such investments.  
See also Article II (3) of the US-Estonia BIT (1994); Article III (1) of the Netherlands-Czech and Slovak 
Republic BIT (1991); Article 2(2) of the Hong Kong Model BIT; Article 3 (1) of the Netherlands Model BIT 
(1993); Article 2 (2) of the UK Model BIT (1994); Article II (2) (a) of the US-Czech and Slovak Republic BIT 
(1991); Article 3 of the US-Ecuador BIT (1993); Article II (2) of the US-Argentina BIT (1991); Article II (3) of 
the US-Turkey BIT (1985); Article 2 of the Germany-Argentina BIT (1991); etc. 
82 See e.g., Article 10 (1) of the ECT (1994) provides:  
[E]ach Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create 
stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to 
make investments in its area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to 
Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. 
See also Article II (2) (a) of the US-Czech and Slovak Republic BIT (1991); Article 3 (a) of the US-Ecuador BIT 
(1993); Article II (2) of the US-Argentina BIT (1991); Article II (3) of the US-Turkey BIT (1985); etc. 
83 See e.g., Article 4 (1) of the Argentina –Spain BIT; Article II (3) of the US-Estonia BIT (1994);Article III (1) 
of the Netherlands-Czech and Slovak Republic BIT (1991); Article 4 (1) of the Spain-Mexico BIT (1995); Article 
3(1) of the Malaysia-Chile BIT (1992); Article 2 (1) of the Germany-Argentina BIT (1991); etc. 
TREATMENT STANDARDS OF SOE INVESTMENTS 
169 
 
Although host states grant SOE investments FET protections in most cases, the 
degree or level of protection may vary depending on the specific wordings adopted 
by the applicable treaties. For example, some treaties prescribe FET with reference 
to customary international law, while others do not.84 In the former case, there is no 
doubt that the FET standard is meant to be a rule of international law.85 In the latter 
case, tribunals tend to interpret the relevant provisions autonomously.86 However, 
such interpretation has led to conflicts and uncertainty in the application of the FET 
standard. 87  Nonetheless, tribunals have increasingly focused on discerning the 
substantive contents of FET rather than discussing the relationship between FET and 
the minimum standard of treatment of aliens.88 However, the elements of FET are 
subject to disagreement between arbitral tribunals, states, and academics.89 
 
Since 2000, some states began to respond to such uncertainty in arbitral 
jurisprudence in ways that clarify the meaning of FET. For example, representatives 
of the three NAFTA states in 2001 issued an authoritative interpretation through the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) which stated that FET does not go beyond 
the minimum standard of customary international law. 90  However, the joint 
                                                             
84 For instance, German, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss BITs generally without reference to customary international 
law. By contrast, Article 1105 (1) of NAFTA provides that ‘each Party shall accord to investments of investors of 
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security’. Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 135. 
85 ibid 133. 
86 ibid 137. Mann also noted that ‘no standard defined by other words is likely to be material. The terms [FET] 
are to be understood and applied in dependently and autonomously’, FA Mann, ‘British Treaties for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (1982) 52 British Yearbook of International Law 241, 244. For arbitral 
cases, see e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 13 November 
2011, Award, para 83; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, 12 April 2002, para 143; Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Award, 17 January 2007, paras 291, 299-300, 308. 
87 Gallagher and Shan (n 8) 110. 
88 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 61. 
89 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 109. 
90 As stated by the NAFTA FTC: 
Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimums standard of treatment of aliens 
as the minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to investments of investors of another Party.  
The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment 
in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens… 
The interpretation is considered as a response to the ‘additive’ interpretation by the Pope & Talbot v. Canada 
tribunal that ascribed a protective scope of the FET clause beyond the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment, Pope & Talbot (n 46), paras 110- 17. In fact, the interpretation has disturbed the Pope & 
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interpretation did not solve the debate, since the minimum standard of customary 
international is itself a subject of disagreement and uncertainty.91 Nonetheless, a 
growing number of countries, including but not limited to the NAFTA parties, have 
contained explicit references linking FET to the customary international minimum 
standard in investment treaties.92  
 
In recent years, a trend of defining FET more precisely within the context of 
investment treaties is beginning to emerge.93 For instance, many treaties not only 
refer to FET as a minimum standard of treatment but also specify the due process of 
law as the FET obligation.94 Furthermore, Article 8.10 of the CETA contains a non-
exhaustive list of measures that may violate FET obligations, including: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Talbot tribunal and have been accepted by the some subsequent tribunals, such as Mondev, ADF, and Merrill. 
Pope & Talbot (n 46), Award in Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002, paras 47-69; Mondev International Ltd. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 Oct 2002, para 121; ADF (n 65), para 177; 
Merrill and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31 March 2010, para 192. 
Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth versus Reality’ 
(2017) 42 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 57; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Interpretive Powers of the Free 
Trade Commission and the Rule of Law’ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Frédéric Bachand (eds), Fifteen Years of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration (JurisNet, LLC 2011) 182–4. 
91 In fact, a number of developing countries have traditionally held reservations as to whether the FET standard is 
a part of customary international law. Moreover, some tribunals found no basis for equating principles of 
international law with the minimum standard of treatment, see e.g., Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 21 November 2000, para 745. 
See also Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice’ (2000) 70 British Yearbook of International Law 99, 139–44; Gallagher and Shan (n 8) 130; Bonnitcha, 
Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 113; Alschner (n 90) 57. 
92 See e.g., Australia-Japan EPA (2014), Article 14.5; Japan-Ukraine BIT (2015), Article 5; Colombia-Turkey BIT 
(2014), Article 4; Australia-Republic of Korea FTA, Article 11.5; Cameroon-Canada BIT (2014), Article 6; 
Guatemala -Trinidad and Tobago BIT (2013), Article 4 (1); New Zealand-Taiwan Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (2013), Article 10; Korea-Colombia FTA (2013), Article 8.5; Moldova-Qatar BIT (2012), Article 4; 
Morocco-Viet Nam BIT (2012), Article 2 (2); Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012), Article 12.7; etc. 
93 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 113. 
94 For instance, Article 12.5 of the China-Korea FTA (2015) provides: 
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The 
concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive 
rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) ‘fair and equitable treatment’ includes the 
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process of law; and… 
Similar provisions see also Article 9.6 (2) (a) of TPP (2016); Article 11.5 (2) of Australia- Korea FTA (2012), 
Article 5 (2) (a) of Japan-Ukraine BIT (2015),  Article 4 (4) (5) of Colombia-Turkey BIT (2014), Article 11.5 (2) 
(a) of Australia-Korea FTA (2014), Article 10 (2) (a) of New Zealand-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Agreement, 
Article 8.5 (2) (a) of Korea-Colombia FTA (2013), Article 2 (2) (1) of Morocco-Viet Nam BIT (2012); etc. 
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(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;   
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of 
transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings;   
(c) manifest arbitrariness;  
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, 
race or religious belief;  
(e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; 
or  
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment 
obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
Article.95 
 
A similar approach to specifying FET obligations may be accepted in the future EU-
Singapore FTA and the TTIP.96  
 
The above new trend of FET provisions may limit the scope of FET obligations to 
some extent and guide future arbitral tribunals in assessing whether the host states 
have breached FET. As will be discussed later, these textual elements of FET 
overlap with components considered by tribunals in the interpretation and 
application of FET. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how arbitral tribunals will 
apply these elements of FET to SOE protection in individual disputes. What is clear 
now is that SOE investments are generally granted FET protection under IIAs. But, 
the abstract and varied wordings adopted in different treaties suggest that to ascertain 
whether SOE investments are accorded FET remains a challenge. 
 
4.3.2 SOE Investments and Emerging Components of FET Obligations 
 
                                                             
95 Article 8.10 (2) of the CETA. Paragraph 3 of this Article provides that ‘the Parties shall regularly, or upon 
request of a Party, review the content of the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. The Committee on 
Services and Investment, established under Article 26.2.1(b) (Specialised committees), may develop 
recommendations in this regard and submit them to the CETA Joint Committee for decision’. According, the 
elements of FET are not limited to the listed obligations. 
96 See Article 9.4 (2) of the Draft EU-Singapore FTA (Version May 2015) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152844.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017; Article 3 
(2) of the European Commission draft text TTIP 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf > accessed 4 Sep 2017. 
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As mentioned, arbitral tribunals have played a major role in the interpretation and 
application of FET. A range of components has been identified by tribunals that are 
comprised in the FET standard.97 This part focuses on three factors concerned by 
tribunals in interpreting the FET standard, including unreasonable discrimination, 
legitimate expectation and arbitrariness, to discuss their application to SOE investors 
and impacts on host states. 
 
A. Unreasonable discrimination 
 
Some tribunals have held that the FET standard prohibits discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investors and their investments.98 In CMS v. Argentina, for example, the 
tribunal held that ‘any measure that might involve arbitrariness or discrimination is 
in itself contrary to the FET’.99 Earlier NAFTA tribunals have also included non-
discrimination in the interpretation of the FET standard. 100  As the Waste 
Management v. Mexico tribunal stated, ‘the minimum standard of treatment of FET 
is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the 
conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, discriminatory’.101 Hence, 
the FET standard inherently precludes discriminatory action against investors.102  
 
                                                             
97 The factors include: (a) legitimate expectation; (2) denial of justice and due process; (3) manifest arbitrariness; 
(d) discrimination; (e) outright abusive treatment. Some other elements such as transparency and consistency 
have generated concerns and criticism, so they may not be said to have materialised in the content of FET with a 
sufficient degree of support, UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 62–3. It is notable that scholars 
present different taxonomies of elements of the FET standard for understanding arbitral decisions in applying 
FET, Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 109. 
98 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 81. 
99 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 
2005, paras 287, 290. See also Saluka (n 60), para 461; Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award on Merits, 26 June 2003, para123; Waste Management, 
Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30April 2004, para 98. 
100 Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments’ in August Reinisch (ed), 
Standards of Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 122. 
101 Water Management (n 99), para 98. 
102 As Vasciannie explains, ‘…if there is discrimination on arbitrary grounds, or if the investment has been 
subject to arbitrary or capricious treatment by the host State, then the fair and equitable standard has been 
violated. This follows from the idea that fair and equitable treatment inherently precludes arbitrary and capricious 
actions against investors…’ Vasciannie (n 91) 133. See also Christoph H Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(FET): Interactions with Other Standards’ (2007) 4 TDM 4–5 <www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1138> accesseed 12 September 2017. 
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Unlike NT and MFN, a discriminatory measure that breaches the FET standard is not 
necessarily taken on the basis of nationality. 103  Other considerations for 
discrimination such as race, religion, political affiliation, or disability may also form 
a violation of FET.104 In this sense, the FET standard may fill gaps in the non-
discrimination principle in IIAs since NT and MFN treatment can only guarantee 
non-discriminatory treatment on the basis of nationality. 
However, a question arises whether a discriminatory measure taken on the basis of 
ownership breaches FET. In Grand River Enterprises v. US, the tribunal held that, 
‘neither Article 1105 nor the customary international law standard of protection 
generally prohibits discrimination against foreign investments’.105 In fact, arbitral 
tribunals seem to consider that only unreasonable discriminations constitute a 
violation of the FET standard. In other words, the host state may take discriminatory 
measures against foreign investors, as long as the action is made on reasonable 
considerations which normally refer to legitimate policy objectives. In Saluka v. 
Czech Republic, the tribunal held that:  
 
[T]he standard of ‘reasonableness’ therefore requires, in this context as well, 
a showing that the State’s conduct bears a reasonable relationship to some 
rational policy, whereas the standard of ‘non-discrimination’ requires a 
rational justification of any differential treatment of a foreign investor.106  
 
Despite that the tribunal’s interpretation may vary in individual disputes, arbitral 
practice has indicated that discriminatory treatment against foreign SOEs may not 
violate the FET standard if the host state action is driven by legitimate policy 
concerns.  
 
The following question, therefore, is what are ‘legitimate policy concerns’ and to 
what extent the policy is ‘rational’ in respect of SOE investments. It is necessary 
here to address two observations in arbitral practice. First, public policy should not 
be motivated by purely political or discriminatory considerations. For example, the 
                                                             
103 Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 195. 
104 ibid. 
105 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 12 January 
2011, para 209. 
106 Saluka (n 60), para 460. 
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Saluka tribunal held that a purely arbitrary act is one not related to legitimate policy 
objectives, and unreasonable conduct is motivated by political or discriminatory 
considerations. Similarly, the S.D.Myers tribunal considered that unreasonable acts 
were arbitrary acts or acts on the basis of political or discriminatory motives.107 In 
this sense, host states’ action against foreign SOEs is likely to be alleged by SOE 
investors for pursuing political or discriminatory motives. Nonetheless, it is not 
always easy for SOE investors to discern the intention of states’ policies as the 
policy regarding SOEs may be driven by both commercial and political 
motivations.108 
 
Second, domestic law can play a role in assessment. In ADF v. US, for instance, the 
tribunal noted that ‘something more than simple illegality or lack of authority under 
the domestic law of State is necessary to render an act or measures inconsistent with 
FET’.109 In Noble Venture v. Romania, the tribunal observed that the process of 
privatisation was not arbitrary given it was the only solution to the company’s 
insolvency and was conducted in accordance with Romanian law.110 However, some 
scholars argue that international tribunals should not rely on domestic law, given that 
it may not restrict certain discriminations. Nevertheless, domestic law can serve as 
an explicit expression of public policy. In other words, if a policy is expressed in 
domestic law, it is more likely to be interpreted as a rational policy.  
 
As noted in previous chapters, some countries have taken measures against foreign 
SOEs in response to growing concerns about national security and competitive 
neutrality. In this context, regulatory measures against SOEs may come under 
scrutiny by arbitral tribunals for being discriminatory.111 For instance, the UK 
government in 1988 directed KIO, a Kuwait SWF, to divest its stake within a year 
for the protection of the public interest.112 In such a case, the KIO might claim that 
                                                             
107 S.D. Myers (n 43), para 263. 
108 See Ch 1. 
109 ADF (n 65), para 190. 
110 Noble Ventures (n 65), para 182. 
111 Poulsen (n 71) 89. 
112 Reuters, ‘British Tell Kuwait to Cut BP Stake: Arab Oil Producer Could Lose $593 Million in Selloff’ Los 
Angeles Times (London, 5 October 1988) <http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-05/business/fi-2758_1_arab-oil> 
accessed 17 March 2017. See also Chester Brown and Audley Sheppard, ‘United Kingdom’ in Chester Brown 
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divestment by the UK government breached the FET standard and an international 
tribunal would determine the issue. Here, while protecting public interest sounds like 
a rational policy, if UK legislation did not specify the divestment measures, the 
tribunal might consider that divestment breached FET as it constituted an 
unreasonable discrimination against KIO. 
 
B. Legitimate expectations 
 
Many arbitral tribunals have recognised that the protection of investors’ legitimate 
expectations is a key element of the FET standard under investment treaties.113 In 
Saluka v Czech Republic, for example, the tribunal referred to the concept of 
legitimate expectations as ‘the dominant element of that [FET] standard’.114 The 
Tecmed tribunal also considered that the FET required states to provide international 
investment treatment that did not affect the ‘basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment’. 115  Nonetheless, the 
legitimate expectation of foreign investors protected under the FET is a subject of 
disagreement and uncertainty among investment tribunals.116   
 
Before we start to discuss the legitimate expectations of SOE investors protected by 
investment treaties, the question may arise of whether or not SOE investors differ 
from private investors in respect of legitimate expectations that would be protected 
by IIAs. In other words, whether SOE investors have legitimate expectations in 
international investments and if yes, are they different from that of private investors? 
As noted, the concept of legitimate expectations has been recognised in both 
domestic legal system and international law, without reference to the ownership of 
investors.117 The doctrine of legitimate expectations may be formulated to offer an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(ed), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 742. 
113 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 63. 
114 Saluka (n 60), para 302. Similarly, the EDF tribunal views the FET standard as ‘one of the major components’, 
EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, Award, para 216. 
115 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 
Award, 29 May 2003, para 154. 
116 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 111; Michele Potesta, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty 
Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review 88, 89. 
117 Roland Klager, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (CUP 2011) 165. More 
discussion on legitimate expectations in domestic legal systems see e.g., Potesta (n 116) 93–8. 
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individual ‘legal protections from harm caused by a public authority resiling from a 
previous publicly stated position, whether that be in the form of a formal decision or 
in the form of a representation’.118  
 
Accordingly, the idea of legitimate expectations includes two aspects: one relates to 
the protection of the reliance of individuals on public authorities, and the other is to 
restrict willful revocation by those authorities.119  As noted by some tribunals, 
investment treaties normally require host states to ensure a stable and predictable 
business environment for investors to operate investment.120  In this regard, there 
should not be any difference between public and private investors. In Tecmed v. 
Mexico, the tribunal pointed out that: 
 
[T]he foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations 
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies 
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment 
and comply with such regulations… the foreign investor also expects the host 
State to act consistently, i.e., without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing 
decisions or permits issued by the State that was relied upon by the investor 
to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and 
business activities. The investor also expects the State to use the legal 
instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the investment in 
conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments and not to 
deprive the investor of its investment without the required compensation…121 
 
                                                             
118 Chester Brown, ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations As A “General Principle of Law”: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts’ (2009) 6 TDM 2 <www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1303> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
119 Klager (n 117) 165. 
120 ibid 169; Zach Meyers, ‘Adapting Legitimate Expectations to International Investment Law: A Defence of 
Arbitral Tribunals’ Approach’ (2014) 11 TDM 19; Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, ‘Investor-State 
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global 
Administrative Law’ (2009) New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 141, 10 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=nyu_plltwp;> accessed 12 September 2017. 
121 Tecmed (n 115), para 154. 
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While some scholars argue that the above expectations are too perfect to achieve, 122  
they are common aspirations of all foreign investors, regardless of whether they are 
publicly- or privately-owned. Furthermore, SOE investors may have a greater 
demand for stability and predictability of an investment environment compared to 
private investors since some host states have given rise to increasing concerns over 
SOE investment and attempted to take measures against them.123 
 
Nonetheless, not all expectations of SOE investors are legitimate and protected 
accordingly by international investment treaties. As the EDF tribunal stated, 
‘legitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the 
investor’.124 The Suez tribunal also noted that ‘expectations are protected only if they 
are legitimate and reasonable in the circumstances’.125 Although tribunals differ in 
deciding whether an investor’s expectations are legitimate or not, some tribunals 
have recognised that investors’ legitimate expectations are based on the host state’s 
legal framework and any undertakings and representations made explicitly or 
implicitly by the host state.126 In Parkerings v. Lithuania, for instance, the tribunal 
held that: 
 
[T]he expectation is legitimate if the investor received an explicit promise or 
guarantee from the host state, or if implicitly, the host state made assurances 
or representation that the investor took into account in making the 
investment…in the situation where the host State made no assurance or 
representation, the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 
agreement are decisive to determine if the expectation of the investor was 
legitimate.127 
                                                             
122 For example, Douglas argues that ‘the Tecmed standard is actually not a standard at all; it is rather a 
description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which all states should aspire but very few if any 
will ever attain’, Zachary Douglas, ‘Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko 
and Methanex’ (2006) 22 Arbitration international 27, 28. Also, the El Paso v. Argentina tribunal held that 
Tecmed’s analysis of FET established ‘a programme of good governance that no state in the world is capable of 
guaranteeing at all times’, El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, para 342. 
123 See Ch 1 and Ch 3. 
124 EDF (n 114), para 219. 
125 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para 229. 
126 Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 145. 
127 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, 
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Similarly, in Urbaser v. Argentina, the tribunal acknowledge that a state’s violation 
of specific commitments would breach FET where those commitments were 
‘decisive for an investor’s decision to proceed with the investment’.128 Nonetheless, 
tribunals may differ in what is a specific commitment. For example, in the LG&E 
case, the tribunal considered that the licensing of foreign investors constituted a 
specific commitment which had specifically guaranteed the payment of gas tariffs to 
investors in US dollars and indexed to the US gas market.129 In Charanne v Spain, 
the tribunal held that the Spanish legislative framework in the solar sector did not 
create a specific commitment for each solar investor.130 Obviously, the requirement 
of specific commitment limits the investor’s legitimate expectations, which may 
prevent both private and SOE investors from claiming a breach of FET. 
 
A relevant notion here is the stability of legal framework in the host state. This 
addresses the question of whether or not, where there is no specific commitment, the 
investor can have a legitimate expectation of a stable legal environment in the host 
state.131 This issue is of great importance to SOE investors since an increasing 
number of states have strengthened or attempt to strengthen domestic regulations on 
SOEs. 132  Some scholars consider that the host state’s legal framework is an 
important source of expectations for investors.133 But, some tribunals criticised the 
view that FET entails a guarantee of stability of the legal framework unless the state 
has made specific commitments.134 As the Parkerings tribunal stated:  
 
[I]t is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign 
legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its 
                                                                                                                                                                            
para 331. See also Waste Management (n 99), paras 114-5; Tecmed (n 115), paras 152-74; CMS (n 99), para 290. 
128 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 8 December 2016, para 627. 
129 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 134. 
130 Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Award (Unofficial English 
translation by Mena Chambers), 21 January 2016, paras 492-4. 
131 Bonnitcha, Poulsen and Waibel (n 74) 112. 
132 See more in Ch 1. 
133 Dlozer and Schreuer (n 10) 115. See e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012, para 383. 
134 LG&E (n 129), Award, 25 July 2007, paras 66-7; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and 
Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on 
Liability, 30 July 2010, para 224. 
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own discretion…Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a 
stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the 
amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an 
investor made its investment.135 
 
Similarly, the Total v. Argentina tribunal also noted that the legal regime in force in 
the host country at the time of making the investment ‘is not automatically subject to 
a guarantee of stability’, unless the host state has ‘explicitly’ assumed a specific legal 
obligation for the future, such as through contracts, concessions or stabilisation 
clauses on which the investor is therefore entitled to rely as a matter of law.136 
Nonetheless, some tribunals consider that in certain circumstances the change of 
legal framework may breach FET. For example, the Toto tribunal held that ‘changes 
in the regulatory framework would be considered as a breach of the duty to grant full 
protection and FET only in case of drastic or discriminatory changes in the essential 
features of the transaction’.137 The Impregilo tribunal considered that ‘investors must 
be protected from unreasonable modifications of that legal framework’. 138 
Accordingly, SOEs may allege that the host state violates FET if the change of legal 
framework is unreasonable or drastic. In Tatneft v. Ukraine, the tribunal held that ‘a 
predictable, consistent and stable legal framework is an FET requirement which 
ought to be safeguarded in this integrity irrespective of which organ of the State 
might compromise its availability’. Hence, both executive acts and acts of judiciary 
could frustrate the investor’s legitimate expectations of the host state.139 
 
                                                             
135 Parkerings (n 127), para 332. 
136 Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, 
para 117. The similar position can be found in EDF case, EDF (n 114), para 217; El Paso (n 122), para 364; BG 
Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 24 December 2007, paras 292-310; Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008, para 219; 
Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, 
paras 258-61; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, 23 September 2010, paras 9.3.37-35; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company 
and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, 28 April 2011, para 302; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 
21 June 2011, paras 290-1; El Paso (n 122), paras 344-52, 365-74. 
137 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 7 June 
2012, para 244. 
138 Impregiolo (n 136), para 291. 
139 OAO Tatneft v. Ukraine, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits, 29 July 2014, para 407. 
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While the protection of legitimate expectations is an obligation of host states, some 
tribunals also take into account the conduct of investors. In this context, the SOE 
investor may be required to act diligently or prudently in taking into account all 
circumstances surrounding investment when making an investment. First, some 
cases have shown that investors must anticipate that circumstances could change and 
thus review their investment to adapt it to potential changes of legal environment. As 
the tribunal in Parkering v. Lithuania stated, ‘the investor will have a right to 
protection of its legitimate expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that 
its legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances’.140 Second, 
some tribunals held that the regulatory risk should also be assessed in the context of 
legitimate expectations.141 Third, investors should be aware and take into account the 
level of the country’s development and administrative practices.142 The investor’s 
legitimate expectations must relate to the specific characteristics of the investment 
environment in the host state, given that the investor’s legitimate expectations would 
be quite different in the context of a highly developed country compared with a 
developing or emerging country.143 One treaty, the COMESA, provides that the 
different levels of development of member states should be considered in the 
interpretation of the FET standard.144  
 
In the absence of such an express provision in the treaty, tribunals have stressed that 
‘the assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all 
circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment but also the 
political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host 
State’.145 In MTD v. Chile, the tribunal held that if the investor had performed a 
                                                             
140 Parkerings (n 127), para 333. 
141 Methanex (n 49), paras 9-10; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 
2009, para 767. 
142 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 71. 
143 Potesta (n 116) 118. 
144 Article 14 (3) of Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (2007) provides that:  
[F]or greater certainty, Member States understand that different Member States have different forms of 
administrative, legislative and judicial systems and that Member States at different levels of 
development may not achieve the same standards at the same time. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 
[prohibition of the denial of justice and affirmation of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens] do 
not establish a single international standard in this context. 
145 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 
Award, 18 August 2008, para 340. 
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diligent inquiry into the regulatory framework, it could not have developed 
legitimate expectations in the first place because its investigation would have 
evinced that its investment could not proceed as planned.146 The Metalpar tribunal 
observed that the investor is unlikely to legitimately expect that ‘their investments 
would not be subject to the ups and downs of the country in which they were made 
or that the crisis that could already be foreseen would not make it necessary to issue 
legal measures to cope with’.147 In this context, it is particularly necessary for SOE 
investors to know the regulations and policies targeted at SOE investments before 
making the investment; otherwise, it may fail to establish any protection based on 
legitimate expectations. For example, if it is known or ought to be known that an 
SOE investment bears higher requirements or will be treated unfairly or in an 
unfriendly manner, the claim of legitimate expectations under such conditions could 
hardly convince the tribunal.  
 
Nevertheless, the relevant investment regulations in host states need to be accessible 
and transparent, and the requirement of transparency will promote the rule of law 
and better governance in host states. Yet, the Urbaser v. Argentina tribunal also 
pointed out that while FET required transparency, this does not mean that the host 
state has to ‘act under complete disclosure of any aspect of its operation’; rather, it 
means the state’s authorities shall act in such a way as to create a ‘climate of 
cooperation’ with investors when changes occurred.148 Besides, the Azinian tribunal 
considered that if investors misrepresent or conceal their nature or purpose, they are 
not protected under the Treaty.149 In this regard, SOE investments may be subjected 
to a higher requirement of transparency given that they are distrusted on suspicion of 
non-commercial motives, and SOE investments may fail to gain protection if they do 
not make required disclosures. 
 
                                                             
146 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004, paras 167-178, 242-6. 
147 Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award on the Merits, 
6 June 2008, para 187. 
148 Urbaser (n 128), para 682. Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Analysis: Arbitrators in Urbaser v Argentina Water Dispute 
Deviate From Prior Impregilo Award on Necessity And Damages’ IAReporter (12 January 2017) 
<http://tinyurl.com/z6ydfa8> accessed 12 September 2017. 
149 Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/97/2, Award, 1 November 1999, para 105. 
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The rationale behind the protection of legitimate expectations is to enable the foreign 
investor to make sensible investment decisions on the basis of the representations of 
the host state.150 However, arbitral practice has shown that it might be hard for SOE 
investors to invoke legitimate expectations. On the one hand, since SOEs have given 
rise to increasing a broad range of concerns such as national security and 
transparency in some countries, the tribunal may address the due diligence that SOE 
investors shall reckon regarding possible changes of legal framework in host states. 
On the other hand, regulations targeting SOEs are likely to be justified under the 
FET standard.  
 
In fact, a significant number of awards have emphasised the need to balance investor 
expectations against the legitimate regulatory goals of the host country. They suggest 
that the FET obligation does not prevent host states from acting in the public interest 
even if such acts adversely affect investments.151 In Eureko v Poland, the tribunal 
held that a breach of basic expectations might not be a violation of FET if good 
reasons existed why the expectations of the investor could not be met.152 In Saluka v. 
Czech Republic, the tribunal held that: 
 
…[T]he host State’s legitimate right to regulate domestic matter in the public 
interest must be taken into consideration as well… 
The determination of a breach of [FET] therefore requires a weighing of the 
claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the 
respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other… 
A foreign investor…may in any case properly expect that the Czech Republic 
implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the 
investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that such 
conduct does not manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, 
transparency, even-handedness and non-discrimination…153  
 
                                                             
150 Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, ‘At What Time Must Legitimate Expectations Exist?’ in Jacques 
Werner and Arif Hyder Ali (eds), A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Walde - Law Beyond Conventional Thought (CMP 
Publishing 2009) 265. 
151 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 73. 
152 Eureko (n 64), para 232. Similar position can be found in Continental Casualty (n 136), para 258; Vivendi (n 
91), para.7.4.31; EDF (n 114) para 217. 
153 Saluka (n 60), paras 305-7. 
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Similarly, the EDF tribunal stated that, ‘legitimate expectations cannot be solely the 
subjective expectations of the investors…expectations may be deduced from all the 
circumstances of the case, due regard being paid to the host state’s power to regulate 
its economic life in the public interest’.154 Given that public interest is a vague 
concept and can be broadly extended, it is possible for host states to allege that 
changes of legal framework targeting SOEs are made on the basis of public interest 
because the emerging regulations on SOEs are made on the basis of national security, 
anti-competitiveness, and transparency concerns, and thereby the frustrations of 
SOEs’ legitimate expectations can be justified in this regard. 
 
Notably, some scholars maintain that legitimate expectations should not be over-
stressed. The legitimate expectation doctrine is best understood as referring to a 
situation where the security principle is breached by the host state’s conduct 
inconsistent with prior promises or assurances on which the investor relied, rather 
than as a complete theory of the FET standard.155 However, it is undeniable that it 
has played an increasingly significant role in the interpretation of the FET standard. 
Given the ambiguity of relevant concepts and the inconsistency of arbitral practice, 
both SOE investors and host states should be very cautious about how they conduct 
business in the context of legitimate expectations. 
 
Some recent treaties attempt to clarify legitimate expectations under the FET 
standard, while the approach differs among states. The CETA, for instance, 
stipulates that in applying the FET obligation, a tribunal may take into account 
‘whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered 
investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor relied 
in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party 
subsequently frustrated’.156 In contrast, the TPP asserts that ‘the mere fact that a 
Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s 
expectations’ does not constitute a breach of FET, ‘even if there is loss or damage to 
                                                             
154 EDF (n 114), para 219. 
155 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (n 21) 235. 
156 Article 8.10 (4) of CETA. Similar provisions proposed by the EU in the EU-Singapore FTA negotiations, 
Article 9.4 (2) (e). 
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the covered investment as a result’.157 Nonetheless, tribunals have great discretion on 
whether and to what extent an SOE investor can successfully allege that the host 
state breaches its legitimate expectations. 
 
C. Arbitrary conduct 
 
As discussed, a state’s conduct is not frozen under the FET standard of the 
investment treaty. However, such flexibility of regulatory sovereignty does not mean 
there is no limitation on the host state’s conduct. In Parkerings v. Lithuania, for 
instance, the tribunal held that each state has an ‘undeniable right and privilege’ to 
exercise its sovereign legislative power and any businessman or investor knows that 
laws will evolve over time. The FET standard under investment treaties only 
prevents the state from acting ‘unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise 
of its legislative power’.158 In fact, beyond legitimate expectations, several tribunals 
have emphasised that the prohibition of arbitrariness is part and parcel of the FET 
standard. 159  Arbitral conduct has been described as ‘founded on prejudice or 
preference rather than on reason or fact’.160 The Lemire tribunal stated that ‘the 
underlying notion of arbitrariness is that prejudice, preference or bias is substituted 
for the rule of law’.161 In this context, legitimate regulations are protected by the 
treaty, but the state’s conduct in regulatory matters should be exercises fairly, 
reasonably or equitably. Otherwise it may constitute a breach of the FET standard. 
Accordingly, some tribunals and commentators have suggested that it is only when a 
change in state policy or regulation amounts to ‘manifestly arbitrary conduct’ or ‘to 
abuse of state power’ that a violation of fair and equitable treatment would occur.162 
 
                                                             
157 Article 9.6 (4) of TPP. 
158 Parkerings (n 127), para 332. 
159 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (n 75) 78. 
160 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, Award, 3 September 2001, para 221; 
Plama (n 136), para 184. 
161 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 21 
January 2010, para 385. 
162 Kalicki and Medeiros (n 5) 49; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations: 
Balancing the Rights of the State and the Individual under International Law in a Global Society’ (2003) 5 
International Law FORUM du droit international 188, 194.  
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Some tribunals have attempted to interpret what manifest conduct is. For example, 
the S.D.Myers tribunal stated that: 
 
[A] breach of Article 1105 (FET) occurs only when it is shown that an 
investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the 
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international 
perspective. That determination must be made in the light of the high 
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.163  
 
In Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal noted that ‘a finding of arbitrariness requires that 
some important measure of impropriety is manifest’.164 The Saluka tribunal held that 
an investor may in any case properly expect that the host state ‘implements its 
policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the investors’ investment, 
reasonably justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does not manifestly 
violate the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and 
nondiscrimination’.165 However, in the Thunderbird case, the tribunal held that ‘the 
threshold for finding a violation of the minimum standard of treatment still remains 
high’.166 The tribunals concluded that: 
 
[A]cts that would give rise to a breach of the minimum standard of treatment 
prescribed by the NAFTA and customary international law [are] those that, 
weighed against the given factual context, amount to a gross denial of justice 
or manifest arbitrariness falling below acceptable international standards.167  
 
In Waste Management, the tribunal held that there was no evidence to support that 
‘the City acted in a wholly arbitrary way or in a way that was grossly unfair’, given 
that the failure to pay could be explained by the financial crisis and was not 
motivated by any sectoral or local prejudice.168 
                                                             
163 S.D.Myers (n 43), para 263.  
164 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 
May 2007, para 281. 
165 Saluka (n 60), para 307. 
166 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Arbitral Award, 
26 January 2006, para 194. 
167 ibid, para 197. 
168 Waste Management (n 99), para 115. 
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The ambiguous concept and distinct test of ‘arbitrary conduct’ may give rise to 
considerable controversies in assessing the host state’s conduct againt SOEs. For 
instance, some tribunals have noted that conduct motivated by political 
considerations (politics and nationalistic reasons) might constitute ‘arbitrary action’ 
which violates the FET.169 In Eureko v. Poland, the claimant’s request for expanding 
interest in a state-owned insurance company in the process of being privatised, 
relying upon Poland’s commitment, which would enable the claimant to be a 
controller, was withdrawn by the state. The tribunal held that ‘it is abundantly clear 
that the claimant has been treated unfairly and inequitably by the Republic of 
Poland’.170 The tribunal noted that the conduct of Poland was ‘not for cause but for 
purely arbitrary reasons linked to the interplay of Polish politics and nationalistic 
reasons of a discriminatory character’.171 Although it is questionable whether other 
tribunals would accept the same approach, the interpretation of treatment standards 
might provide a hypothetical scenario where foreign SOEs could be similarly 
affected, given that sovereign investment with a politically sensitive character is 
likely to be targeted by domestic measures in host states. As noted, the rise of 
sovereign FDI has been met with growing concern by policy-makers in some host 
countries, especially developed countries.172  The most important and prevalent 
concern over SOEs relates to adverse national security implications in sensitive or 
strategic industries.173 As a response, some countries have instituted new policy 
measures touching upon inward FDI by SOEs with a strong national security 
focus.174 Although domestic protection of critical industries on national security 
grounds is generally permitted through trade and investment agreements, economic 
protectionism is not, and the lack of a defined concept of ‘national security’ makes it 
difficult to distinguish legitimate national security concerns from protectionism or 
other considerations.175 In this context, conduct on the basis of national security 
                                                             
169 See e.g., Inmaris Perestroika (n 64), para 303; Eureko (n 64), para 233; Azurix (n 64), para 340; Biwater (n 
64), para 500; Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 
27 March 2007, para 199; Vivendi (n 91), para 74.22. 
170 Eureko (n 64), para 231. 
171 ibid, para 233. 
172 Sauvant, Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed (n 30) 10. 
173 ibid 11. 
174 ibid 16. 
175 ibid 17. 
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considerations of a political character might be challenged by foreign SOEs as 
‘arbitrary’.  
 
Nevertheless, the range of legitimate policies is potentially very broad and not 
limited to oft-mentioned goals of environmental protection, public health or 
consumer protection. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a distinction between 
arbitrary conduct and legitimate regulation in the context of SOE FET protection. 
Otherwise, national security might be used as a tool of arbitrary conduct to target 
SOEs.  
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter discusses whether and to what extent SOE investors enjoy non-
discriminatory treatment and FET granted by host states under investment treaties. 
As shown in section 4.2, SOEs and their investments are in principle protected by 
investment treaties with standards of non-discriminatory treatment including NT and 
MFN. However, such NDT of SOEs is subject to various qualifications and 
exceptions. This relates especially to new generation IIAs, which to a large extent 
have granted flexibility to host states to address their concerns over SOE investments, 
including national security and competitive neutrality. As will be elaborated in next 
chapter, some recent investment treaties have provided security exceptions to NDT 
that can be useful to address national security concerns over SOEs. Meanwhile, host 
states’ concerns on competitive neutrality of SOEs can be addressed through 
clarifying the ‘in like circumstances’ component of the NDT test and through the use 
of ‘public policy’ exceptions. Nonetheless, further clarifications of the key terms, 
such as an express reference to ownership considerations in the definition of ‘in like 
circumstances’ and explicit inclusion of the ‘competitive neutrality’ objective in 
public policy exception provisions, would be helpful for states to protect their public 
interests and retain certain regulatory space in response to SOE challenges without a 
breach of NDT under investment treaties. 
 
As shown in section 4.3, host states shall grant FET to foreign investors and their 
investments, regardless of whether they are publicly or privately owned. However, 
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the degree of FET protections differs among countries: under some treaties, the FET 
of SOEs equals to the minimum treatment standard under customary international 
law; while under some treaties, the FET of SOEs is subject to certain substantive 
elements. Since the relevant terms in the FET standard are broad and ambiguous, 
arbitral tribunals play an important role in assessing whether a host state’s action 
breaches FET obligations. Three factors of the FET standard are normally considered 
by tribunals that may affect states’ regulations on foreign SOEs, including 
unreasonable discrimination, legitimate expectations and arbitrary conduct. While 
national security or competitive neutrality considerations may be deemed as rational 
public policies, arbitral tribunals may consider that the state’s action against SOEs 
on that basis is driven by political or discriminatory motivations that reduce the 
reasonableness of public policy. In this regard, an explicit expression of those 
considerations in domestic laws may be helpful to strengthen legitimacy of public 
policies. Moreover, a frustration of legitimate expectations of SOE investors may 
violate the FET standard, but SOEs’ legitimate expectations may be restricted to 
certain conditions, such as due diligence. Also, regulations targeted to SOEs may not 
breach FET standard, but a host state’s conduct cannot be exercised arbitrarily.  
 
In sum, substantive standards of treatment as core provisions in international 
investment treaties are subject to great disagreement and uncertainty in arbitral 
practice. Two overarching conclusions emerge. First, the broad and vague terms in 
substantive standards of investment protections imply that investors may challenge a 
wide range of state actions at international tribunals. More importantly, tribunals 
have great discretion in deciding whether a host state’s action against foreign SOEs 
violates substantive obligations of NDT and FET. In response to such uncertainty 
and unpredictability in arbitration, some recent treaties have attempted to clarify key 
provisions. Secondly, features of SOEs, such as state ownership or competitive 
advantages obtained from their home governments, may generate new problems 
regarding the application scope of substantive standards of treatment. As noted 
earlier, in application of NDT to an SOE investor, a tricky question of comparisons 
may be raised when identifying ‘like circumstances’. Also, SOEs may be presumed 
to have weak legitimate expectations under FET, because they are used to higher 
levels of screening and slightly more stringent national regulations. Therefore, 
policy-makers may have to consider whether or not to adjust relevant substantive 
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standards of treatment to SOEs considering the expanding jurisdictional scope of 
investment arbitrations of SOE investments. 
 
Taken together, the evolution of investment treaty and arbitral practice on 
substantive standards of investment protection suggest that it is pressing for host 
states to rethink and re-evaluate their treatment to foreign investors, whether private 
or public, under international investment law. The current investment treaty 
standards were devised by developed countries and crystallised long before the 
spread of SOE investments where provisions such as FET protection do not 
differentiate between SOE and other investment. This may render problems and 
conflicts to a variety of host state legitimate regulations with the application of treaty 
obligations. The challenge is how to attract foreign investments by providing 
adequate guarantees and protections, whilst preserving regulatory rights of states 
under the international investment regime. With the rise of SOE investments from 
developing countries, developed countries today may have to adjust some treaty 
standards for safeguarding legitimate public policies. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
SOE INVESTMENTS AND INVESTMENT TREATY 
EXCEPTIONS: SAFEGUARDING STATES’ ESSENTIAL 
INTERESTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The changing landscape of investment policy in relation to SOE investments requires 
a proper balance to be struck between protecting foreign SOE investors and 
addressing regulatory rights of host states. While this thesis maintains that SOE 
investors and their investments should in principle be accorded substantive 
protections such as NDT and FET under IIAs, it also acknowledges that SOEs, rather 
than other foreign investors, are more likely to trigger national security concerns due 
to their close ties with home governments and the potential for political interference 
by the government. Furthermore, Chapter 3 noted that whether the investor is 
controlled by a foreign government is an imporant factor to be considered by host 
states in determining the effect of SOE investments on national security. 
 
Recently, a remarkable trend is that an increasing number of governments have 
strengthened screening procedures on foreign investments and barred certain SOE 
transactions because of national security considerations.1 Although it is, of course, a 
sovereign right of states to screen or block foreign SOE investments on national 
security grounds, such measures have been criticised as protectionism against certain 
foreign investors. For example, China’s leading news agency Xinhua said that the 
Hinkley deal was unexpectedly placed under review because of ‘some fictitious 
national security concerns’ over Chinese SOE involvement, i.e., ‘China-phobia’.2  
                                                             
1 Since 2006 at least eight developed, developing and transition economies have enacted legislation on foreign 
investment reviews on national security grounds (i.e. Canada (2009), China (2011 and 2015), Finland (2012), 
Germany (2009), Italy (2012), the Republic of Korea (2006), Poland (2015), and the Russian Federation (2008)), 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016 - Investment Nationality: Policy Challenges 95. For more discuss see 
Ch 2. 
2 Liu Chang, ‘Commentary: London’s approval for nuclear plant project welcoming move’ Xinhua (Beijing, 15 
September 2016) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/15/c_135689586.htm> accessed 26 January 2017. 
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In the context of international law, the question then arises of whether and to what 
extent IIAs should allow the contracting states to take regulatory measures against 
foreign SOE investors in order to protect certain vital interests. In other words, if a 
host state takes action against a foreign SOE investment, will it violate any 
international obligations under the applicable investment treaty?  
 
With this consideration in mind, many treaties contain one or more exceptions which 
may be invoked by host states to safeguard certain important national interests and 
maintain their ability to exercise authority in that area.3 In treaty practice, some 
exceptions are drafted narrowly to exclude the application of a specific treaty 
provision, for example, the commitment to non-discriminatory treatment;4 other 
treaties contain a carve-out exception to exclude the application of all treaty 
provisions.5 In order to protect certain vital interests, some treaties explicitly allow 
contracting states to derogate from treaty obligation under exceptional circumstances 
where these vital interests are at stake.6 Such vital interests include national security, 
public order, and international peace and security.7 Some treaties also refer to public 
interest in the form of human, animal or plant life or health, public security or moral 
or public order, the conservation of finite natural resources, and so on.8  
 
When some foreign investors filed cases against Argentina in response to the 
financial crisis, the Argentinian government, relying on provisions of this kind, 
argued that the emergency measures were taken to protect ‘essential security 
interests’ which could be justified under the US-Argentina BIT. Accordingly, if an 
SOE investor brings a case in an investment tribunal, the responding state is in 
theory likely to invoke such exception clauses to justify its action against SOE 
investments. 
 
However, such a scenario relating to SOE investment has never been tested in a real 
                                                             
3 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Second Edi, OUP 2015) 377. 
4 For further discussions see Ch 4. 
5 For example, Article 19 of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement explicitly carves out a class of 
‘investors’ from the protections under the treaty. 
6 Salacuse (n 3), 378. 
7 For example, Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT. ibid. 
8 For example, Article 28.3 (General exceptions) of the CETA. 
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arbitral case. Furthermore, treaty practice on the exception clause is diverse while 
arbitral interpretations are relatively few and not always consistent, leaving the 
question far from resolved. 
 
It is in this context, therefore, that this chapter attempts to analyse whether, to what 
extent, and under what circumstances the host state can invoke treaty exceptions to 
justify its regulatory measures against SOE investments. The following discussion 
focuses on security exception clauses in IIAs and their invocations by host states to 
deal with security-related concerns over foreign SOE investments. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the significant role of security exception clauses in 
safeguarding states’ essential interests in relation to its SOE investments and to 
outline implications for rule-makers who have to strike a proper balance between the 
protection of foreign SOE investments and that of the policy discretion of states.  
 
5.2 Regulatory Measures for Foreign SOE Investments and Risk of 
Investor-State Arbitration  
 
Before discussing whether a host state’s regulatory measure against a foreign SOE 
investment may be justified by invoking treaty exceptions, we must ascertain 
whether the restrictive measure relates to the establishment of foreign SOE 
investments or to their treatments after establishment.9 As noted in the previous 
chapters, most debates surrounding the national security implications of foreign SOE 
investments focus on screenings which result in the host states blocking certain 
transactions involving foreign SOEs for reasons of national security.10 Restrictive 
measures of this kind usually relate to the market access of foreign SOE investments, 
especially to critical infrastructure and so-called ‘strategic’ industries.11 
                                                             
9 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009 - Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and 
Development 27. 
10 For more discussion see Ch 2. 
11 Countries define ‘critical infrastructure’ or ‘strategic industries’ in various ways and, which mainly include 
mining of minerals, exploration of oil and gas, energy generation and transmission, water supply, 
telecommunication, IT, etc., see UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 1) 97; Kathryn Gordon and Maeve Dion, ‘Protection Of 
“Critical Infrastructure” And The Role Of Investment Policies Relating To National Security’ (OECD Publishing 
2008) 3–5 <https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/40700392.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017; 
Frédéric Wehrlél and Joachim Pohl, ‘Investment Policies Related to National Security: A Survey of Country 
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However, it is noteworthy that in the post-entry phase host states may also impose 
restrictions on foreign investments, irrespective of whether they are publicly or 
privately owned, to protect some important national interest or policy. In the context 
of Argentina’s 2011 financial crisis, for instance, the Argentinian government 
imposed a series of regulatory measures, including the control of capital transfer, in 
order to mitigate the worsening economic situation.12  
 
There are also some cases in which host governments have adopted legislation in 
favour of strategic domestic industries like the energy sector, telecommunications or 
water supply; or in which host governments have cancelled licenses or state contracts, 
or even dispossessed a foreign investment either by closing it down or by forcing the 
investor to divest certain interests.13 In the first Vattenfall case, for example, the 
Swedish state-owned energy company, Vattenfall, claimed that the German 
government changed their prior agreement and imposed additional environmental 
restrictions on its power plant project under construction.14 In the second Vattenfall 
dispute, shortly after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, the German 
parliament amended its Atomic Energy Act to phase out nuclear energy, resulting in 
an immediate closure of Vattenfall’s nuclear power plants.15 Although such national 
regulations do not target SOE investments specifically, they may significantly affect 
any established foreign investments including those involving with SOEs, which are 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Practices’ (OECD Publishing 2016) 2016/02 22–4 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwrrf038nx-en> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
12 José E Alvarez and Tegan Brink, ‘Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina’ in Karl 
P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011 (OUP 2012) 322. 
13 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs: UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies 
for Development (UN Publication 2009) 30–2; UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 1) 97. 
14 The parties reached a settlement agreement before the tribunal could rule on any issue, Rudolf Dolzer and Yun-
I Kim, ‘Germany’ in Chester Brown (ed), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 300. 
For more discussion see also Nathalie Bernasconi, ‘Background Paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration’ 
(IISD 2009) <https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/background_vattenfall_vs_germany.pdf> accessed 12 September 
2017. 
15 Notably, this case is still pending. For more discussion see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Rhea Tamara 
Hoffman, ‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background 
to the New Dispute Vattenfall v Germany (II)’ [2012] IISD Briefing Note 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/german_nuclear_phase_out.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. Besides, some 
companies also filed cases in German court, and the Federal Constitutional Court has made a judgement on 6 
December 2016, see ‘The Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act Is for the Most Part Compatible with 
the Basic Law’ (Press Release No. 88/2016, 6 December 2016) 
<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-088.html> accessed 
12 September 2017. See also Ch 1. 
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likely challenged in future investment arbitrations. 
 
Even if a host state has approved a transaction by foreign SOEs in a national security 
review, security-related concerns arising from SOE investment may resurface after 
its establishment, and the host state may then wish to take regulatory measures 
restricting or otherwise detrimentally affecting the SOE project. Returning to the 
instance of the Hinkley Point project, Nick Timothy, an advisor to the British Prime 
Minister Teresa May, once said in objection to the project that ‘Chinese could use 
their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut 
down Britain's energy production at will...’16 Although the deal was provisionally 
approved by Mrs May, it is possible for future British governments to take action 
against the Chinese SOE investor, CGN, and its investments in Hinkley and the other 
two nuclear power stations for national security interests. In such a hypothetical case, 
the British government may take various restrictive measures such as divestment or 
even nationalisation of the foreign SOE investment; it may also amend legislation to 
shut down the facilities (such as in the Vattenfall II case) or restrict financial transfers 
(such as in many Argentine cases). 
 
It is notable that in 1988 the UK government directed an SWF, Kuwait Investment 
Office (KIO), to divest its 21.6% stake in British Petroleum (BP) to 9.9% within a 
year for the protection of the ‘public interest’.17 While the KIO purchased the major 
stake in BP after its privatisation on the open market, the British Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (BMMC) investigated the holding and noted that ‘unlike other 
shareholders, Kuwait is a sovereign state with wide strategic interests and could be 
expected to exercise its influence in support of its own national interest’.18 This case 
provides a clear example that host state may revoke an SOE investment on the basis 
of a vaguely defined ‘public interest’, even if it is a completely legal transaction.19 
                                                             
16 Henry Hill, ‘The wit and wisdom of Nick Timothy. 19) Stop selling our security to China’ Conservative Home 
(15 July 2016) <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/07/the-wit-and-wisdom-of-nick-timothy-19-
stop-selling-our-security-to-china.html> accessed 30 January 2017. 
17 Reuters, ‘British Tell Kuwait to Cut BP Stake: Arab Oil Producer Could Lose $593 Million in Selloff’ Los 
Angeles Times (London, 5 October 1988) <http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-05/business/fi-2758_1_arab-oil> 
accessed 29 March 2017;Brown and Sheppard 742.  
18 ibid. 
19 Christopher Balding, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Intersection of Money and Politics (OUP 2012) 84. 
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Whether the regulatory measure relates to the pre-entry or post-entry of foreign 
SOEs relates closely to whether the host state’s action is subject to international 
investment obligations. In this context, the situation may be distinguished between 
investment treaties which only cover the post-establishment phase and those which 
extend to a pre-establishment phase. Specifically speaking, under IIAs that cover the 
pre-establishment phase, if the contracting state restricts the entry of foreign SOEs 
for national security considerations, state action might amount to a violation of 
relevant treaty commitments, such as non-discriminatory treatment, and SOE 
investors might challenge such state action in an investor-state arbitration, unless 
there are express reservation and exceptions.20  
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, some treaties have expressly excluded certain 
sectors or activities relevant to national security or of strategic importance from pre-
establishment obligations. A problem here is that the sector or activity as 
strategically important or sensitive for national security may change over time.21 For 
instance, with the rapid developments of technologies, cyber security has become a 
critical element in national security interests and the IT industry may be considered 
as being strategically important. Hence, it seems impossible to exclude all sectors 
and activities relevant to national security or of strategic importance from pre-
establishment commitments.  
 
However, if a treaty providing for pre-establishment protection has included 
security-related exceptions, the host state can have recourse to the exception clause 
to defend entry restrictions and to become exempt from international obligations. For 
example, if the US government blocks a foreign SOE transaction in the CFIUS 
review, the SOE investor might claim that the CFIUS determination violates pre-
establishment non-discriminatory treatment in an international arbitration. In such a 
case, some scholars argue that the security exception clause under the US 2012 
Model BIT is ‘broad enough’ to allow the US regulators to protect essential security 
interests.22 While this argument is disputable and has never been tested in practice,23 
                                                             
20 For more discussion see Ch 3. 
21 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 29. 
22 Chow 121. 
23 Lauren Gloudeman and Nargiza Salidjanova, ‘Policy Considerations for Negotiating a US-China Bilateral 
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it at least suggests that the security exception clause can be used to safeguard 
important national interests of host states, including protecting host states’ discretion 
to restrict the entry of foreign SOEs for national security considerations.24 
 
By contrast, most international investment treaties do not cover the pre-
establishment phase; thus, host states’ actions in respect of the market access of 
foreign SOEs will never trigger a violation of treaty obligations.25 Here, the IIA does 
not prevent contracting states from denying entry to certain foreign SOEs due to 
national security considerations. For example, under the current China-UK BIT,26 the 
Chinese SOE investor would not be able to claim that the Hinkley Point review 
violated treaty obligations. This is because the China-UK BIT does not grant 
establishment rights, so the UK government retains unlimited discretion to control 
the entry of foreign investments.27    
 
Some argue that imposing burdensome restrictions on FDI inflows could trigger 
other nations to enact similarly restrictive policies.28 Meanwhile, blocking a foreign 
SOE investment might discourage other SOE investors and be suspected of creating 
an unwelcoming environment for foreign investments. To avoid this, some pre-
establishment IIAs contain a political commitment to create favourable conditions 
for foreign investment from the other contracting state.29 Some countries have in 
addition signed a nonbinding commitment to treat foreign SOEs on their territories 
no less favourably than domestic enterprises.30 But under most IIAs that remain 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Investment Treaty’ (Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report 2016) 25 
<https://www.uscc.gov/Research/policy-considerations-negotiating-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
24 For more discussion see Ch 3. 
25 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 28. 
26 See the China-UK BIT (1986) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/793> accessed 30 
January 2017. 
27 For more see Ch 3. 
28 Jonathan Masters and James McBride, ‘Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security’ Council on Foreign 
Relations (14 December 2016) <http://www.cfr.org/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-investment-us-national-
security/p31477> accessed 30 January 2017.  
29 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 28. 
30 OECD, ‘Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises’ (25 May 2011) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationoninternationalinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm> accessed 30 January 2017; 
Masters and McBride (n 28). 
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completely silent on establishment rights, under no circumstances can even the most 
restrictive policy of a host state in respect of pre-establishment stipulations amount 
to a treaty obligation.31  
 
The post-establishment IIAs, however, do not prevent SOE investors from alleging 
the violation of obligations such as non-discriminatory treatment, expropriation, 
compensation or transfers, if a host government has imposed restrictions in the post-
establishment phase, just as in the hypothetical instance of Hinkley Point or the 
divestment order against KIO. In such scenarios, the outcome very much depends on 
the specific circumstances of the individual case, the precise language of that 
particular treaty, and the tribunal’s interpretation. 
 
5.3 Exception Clauses and Policy Discretion to Regulate SOE 
Investments 
 
While the network of IIAs and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism may 
entitle foreign investors to challenge the states’ restrictive measures before arbitral 
tribunals, some treaties also contain exception clauses which can limit the 
applicability of investor protections in certain circumstances.32 For example, Article 
XI of the US-Argentina BIT states: 
 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.33 
 
Thus this exception clause allows the contracting states to take actions otherwise 
inconsistent with the treaty for specific objectives including ‘maintenance of public 
                                                             
31 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 28. 
32 William W Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times : The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2008) 48 
Virginia Journal of International Law 309, 311; Salacuse (n 3) 378. Notably, as many treaty exceptions usually 
use the term ‘preclude’, such clauses also refer to non-precluded measure clauses (NPM clauses). Since the NPM 
may give rise to a confusion between treaty-based NPM clause and necessity defence in customary international 
law, for purpose of this research, the term of ‘exception clause’ will be adopted. 
33 Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT. 
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order’, ‘maintenance or restoration of international peace or security’, and 
‘protection of essential security interests’.34 Such an exception clause implies that 
contracting states may take actions against foreign SOEs or SOE investments for the 
protection of certain interests where the actions do not constitute breaches of 
international commitments and the states should not face liability under the 
investment treaty. 
 
Nonetheless, whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances a host state can 
take regulatory measures against a foreign SOE investment very much depend on the 
language of a specific exception clause. Hence, the policy discretion of host states to 
take restrictive measures against SOE investments may be different under different 
investment treaties. The principal issue is whether the host state’s action against a 
foreign SOE investment falls within the permissible objectives covered by the 
exception clause. The broader the range of permissible objectives, the greater the 
degree of flexibility retained by host states to regulate foreign SOE investments.35  
 
The permissible objectives in exception clauses which are most frequently invoked 
are security,36 international peace and security,37 and public order.38 Some treaties 
also allow contracting parties to pursue other objectives, such as public health,39 
public morality, 40  extreme emergency, 41  prevention of disease or pests, 42  the 
                                                             
34 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 309; Salacuse (n 3) 311–2. 
35 Andrew D Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, ‘Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in 
International Investment Law and WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 93, 105; Anne van 
Aaken, ‘International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis’ (2009) 
12 Journal of International Economic Law 507, 523–4. 
36 See e.g., Article X (1) of the Panama-US BIT (1982); Article 1 of the Senegal-US BIT (1983); Article 11 of the 
China-Singapore BIT (1985); Article 11 of the China-New Zealand BIT (1988); Article X (1) of the Argentina-
US BIT (1991); Article XIV of the Nicaragua-US BIT (1995) Article XIV; Article 15 of the Australia-India BIT 
(1999); Article 14 of the China-India BIT (2006); Article 10 (4) of the Canada-Peru BIT (2006); Article IX (5) of 
the Canada-Czech Republic BIT (2009); Article 18 of the China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment agreement 
(2012); Article 12.18 (1) of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012); Article 17 (4) of the Canada-Tanzania BIT 
(2013); Article 12.14 of the China-Korea FTA (2014); etc. 
37 See e.g., Article X (1) of the Panama-US BIT (1982); Article X (1) of the Argentina-US BIT (1991); Article 
XIV of the Nicaragua-US BIT (1995); Article IX (5) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT (2009); Article 18 of the 
China-Japan-Korea trilateral investment agreement (2012); Article 12.14 of the China-Republic of Korea FTA 
(2014); etc. 
38 See e.g., Article X (1) of the Panama-US BIT (1982); Article 1 of the Senegal-US BIT (1983); Article X (1) of 
the Argentina-US BIT (1991); Article 14.15 (a) of the Australia-Japan EPA (2014); etc. 
39 See e.g., Article 11 of the China-Singapore BIT (1985); Article 11 of the China-New Zealand BIT (1988); etc. 
40 See e.g., Article 1 of the Senegal-US BIT (1983); Article 12.18 (1) of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012) 
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protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 43  conservation of natural 
resources, 44  prudential reasons, 45  protection of cultural industries, 46  sound 
development of national economy,47 and so on.48  
 
Moreover the exception clauses commonly include a nexus requirement which 
determines both the relationship between the disputed measure and permissible 
objectives and, consequentially, the degree of scrutiny that an investment tribunal 
would be expected to direct at the relationship between the policy objective and the 
measure chosen to achieve it.49 Most of the exception clauses require that state action 
should be ‘necessary’ for the permissible objectives,50 while other exception clauses 
define the nexus requirement that the measure must be ‘required’,51 ‘directed to’,52 
‘proportional to’, 53  ‘appropriate to’, 54  ‘for’, 55  or ‘designed or applied to’ 56  the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Article 14.15 (a) of the Australia-Japan EPA (2014); etc. 
41 See e.g., Article 14 of the China-India BIT (2006); Article 20 of the China-Japan-Korea TIA (2012); etc. 
42 See e.g., Article 11 of the China-Singapore BIT (1985); Article 11 of the China-New Zealand BIT (1988); 
Article 15 of the Australia-India BIT (1999); etc. 
43 See e.g., Article10 (1) of the Canada-Peru BIT (2006); Article IX (1) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT 
(2009); Article 12.18 (1) of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012); Article 17 (1) of the Canada-Tanzania BIT 
(2013); Article 14.15 (b) of the Australia-Japan EPA (2014); Article 9.8 of the China-Korea FTA (2015); etc. 
44 See e.g., Article 10 (1) of the Canada-Peru BIT (2006); Article IX (1) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT 
(2009); Article 12.18 (1) of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012); Article 17 (1) of the Canada-Tanzania BIT 
(2013); Article 14.15 (e) of the Australia-Japan EPA (2014); Article 9.8 of the China-Republic of Korea FTA 
(2015); etc. 
45 See e.g., Article 10 (2) of the Canada- Peru BIT (2006); Article IX (2) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT 
(2009); Article 17 (2) of the Canada-Tanzania BIT (2013); etc. 
46 See e.g., Article 10 (6) of the Canada-Peru BIT (2006); Article IX (7) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT 
(2009); Article 12.18 (1) of the Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012); Article 17 (7) of the Canada-Tanzania BIT 
(2013); Article 14.15 (d) of the Australia-Japan EPA (2014); Article 9.8 of the China-Korea FTA (2015); etc. 
47 See e.g., the Protocol of the China-Japan BIT (1988) provides that:  
3. …it shall not be deemed “treatment less favorable” for either Contracting Party to accord 
discriminatory treatment, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulation, to nationals and 
companies of the other Contracting Party, in case it is really necessary for the reason of public order, 
national security or sound development of national economy. 
48 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 334–5; Mitchell and Henckels (n 35) 105–6. 
49 ibid 107. 
50 See e.g., Article 18 of the US 2012 Model BIT; Article 10 (1) & (4) of the Canada 2004 Model FIPA. 
51 See e.g., Article 3 (2) of the Belgium-Luxembourg-Uganda BIT. 
52 See e.g., Article 11 of the China-New Zealand BIT. 
53 See e.g., Article VIII of the Colombia 2007 Model BIT 
<http://www.italaw.com/documents/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf> accessed 5 Feb 2017. 
54 See e.g., Article 22 (2) of the COMESA Investment Agreement <http://www.tralac.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/Investment_agreement_for_the_CCIA.pdf> accessed 5 Feb 2017. 
55 See e.g., Article 12 (2) of the Croatia-India BIT (2001). 
56 See e.g., Article 22 (1) of the COMESA Investment Agreement. 
SOE INVESTMENTS AND INVESTMENT TREATY EXCEPTIONS 
201 
 
protection of permissible objectives.57 Whilst many exception clauses apply to the 
entire investment treaty,58 other exception clauses apply only to specific provisions, 
such as expropriation,59 non-discrimination,60 dispute settlement,61 applicable laws,62 
etc.63 The applicability of exception clauses varies significantly between different 
treaties. 
 
While foreign SOE investment may give rise to various concerns in host states, most 
of the current debates centre on those of national security.64 In IIAs that include 
national security exceptions, states may choose to use different formulations of 
security exception clauses, reflecting a different level of discretion that contracting 
states wish to retain for themselves when faced with a security threat.65 For example, 
some treaties include broad national security exceptions, by means of an independent 
national security exception clause or a general exception clause, that aim at 
maximum state discretion; other treaties adopt a narrower approach, by listing the 
invocation conditions or restricting the application to specific substantive 
provisions. 66  While only a few investment treaties contain national security 
exceptions, such provisions may become more important in future IIA negotiations, 
because national security has become an important part of foreign investment 
policies where there is a need for states to retain certain levels of discretion and 
flexibility in order to regulate foreign investments and to avoid international 
obligations. 
 
Security exceptions formulated differently may have different implications for their 
interpretation in concrete cases. Many security exception clauses, for example, 
                                                             
57 Mitchell and Henckels (n 35) 106–7; Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 330–1. 
58 For example, the US- Panama BIT provides that ‘[t]his treaty shall not preclude…’ the Canadian 2004 Model 
FIPA provide that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall preclude…’ ibid 331. 
59 See e.g., Article 4 of the BLEU- China BIT (2005). 
60 See e.g., para 4 Ad Article 3 of the Protocol of the China-Germany BIT (2003); para 3 of the Protocol of the 
China-Japan BIT (1988). 
61 See e.g., Article 19 of the Austria-Mexico BIT (1998). 
62 See e.g., Article 11(2) of the India-UK BIT (1994). 
63 K Yannaca-Small, ‘Essential Security Interests under International Investment Law’, International Investment 
Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a Changing World (OECD Publishing 2007) 99. 
64 See also Ch 1. 
65 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 71. 
66 ibid. 
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allude to ‘essential security interests’, 67  while others use the term ‘national 
security’,68 or ‘public security’.69 The question then may be asked whether these 
terms address the same kind of situations. One may argue that the terminology of 
‘essential security interests’ seems narrower than that of ‘national security’ by 
including the expression ‘essential’; and ‘public security’ might be broader than 
‘national security’, as ‘it may also cover scenarios where the security threat does not 
reach the national level but is limited to a local or regional event’.70 A few treaties 
may define and clarify the relationship between the security-related terms used in 
exception clauses. Under the Canada-Korea FTA, for instance, ‘national security’ 
includes contracting parties’ ‘essential security interests’ and international peace and 
security,71 while the COMESA Investment Agreement comprises both ‘national 
security’ and ‘essential security interests’ within the general exception clause.72  
 
However, since most treaties only use the term ‘essential security interests’, a 
potential debate might arise concerning whether or not a restrictive measure against 
foreign SOEs, such as a negative national security review decision would fall within 
the scope of the essential security interests covered by the relevant exception clause. 
Some argue that ‘it is far from obvious that contracting parties, by choosing one of 
these alternatives, actually intended to introduce such a distinction... [which] leaves 
                                                             
67 See e.g., United States of America-Uruguay BIT (2005) Article 18; Rwanda-United States of America BIT 
(2008) Article 18; US 2012 Model BIT Article 18; etc. 
68 See e.g., Article 2 of the Protocol of the China-Korea BIT (1992); Canada-Korea FTA (2014) Article 22.2; 
CETA Article 28.6; Article 22 (1) (a) of the COMESA Investment Agreement. 
69 See e.g., Article 28.3 (2) (a) of the CETA; Article IV of the UK-Colombia BIT (2014). 
70 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 73,98. 
71 Article 22.2 (National Security) provides: 
This Agreement is not to be construed:  
(a) to require either Party to furnish or allow access to information if that Party determines that the 
disclosure of the information would be contrary to its essential security interests;  
(b) to prevent either Party from taking actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests: (i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war and to 
traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services, and technology undertaken directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security establishment; (ii) taken in time of 
war or other emergency in international relations; or (iii) relating to the implementation of national 
policies or international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; or  
(c) to prevent either Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under its international 
agreements for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
72 The COMESA Investment Agreement, Article 22 (1) (a) (in respect of protecting national security and public 
morals) and Article 22 (3) (in respect of protecting essential security interests). 
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it mainly to the arbitration tribunals to provide some further clarification of these 
terms’.73 However, no arbitration interpretation to this effect has been identified. 
Some IIAs define ‘essential security interests’ with still further details. For example, 
the Canada-Peru BIT provides that: 
 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and 
to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and 
technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military or other security establishment, 
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or 
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international 
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices74 
 
The above provisions list cases relating to essential security interests. The details of 
such a list may vary slightly in different treaties, which sometimes refer to a WTO-
like security exception.75 Furthermore, a few IIAs expressly state that Article XXI of 
GATT 1994 and Article XIV bis of GATS are part of the agreement, such as the 
Australia-China FTA.76  
                                                             
73  UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 73. 
74 Article 10 (General Exception) of the Canada- Peru BIT (2006). Such a provision is typical in Canadian 
treaties, see e.g., Article 22.2 of the Canada-Korea FTA (2014); Article 10 (4) of the Canada-Peru BIT (2006); 
Article 10.4 of the Canada 2004 Model FIPA; etc. 
75 See e.g., Article 2102 (1) of the NAFTA. Also, Article 28.6 of the CETA provides:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(a) to require a Party to furnish or allow access to information if that Party determines that the 
disclosure of this information would be contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent a Party from taking an action that it considers necessary to protect its essential security 
interests: 
(i) connected to the production of or traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic and transactions in other goods and materials, services and technology undertaken, and to 
economic activities, carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other 
security establishment; 
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(iii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; or 
(c) prevent a Party from taking any action in order to carry out its international obligations for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
76 Article 16.3 of the Australia-China FTA (2015). Article XXI of GATT 1994 (Article XIV bis of GATS) 
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Such further clarifications about essential security interests seem to confine 
contacting states’ actions to military-related purposes and emergency conditions. But, 
WTO practice shows that it is disputable whether such a clause does limit the 
essential security to the non-economic context, or whether the economic defence is a 
part of security in an emergency.77 Given that states’ actions against foreign SOE 
investments are sometimes taken for both economic and non-economic reasons, a 
problem may arise as to whether such actions fall within the scope of essential 
security interests. The key to this situation then is how broadly the tribunal is likely 
to interpret ‘essential security interests’.  
 
It is significant then that the 2015 Indian Model BIT provides an open-ended scope 
to essential security interests by entering the caveat ‘including but not limited to’, 
which explicitly incorporates ‘action taken so as to protect critical public 
infrastructure’.78 The provision accordingly seems explicitly to extend the exceptions 
                                                                                                                                                                            
provides:  
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(a) to require any Member to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to 
its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests: 
(i) relating to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning 
a military establishment; 
(ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or  
(c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. [emphasis added] 
77 For further discussions on WTO laws, see e.g., GATT Analytical Index, ‘Article XXI: Security Exceptions’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf> accessed 5 Feb 2017. 
78 Article 17.1 of the 2015 Indian Model BIT provides:  
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 
(i) to require a Party to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its 
essential security interests; 
(ii) to prevent a Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests including but not limited to: 
(a) action relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(b) action taken in time of war or other emergency in domestic or international relations; 
(c) action relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other 
goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment; 
(d) action taken so as to protect critical public infrastructure including communication, power and 
water infrastructures from deliberate attempts intended to disable or degrade such infrastructure; or 
(iii) to prevent a Party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
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to both economic and non-economic considerations.  
 
However, some treaties, like the China-Columbia BIT, do not enumerate the essential 
security interests, but require that the exception is ‘only applied where a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society’.79 
Hence, the pre-condition for host states to take restrictive measures would be that the 
foreign SOE investment poses a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat’ to 
fundamental interests. But, the security clause does not further explain what 
fundamental interests might encompass and what threats are likely to be seen as 
sufficiently serious.   
 
Most IIAs do not provide further details of essential security interests, the US 
treaties being one example of this. In these cases, host states would retain 
considerable policy discretion to regulate SOE investments. The Letters of Submittal 
accompanying certain US BITs stated that: 
 
…[A] Party’s essential security interests would include security-related 
actions taken in time of war or national emergency. Actions not arising from 
a state of war or national emergency must have a clear and direct 
relationship to the essential security interests of the Party involved. 80 
(emphasis added) 
 
However, recent US treaties omitted such a statement, leaving the scope of ‘essential 
security’ open to broad and open-ended interpretation. Furthermore, some treaties 
adopt a self-judging exception whereby a contracting state is allowed to take 
restrictive measures against foreign SOE investments insofar as ‘it considers 
necessary’ to protect the state’s essential security interests.81 In this sense, host states 
seem to retain maximum policy discretion to regulate foreign SOE investments. 
Many recent treaty practices tend to accept a self-judging clause, for example the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Similar provisions see Article 76 of the New Zealand- Singapore Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEP) 
(2000). 
79 Article 12 of the China-Columbia BIT. 
80 See e.g., Article XIV (1) of the Azerbaijan-US BIT (1997). 
81 The use of the term ‘necessary’ does not impair the self-judging nature of security exception under the self-
judging exception clauses. 
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CETA, the Australia-China FTA, the China-Korea FTA, the Japan-Uruguay BIT, and 
so on. 
 
Nevertheless, although security exception clauses allow host states to take action 
against foreign SOE investments, whether or not their restrictive measures are 
justifiable under treaties may be scrutinised by tribunals if an SOE investor files a 
case before an investment tribunal. The next part will therefore discuss the 
invocation of security exceptions by host states to justify actions against foreign 
SOEs and how tribunals will review this issue. 
 
5.4 Invocation of Security Exceptions to Justify Restrictive Measures 
Relating to SOE Investments 
 
According to UNCTAD, at least 16 national security-related investment cases have 
been examined by international investment tribunals, and over one-third (277 cases) 
of all known investment arbitration cases concern investments in industries that may 
affect a country’s national interests.82 More importantly, national security arguments 
were used by the respondent states as a justification for measures against foreign 
investments taken in the post-establishment phase; that is, nationalisation or 
expropriations of investment by means of legislative acts, or cancellation of licenses 
or state contracts.83 It is unsurprising if, in this context, a host state invokes national 
security reasons to justify its actions against foreign SOE investments.  
 
However, while the security exception clauses discussed above may safeguard host 
states’ ability to take action on grounds of national security, it is still uncertain 
whether restrictive measures against SOE investments would be found justifiable 
under the security exception clauses in investment arbitration since such a scenario 
has never been tested in investment arbitration. To date, only certain arbitral cases 
against Argentina have discussed the security exception clause. Apart from US 
investors, investors from other countries have also challenged Argentina’s regulatory 
measures to tackle the economic crisis under different BITs, but only the US-
                                                             
82 UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 1) 97. 
83 ibid. 
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Argentina BIT included an ‘essential security interests’ exception which was invoked 
by Argentina to defend its actions.84 However, even though US investors brought 
claims on the basis of nearly identical facts and the same security exception clause, 
tribunals reached a variety of conclusions about whether the essential security 
exception clause justified the disputed state measures.85  
 
If an SOE investor claims that a host state’s restrictive measure constitutes a 
violation of investment treaty obligations, whether and to what extent the action is 
justifiable under the security exception clause will be determined by the tribunal on a 
case-by-case basis. The tribunal would then face the question of whether and to what 
extent it has the competence to review the state’s action and how to apply the 
security exception clause, but the approach and interpretations may vary under 
different exception clauses. 
 
5.4.1 Self-Judging Clauses: ‘Good Faith’ Test  
 
When it applies the security exception clause, the tribunal is first faced with the 
problem of whether the security exception is self-judging or non-self-judging, 
because that will determine whether and to what extent the investment tribunal is 
competent to review the state’s restrictive measure in relation to SOE investments.  
 
Some IIAs contain self-judging clauses that emulate Article XXI of the GATT. For 
example, Article 2102 (1) of NAFTA and Article 18 of the US 2012 Model BIT 
provide that nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from 
taking any actions that ‘it considers’ necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests. According to the Statement of Administrative Action in the US’ 
NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, such a security exception is ‘self-judging’ in 
                                                             
84 In early 2000, investors from the US, the UK, Italy and France brought claims against Argentina under their 
BITs with Argentina, but only the US-Argentina BIT presented a security exception clause. For further discussion 
see Prabhash Ranjan, ‘Protecting Security Interests in International Investment Law’ in Mary E Footer and others 
(eds), Security and International Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 295–6. 
85 Tribunals in the CMS, Enron and Sempra cases found the security exception clause inapplicable while the 
LG&E and Casual Continental tribunals reached the opposite conclusion, see William J. Moon, ‘Essential 
Security Interests in International Investment Agreements’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 481, 
485. 
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nature, although each government would expect the provisions to be applied by the 
others in good faith.86 While the self-judging security exception clause clearly 
implies that the respondent state retains exclusive discretion to apply the clause, it is 
implicit that the invocation of the security exception by the state will be made in 
good faith.  
 
Until now no arbitral tribunals have reversed a state’s determination on what it 
considers necessary under a self-judging clause. But, some ICSID tribunals have 
expressed the view that the self-judging nature of such clauses does not entirely 
exempt contracting parties from international judicial reviews, i.e., contracting 
parties are subject to international responsibility under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.87  
 
The LG&E tribunal, for example, stated that ‘[w]ere the Tribunal to conclude that the 
provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be subject to a good faith 
review anyway’.88 In the Enron case, the tribunal found that judicial review of a non-
self-judging clause is not limited to ‘an examination of whether its invocation or the 
measures adopted were taken in good faith’.89 Furthermore, in Continental Casualty, 
Argentina suggested that, even if Article XI is self-judging, ‘a tribunal would be 
empowered to check the recourse to the exception was made in good faith’.90  
 
Accordingly, international jurisprudence has underscored that self-judging clauses do 
not constitute a bar to the jurisdiction of tribunals.91 Hence, if a tribunal faces a case 
                                                             
86 US Statement on Administrative Action of the NAFTA Implementation Act, 217 
<http://www.naftaclaims.com/commissionfiles/USStatementofAdministrativeAction.pdf> accessed 12 September 
2017; see also the Letter of Submittal of the Rwanda-US BIT (2008). For more discussion see Stephan W Schill 
and Robyn Briese, ‘“If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement’ (2009) 13 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 61, 111. 
87 Article 26 of the VCLT provides that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith’. UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 40. 
88 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc.v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 214. See also Enron Corporation and Ponderosa 
Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007), para 327; CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para 366. 
89 Enron (n 88), para 339. 
90 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 
2008, 81 (footnote 271). 
91 Schill and Briese (n 86) 112–3. 
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involving an SOE investment under the self-judging clause, it will still have the 
power to review the state action for evidence of good faith. 
 
The problem however is how to implement a good faith review. The LG&E tribunal 
considered that a good faith review should not significantly differ from the 
substantive analysis under a non-self-judging clause.92 No further guidance was 
provided here, and the principle has never been tested by investment tribunals. In 
fact, the LG&E approach to good faith reviews could mitigate the difference between 
self-judging clauses and non-self-judging clauses, elevating the lower standard of a 
good faith review to that of a higher full-bodied substantive review and so deprive 
the explicit self-judging character of its merits.  
 
Some tribunals also noted that ‘caution must be exercised in allowing a [state] party 
unilaterally to escape from its treaty obligations’ under a self-judging exception 
clause, which ‘would conflict in principle with the agreement of the parties to have 
disputes under the BIT settled compulsorily by arbitration’.93 Here an important 
function of the good faith review is to preventing contracting states from misusing 
the self-judging security exception clause and ensuring a balance between state 
freedom of action and investor protection.94 This is where a good faith review is of 
great importance to foreign SOE investments, especially when one considers that 
some restrictive measures targeting SOEs are criticised as protectionism. A good 
faith review may prevent host states from abusing self-judging security exceptions 
and thus help strike the proper balance between protecting foreign SOE investments 
and regulating SOE investments for national security reasons. 
 
Yet whilst good faith has long been a core principle in international law, a workable 
standard of good faith review has yet to be fully developed.95 The question, therefore, 
remains: what is meant by a good faith review and how can it be implemented in 
practice without conceding too much power to investment tribunals? The danger is 
that in reviewing the legality of state measures under self-judging exceptions 
                                                             
92 LG&E (n 88), para 214. 
93 Continential Casualty (n 90), para 187. 
94 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 378. 
95 ibid. See generally John F O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Dartmouth Publishing 1991). 
CHAPTER 5 
210 
 
investment tribunals may go as far as substituting the state’s decision by their own 
view of what would be necessary for the protection of security and bring about the 
danger of making arbitrary interpretations.96  
 
In Djibouti v France, Judge Keith in his Declaration considered that in invoking a 
self-judging clause a state should not act against the principles of good faith, abuse 
of rights and a misuse of power.97 He further cited the ICJ’s statement in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case that the good faith obligation reflected in Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention ‘obliges the Parties [to a treaty] to apply it in a 
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.’98 Some 
scholars maintain this approach to concretising the good faith review because it 
addresses the characteristic element of self-judging clauses, namely the discretion 
accorded to states in favour of domestic over international interests.99 Some scholars 
consider that the good faith review comprises two elements, including 
reasonableness - a rational basis for state action and honesty - of action and/or in the 
mind of the state.100  
 
However, the above interpretation of good faith reviews is just a plausible approach 
rather than a clear guidance. In practice, it is disputable whether a line can actually 
be drawn between a good faith review and a substantive review. Furthermore, it is 
uncertain and unpredictable how an investment tribunal would review elements of 
good faith as either ‘reasonableness’ or ‘honesty’ should include both objective and 
subjective considerations. 
 
My view on the self-judging exception clause is, firstly, a self-judging clause 
                                                             
96 Schill and Briese (n 86) 120. 
97 As Judge Keith stated, ‘those principles [of good faith, abuse of rights and détournement de pouvoir] require 
the State agency in question to exercise the power for the purposes for which it was conferred and without regard 
to improper purposes or irrelevant factors’, Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djibouti v. France) (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 177, Declaration of Judge Keith, para 6 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/136/136-20080604-JUD-01-06-EN.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. See ibid 117–8, 
124. 
98 ibid, cited Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgement) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 142. 
99 Schill and Briese (n 86) 125, 140. 
100 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 379; Shin Yi Peng, ‘Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National 
Security Exceptions’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 449, 467; Andrew D Mitchell, ‘Good 
Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 339, 345. 
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indicates a declaration of discretion that contracting states would determine any 
security exception. This would include whether or not a foreign SOE investment 
threatens its national security interests and what action against foreign SOE 
investment is necessary to protect national security. In this regard, tribunals are 
poorly placed to ‘second-guess’ the policy choice of a government.101 Secondly, a 
self-judging clause does not bar a tribunal from reviewing state action subject to a 
good faith review. But, a good faith review should not impair a state’s discretion in 
taking action against SOE investments for the protection of national security 
interests. Thirdly, a good faith review under a self-judging clause is a review of 
whether or not the state invokes the self-judging exception in good faith, both 
subjectively and objectively, rather than a ‘substantive’ review of national security 
per se. In this sense, tribunals’ reviews are more like an oversight to prevent 
contracting states from abusing their discretion in self-judging or exercising the 
discretion improperly. 
 
Accordingly, the good faith review would offer an important advantage in protecting 
SOE investments, namely, to prevent host states from abusing security exceptions 
against foreign SOEs for protectionism in disguise. Under the good faith test, 
tribunals could assess whether or not the state’s invocation of a self-judging 
exception served, subjectively, protectionist ends; and objectively, implemented 
improperly, inter alia, whether or not state exercised national policy was instituted in 
an obvious and deliberately arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable way. As a result, a 
policy which bars all Chinese SOEs from acquiring or otherwise gaining control of 
US companies because of the arguably high risk to US national security may 
covertly serve the aims of protectionism. 102  The sudden shut-down of SOE 
investment facilities such as a nuclear power station may similarly be considered an 
arbitrary action on the part of the State. Most importantly, in these cases the 
respondent state may bear a greater burden of proof in demonstrating that its 
                                                             
101 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 381. 
102 In the 2016 Annual Report to the Congress, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said 
that Chinese SOEs could use technologies they acquired to benefit Chinese national interests ‘to the detriment of 
US national security’, and then recommended the Congress to bar Chinese SOE investments, see The US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘2016 Report To Congress’ (2016) 121 
<https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2016 Annual Report to Congress.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2017. 
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invocation of self-judging clauses is in good faith. 
 
Although it is uncertain whether the investment tribunal would be convinced in a 
particular case, the good faith test could constrain the freedom of states to invoke 
self-judging security exceptions, and then strike a balance between maintaining a 
host state’s discretion in matters of national security and the protection of foreign 
SOEs from protectionism.  
 
5.4.2 Non-Self-Judging Clauses: A Substantive Analysis 
 
Most investment treaties do not include the term ‘it considers’ in the security 
exception clause. Thus, a question arises as to whether a security exception clause 
without explicitly self-judging language, such as Article XI of the US - Argentina 
BIT, should be interpreted as inherently self-judging.  
 
When foreign investors filed cases against Argentina in the aftermath of the crisis, 
the Argentinian government argued that Article XI of the US - Argentina BIT should 
be interpreted as self-judging, subject only to good faith review.103 Article XI of the 
Treaty reads as follows: 
 
[T]his Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests. 
  
However, claimant investors did not share the same understanding. In the LG&E 
case, for instance, the investor argued that viewing the clause as self-judging ‘would 
result in the creation of a broad and sweeping exception to the obligations 
established under the Treaty and would eviscerate the very object and purpose of this 
kind of treaty’.104 As a result, all the tribunals concluded that Article XI of the US-
Argentina BIT is not self-judging, and that the tribunal should conduct a substantive 
                                                             
103 For example, Enron (n 88), para 324. See Burke-White and Staden (n 32) 393.  
104 Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 
2007, para 372, cited Expert Opinion of Professor José E. Álvarez, 12 September 2005, para 64. 
SOE INVESTMENTS AND INVESTMENT TREATY EXCEPTIONS 
213 
 
judicial review to examine whether or not the state action met with the conditions 
laid down by the treaty provisions.105 In the instance of the CMS case, while the 
tribunal noted that the US government had a long-standing practice of self-judging 
character of security exception clause in BITs,106 it concluded that, ‘when states 
intend to create for themselves a right to determine unilaterally the legitimacy of 
extraordinary measures importing non-compliance with obligations assumed in a 
treaty, they do so expressly’.107 
 
Furthermore, tribunals referred to Article XXI of the GATT and the ICJ’s decisions 
in the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms cases, and held that ‘the language of a [security 
exception] provision has to be very precise in order to lead to a [positive] conclusion 
about its self-judging nature’.108 Likewise, in the LG&E case, the tribunal held that 
the language of the BIT did not specify who should decide what constitutes essential 
security measures - whether it was Argentina itself or the tribunal. Based on the 
evidence from the understanding of the parties at the time the Treaty was signed in 
1991, the tribunal concluded that the provision was not self-judging.109  
 
Accordingly, if the tribunal finds that the security exception clause is not self-
judging, the state’s action will then be subject to a substantive judicial review where 
the tribunal will determine whether the scope and the nature of the disputed measure 
are justified and indeed necessary.110 But, some scholars argue:  
 
…[T]he fact that a BIT is textually silent on the issue of deference does not, 
however, automatically translate into a presumption in favor of full review to 
                                                             
105 See e.g., Enron (n 88), para 339; CMS (n 88), para 373. See also William J. Moon (n 85) 485; Burke-White 
and von Staden (n 32) 397. 
106 For example, Annex of the Nicaragua-US BIT provides that ‘the Parties confirm their mutual understanding 
that whether a measure is undertaken by a Party to protect its national security interests is self-judging’. The US-
Russia BIT also includes a self-judging security exception clause, and the recent US 2012 Model BIT adopts the 
same approach. 
107 CMS (n 88), paras 368-70. See also Sempra (n 104), para 369. 
108 Enron (n 88), para 336; CMS (n 88), paras 371-2. Likewise, the ICJ held in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, 
referring to the conditions defined by the ILC, that ‘the State concerned is not the sole judge of whether those 
conditions have been met’, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgement) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 
para 51.  
109 LG&E (n 88), para 212. 
110 See e.g., CMS (n 88), para 366; Enron (n 88), para 339; LG&E (n 88), para 214. 
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the extent that arbitrators may fully replace a state’s assessment of a situation 
and the measures necessary to remedy it with their own. The permissible 
objectives of a BIT or language employed in defining the nexus requirement 
may indicate or even necessitate a lower standard of review that gives greater 
deference to a state’s own invocation of an [exception] clause…111  
 
Hence, they suggest that tribunals adopt the ‘margin of appreciation’ approach, 
famously employed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), to reviewing 
state’s action under a non-self-judging clause. 112  This interpretive approach, in 
essence, means that the Court will afford states a margin of appreciation as regards 
their compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, and respect the 
state’s determination of its obligations under the Convention.113 Although the Court 
considers that ‘it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the 
reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of necessity’, the states’ 
power of appreciation is not ‘unlimited’. Furthermore, the Court is responsible for 
ensuring the domestic margin of appreciation goes ‘hand in hand’ with supervision 
that concerns ‘both the aim of the measure challenged and its necessity’.114 In the 
ECHR jurisprudence, the scope of margin can be narrower or wider in different 
kinds of cases, depending on what rights are at stake.115 Meanwhile, the Court may 
assess the ‘necessity’ of the state action by using different formulations such as 
‘proportional’, ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’ or ‘a fair balance’.116 
 
While the recourse of the margin of appreciation in international investment law is 
disputable in academia,117 in the Continental Casualty case, the tribunal considered 
                                                             
111 Burke-White and Staden (n 32) 371. 
112 ibid; Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional At International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and 
Financial Crisis’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325, 365–6. 
113 Julian Arato, ‘The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 545, 566–8; Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law?’ (2006) 16 The European Journal of International Law 907, 910. 
114 Council of European, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ 
<https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp#P85_4072> accessed 12 
September 2017, cited Handyside v. UK [1976] ECHR 5, Judgement, paras 48-9. 
115 See ‘Margin of Appreciation: An Overview of the Strasbourg Court’s Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ Open 
Society Justice Initiative (April 2012) <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/echr-reform-
margin-of-appreciation.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017. 
116 Council of European (n 114). 
117 For further discussion see Julian Arato (n 113); Yuval Shany (n 113); William W Burke-White and Andreas 
von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ 
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that ‘this objective assessment [whether the financial crisis in Argentina triggered the 
essential security exception in Article XI under the BIT] must contain a significant 
margin of appreciation for the State applying the particular measure: a time of grave 
crisis is not the time for nice judgments, particularly when examined by others with 
the disadvantage of hindsight’.118 But, the tribunal then noted that although Article 
XI ‘involves naturally a margin of appreciation by a party invoking it, caution must 
be exercised in allowing a party unilaterally to escape from its treaty obligations in 
the absence of clear textual or contextual indications’.119 As a result, the tribunal 
reached the same conclusion as other ICSID awards that Article XI is non-self-
judging where ‘the tribunal has to evaluate whether the impugned measures were 
‘necessary’ for the maintenance of public order and the protection of the essential 
security interests of Argentina within the meaning of the BIT’.120 
 
Therefore, under a non-self-judging exception clause, even if a tribunal recognises 
that the host state enjoys a margin of appreciation to invoke the exception, it would 
still assess whether the state’s action qualifies under the clause as for the protection 
of national security or other national interests, and whether the action is necessary 
for the objective. Accordingly, if a host state invokes a security exception clause 
such as Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT in investment arbitration in order to 
justify its restrictive measures against foreign SOE investments, the tribunal is likely 
to employ a two-stage assessment: first, to decide what the essential security 
interests are, i.e., whether the SOE investment threatens essential security interests of 
the host state; and second, to determine what action is necessary, i.e., whether the 
restrictive measure is necessary for the protection of essential security interests.  
 
In the litigation of dozens of BIT cases, Argentina learnt lessons that if the security 
exception clause was silent as to whether the invoking party could judge for itself 
when such measures were necessary, such as Argentina- US BIT, the tribunal would 
judge when the clause could be invoked. Therefore, the recent Argentina-Qatar BIT 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 283. 
118 Continental Casualty (n 90), para 181. For further discussion on the ‘margin of appreciation’ in international 
investment law see Yuval Shany (n 113). 
119 Continental Casualty (n 90), para 187. 
120 ibid, paras 188-9. 
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provides a self-judging clause in this respect, stating that nothing shall be construed 
to preclude a state from applying measures that it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests, including measures adopted in time of 
war, armed conflict or ‘other types of emergencies’, or ‘in respect of international 
relations’.121 While the meaning of ‘in respect of international relations’ is obscure, 
the ‘other types of emergencies’ clause could arguably stretch to economic crises that 
affect a state’s essential security.122 Under these provisions, tribunals are nevertheless 
able to conduct a good faith test. 
 
A. SOE investment considered as a threat to essential security interests 
 
Under a non-self-judging clause, tribunals have to determine the scope and 
applicability of security exceptions. The first issue will be whether state’s action 
targets permissible objectives within the scope of the exception clause, i.e., the 
protection of essential security interests. 
 
If the respondent state seeks to defend its restrictive measures against foreign SOE 
investments by citing security exceptions, the tribunal will firstly decide whether the 
SOE investment threatens any security interests of the state, and what the scope of 
the state’s security interests really is. Although this scenario has never been tested in 
a real case, so that a tribunal’s future interpretation retains unclear, some ICSID 
cases which have touched upon the notion of national security may have influenced 
future cases. 
 
There was consensus amongst tribunals that the Argentina cases settled under Article 
XI of the Argentina-US BIT essential security interests cover economic emergency 
or crisis. For instance, the CMS tribunal stated that if the concept of essential security 
interests was understood and interpreted ‘to exclude other interests, for example, 
major economic emergencies’, it could well result in an ‘unbalanced understanding 
                                                             
121 Article 13 of the Argentina-Qatar BIT (2016). 
122 It should be observed, though, that the Qatar BIT differs from the US BIT in that the former does not mention 
‘public order’ as one of the interests at issue. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘ANALYSIS: A look inside Argentina's first 
new Bilateral Investment Treaty in 15 years’ IAReporter (13 December 2016) <http://tinyurl.com/zx2govc> 
accessed 12 September 2017. 
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of Article XI’.123 Similarly, the Enron tribunal noted that:  
 
[T]he object and purpose of the Treaty are, as a general proposition, to apply 
in the situation of economic difficulty and hardship that require the protection 
of the international guaranteed rights of its beneficiaries…any interpretation 
resulting in an escape route from the obligations defined cannot be easily 
reconciled with that object and purpose…124  
 
The Sempra tribunal further considered that ‘there is nothing that would prevent an 
interpretation allowing for the inclusion of economic emergency in the context of 
Article XI. Essential security interests can eventually encompass situations other 
than the traditional military threats for which the institution found its origins in 
customary law’.125 In LE&G, the tribunal rejected the argument that ‘Article XI is 
only applicable in the circumstances amounting to military action and war’ and 
believed that ‘when a State’s economic foundation is under siege, the severity of the 
problem can equal that of any military invasion’.126 Likewise, in the more recent 
Continental Casualty case, the tribunal pointed out that:  
 
[I]t is well known that the concept of international security of States in the 
Post World War II international order was intended to cover not only political 
and military security but also the economic security of States and of their 
population… States have invoked necessity ‘to protect a wide variety of 
interests, including safeguarding the environment, preserving the very 
existence of the State and its people in time of public emergency, or ensuring 
the safety of a civilian population’.127  
 
Accordingly, it appears that international investment tribunals tend to adopt a broad 
interpretation of the scope of essential security interests which may inter alia 
encompass political, economic, social, environmental, and human rights interests.  
 
My understanding of this broad interpretation is that the aim of the protection of a 
                                                             
123 CMS (n 88), para 360. 
124 Enron (n 88), para 331. 
125 Sempra (n 104), para 374. 
126 LG&E (n 88), para 238. 
127 Continental Casualty (n 90), para 175, cited Kenneth J Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation 1992) 222. 
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state’s autonomy in matters of national security is the defence of sovereignty. In 
other words, competence to define what its essential security interests are should rest 
with the state itself. The concept of national security may lose both meaning and 
purpose if a third party has the power to decide whether a threat to a state’s national 
security exists and what measures that state may take in response.128 However, a 
broad interpretation by the tribunal could afford maximum protection of a state’s 
national security. Therefore, although currently there are no cases involving national 
security concerns over SOE investments, should such disputes arise in the future it is 
conceivable that a tribunal would construe such concerns to fall within the scope of 
treaty security exceptions. 
 
However, a broad interpretation of essential security interests may lead to an abuse 
of treaty exceptions since states may have various concerns over foreign investments, 
regardless of whether they are publicly or privately owned, arising from national 
security considerations. Although tribunals have so far tended to give a fairly broad 
interpretation of the notion of ‘essential security interests’, they have disagreed on 
the degree of severity of any security risk that would justify invoking the exception 
clause.  
 
For example, in the CMS and Enron cases, the respective tribunals concluded that 
‘the Argentine crisis was severe but did not result in a total economic and social 
collapse’, 129  and were not convinced by the argument that ‘such a situation 
compromised the very existence of the state and its independence so as to qualify as 
involving an essential interest of the state’.130  By contrast the LG&E tribunal 
considered that the crisis ‘constituted the highest degree of public disorder’ and 
threatened a ‘total collapse’ of Argentinian government, so that Argentina was 
excused under Article XI from liability for any breaches of the treaty.131 In the 
Continental Casualty case, the tribunal held that a crisis that brought about a series 
of threats132 qualified as a situation where ‘the maintenance of public order and the 
                                                             
128 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 41. 
129 CMS (n 88), para 355. 
130 Enron (n 88), para 306. 
131 LG&E (n 88), paras 229, 231. 
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protection of essential security interest of Argentina as a state and as a country was 
vitally at stake’.133 These arbitral awards seem to suggest that only severe economic 
crisis can justify the invocation by the state of the essential security exception - 
although the tribunals did not agree on the requisite level of gravity of the economic 
crisis.  
 
If a state invokes a non-self-judging clause to justify its actions against SOE 
investments on the grounds of national security, a tribunal may have to determine 
whether the threat posed by SOE investments is sufficiently severe to justify 
invoking treaty exceptions. The host state may argue that a foreign SOE investment 
distorted market competition posing a threat to economic security, so that measures 
like the imposition of taxes or the restricting of transactions to re-level the playing 
field all fall within security exceptions. In this scenario, even if the tribunal agreed 
that essential security interests cover economic security, it is uncertain whether the 
tribunal would accept that market distortion was severe enough to justify the 
invocation of security exceptions.  
 
The state might have to bear the burden of proof to demonstrate severity. If a tribunal 
considers that security exception could only be applied when the whole economy of 
the state is at stake, it may be hard to convince the tribunal as market distortion or 
anti-competitive practice by one or more SOE investments in the host state would 
seem unlikely to initiate the collapse of an entire economy.  
 
Notably in this context the Continental Casualty tribunal considered that the 
protection of essential security interests ‘does not require that total collapse of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
[T]he sudden and chaotic abandonment of the cardinal tenet of the country’s economic life, such as the 
fixed convertibility rate which had been steadfastly recommended and supported for more than a 
decade by the IMF and the international community; the near-collapse of the domestic economy; the 
soaring inflation; the leap in unemployment; the social hardships bringing down more than half of the 
population below the poverty line; the immediate threats to the health of young children, the sick and 
the most vulnerable members of the population, the widespread unrest and disorders; the real risk of 
insurrection and extreme political disturbances, the abrupt resignations of successive Presidents and the 
collapse of the Government, together with a partial breakdown of the political institutions and an 
extended vacuum of power; the resort to emergency legislation granting extraordinary legislative 
powers to the executive branch…  
133 ibid, paras 180-1. 
CHAPTER 5 
220 
 
country or that a catastrophic situation has already occurred before responsible 
national authorities may have recourse to its protection’. Further, it considerd that the 
invocation of the essential security exception clause ‘does not require that the 
situation has already degenerated into one that calls for the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees and fundamental liberties’.134  
 
If any future tribunal adopts this interpretation, it might be easier for states to justify 
their measures against SOE investment under security exceptions, because the 
tribunal would not require a threat to national security having occurred already. In 
other words, any (potential) risks posed by SOE investment might trigger the state to 
invoke security exception to justify actions in investment arbitration. Given that 
most (if not all) concerns about the adverse impact of foreign SOE investments on 
national security are merely suspicions, such an interpretation is likely to increase 
the invocation of security exception by states as long as there is a potential risk. 
Nevertheless, how any future tribunal will measure the severity of a threat to 
essential security interests remains to be seen. 
 
B. Whether a restrictive measure against SOE is a necessary action? 
 
If the tribunal agrees with the respondent state’s argument that foreign SOE 
investment threatens essential security interests, in most cases,135 it will then decide 
whether the state’s restrictive measure was indeed a necessary response to the threat.  
 
In arbitral practice, tribunals may adopt different tests in assessing the necessity. In 
the Sempra case, for example, the tribunal considered that its review should not 
‘substitute’ the Government’s choice; instead, the tribunal’s duty ‘only to determine 
whether the choice made was the only one available’.136 In the LG&E case, the 
tribunal applied a reasonableness or rationality assessment, stating that: 
                                                             
134 ibid, para 175. 
135 As noted, most of security exception clauses have a nexus requirement and the typical language is ‘necessary 
to’. For example, Article X (1) of the Bulgaria-US BIT (1992) provides that ‘[t]his Treaty shall not preclude the 
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of 
its own essential security interests’.  
136 Sempra (n 104), para 351. 
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…Article XI refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A 
State may have several responses at its disposal to maintain public order or 
protect its essential security interest. In this sense, it is recognised that 
Argentina’s suspension of the calculation of tariffs in US dollars and the PPI 
adjustment of tariffs was a legitimate way of protecting its social and 
economic system.137 (emphasis added) 
 
The Continental Casualty tribunal held that the evaluation of necessity only required 
that ‘Argentina had no other reasonable choices available, in order to protect its 
essential interests at the time, than to adopt these Measures’. 138  This tribunal 
therefore proposed that the necessity test required the measure in question be ‘less 
restrictive’.139 Some scholars suggest tribunals to take a ‘proportionality review’ 
when evaluating the necessity of state action, requiring the action to be rational, less 
restrictive, and balancing.140  
 
Accordingly, if a state takes action against a foreign SOE investment, by for instance 
divesting the SOE investment, the tribunal may require the state to prove in a 
necessity test that no less restrictive measure is available to protect its national 
security, except for divesting the foreign SOE investment. Otherwise, the tribunal 
may need to assess whether the divestment of SOE investment is necessary to 
eliminate the threat to national security. Here it is apparent that the regulatory 
discretion of host states will be restricted by the necessity test under a non-self-
judging clause, but it is unclear whether it can enhance legal clarity and 
predictability since the arbitral interpretation is not always consistent.  
 
For SOE investments, the importance of the necessity test under a non-self-judging 
clause is to explicitly entitle the investment tribunal to judge whether state action is a 
necessary response. Some arbitral cases recognised that states, rather than tribunals, 
are in a better place to craft appropriate responses to emergency situations.141 But 
under a non-self-judging clause, the necessity requirement is an objective criterion, 
                                                             
137 LG&E (n 88), para 239. 
138 Continental Casualty (n 90), para 199. 
139 Kurtz (n 112) 368. 
140 ibid 366. 
141 Burke-White and von Staden (n 32) 398. 
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subject to a reasonable, rational, proportional, or less restrictive test. Accordingly, 
although taking a restrictive measure against an SOE investment is usually a policy 
decision by the host state, such an action is likely subject to closer scrutiny by 
investment tribunals where the host state might be required to prove that no less 
severe measures was available to protect national security.  
 
5.4.3 Invoking the Necessity Defence under Customary International Law? 
 
As mentioned earlier, most of the traditional IIAs do not provide a security exception 
clause. According to Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, however, 
states may invoke the necessity as a ground for derogating from their international 
obligations.142 Hence, in the absence of any security exceptions in an IIA, it is 
nevertheless possible for a host state to invoke the necessity under customary 
international law to justify its action against a SOE investment. 143 In addition, even 
under a non-self-judging security exception clause, it is notable that host state might 
resort to both treaty provisions on national security exception and customary 
international law on state of necessity in order to justify its action against SOE 
investments in investment arbitrations.144 
 
While a number of literatures have discussed the interplay between Article 25 and 
treaty exceptions,145 for the purpose of this thesis, an important question still arises: 
to what extent can customary international law exempt a state from international 
responsibility if it takes restrictive measures against a SOE investment for national 
                                                             
142 Article 25 of ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides:   
1. Necessity may not be invoked by the State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not 
in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the 
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; (b) does not seriously impair 
an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) 
the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State 
has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
143 As noted, ILC Article on State Responsibility are generally accepted as a codification of existing customary 
international law, see UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 34, 47. 
144 See, e.g., CMS (n 88), paras 117-8. 
145 For more discussion see Kurtz (n 112); August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment Arbitration’ in IF Dekker 
and E Hey (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law Volume 41 (Springer 2010); Mitchell and Henckels, 
(n 35) 93. 
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security reasons? Will the tribunal’s analysis of the defence under Article 25 be 
different if the dispute involves SOE investments? 
 
In investment arbitrations, most tribunals read the requirement set out in Article 25 
of ILC into Article XI of the BIT, thus conflating them into a single inseparable 
defence.146 The CMS Annulment Committee, however, observed that Article XI and 
Article 25 are ‘substantively different’. Article XI is a ‘threshold requirement’ that 
specifies the conditions under which the treaty obligations do not apply; whereas 
Article 25 is an excuse which is only relevant once it has been decided that there has 
otherwise been a breach of those substantive obligations.147 Furthermore, the CMS 
Annulment Committee found that Article XI should be applied ‘as lex specialis 
governing the matter and not Article 25’, while Article 25 was a secondary rule 
which ‘could only be subsidiary to the exclusion based on Article XI’.148 In the 
Continental Casualty case, the tribunal concluded that:  
 
[T]he invocation of Article XI under the BIT, as a specific provision limiting 
the general investment protection obligation (of a ‘primary’ nature) 
bilaterally agreed by the Contracting Parties, is not necessarily subject to the 
same conditions of application as the plea of necessity under general 
international law.149  
 
Although it is uncertain whether future tribunals will follow the interpretation by the 
CMS annulment committee or the Continental Casualty tribunal, the arbitral practice 
to date indicates that the necessity defence under customary international law also 
provides flexibility for states to derogate from international obligations, and that the 
tribunal might consider the necessity in Article 25 of ILC in the interpretation of 
treaty exceptions on national security.150 
                                                             
146 For example, the Sempra tribunal stated that ‘the Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law 
standard insofar as the definition of necessity and the conditions for its operation are concerned, given that it is 
under customary law that such elements have been defined’, Sempra (n 104), para 376. See also Enron (n 88), 
para 334. 
147 CMS (n 88), Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 
25 September 2007, para 129. 
148 ibid, paras 132-3. 
149 Continental Casualty (n 90), paras 162-7. 
150 ibid, para 168. 
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Hence, regardless of whether an IIA provides any security exception clause, 
customary international law can provide states certain legal flexibility in exceptional 
circumstances, including taking restrictive measures against foreign SOEs for 
national security reasons.  
 
However, compared to national security exception in IIAs, the defence of necessity 
under customary international law only applied within narrow limits.151 In fact, 
Article 25 of ILC requires a very high threshold of application, i.e., action taken 
must be ‘the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril’, and it is essential that action ‘does not seriously impair an 
essential interest’ of another State.152 Furthermore, the necessity defence would not 
be applicable if ‘the state has contributed to the situation of necessity’.153 The 
Argentine cases demonstrate that it is very hard to argue that certain economic 
emergency measures are the ‘only way’ to counteract economic difficulties,154 while 
the tribunals reached distinct conclusions on whether Argentina contributed to the 
crisis resulting in the state of necessity- although they assessed the issue on nearly 
identical facts.155 
 
Despite of the divergence of interpretation, it would be very difficult for states to 
justify their action against SOE investments for national security reasons under the 
customary international law. In the KIO case, for example, it seemed hard for the 
tribunal to be convinced that a majority stake by KIO in BP would, as a grave and 
imminent peril, impair the essential interests of Britain, and that the divestment order 
was ‘the only way’ for the UK government. Furthermore, it is problematic whether 
the tribunal would conclude that the UK government’s action had precipitated the 
necessity, especially considering that KIO’s investment was a completely legal 
                                                             
151 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 34. 
152 Article 25 (1) of ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
153 ibid, Article 25 (2) (b). 
154 According to the CMS decision, the necessity plea ‘is excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means 
available, even if they may be costlier or less convenient’, CMS (n 88), para 324. See also Reinisch (n 145) 153. 
155 For example, the LG&E tribunal concluded that ‘no serious evidence in the record that Argentina contributed 
to the crisis’, LG&E (n 88), para 257. But, the CMS tribunals found that ‘government policies and their 
shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis and the emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel 
additional difficulties they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in this matter’, CMS (n 88), para 
329. Tribunals in Sempra and Enron reached the same conclusion with the CMS tribunal, see ibid 154. 
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transaction, following the UK government’s call for privatisation of the company. 
Besides, one could doubt whether or not customary international law could provide 
justification for the protection of strategic industries unless it occurred in the context 
of a severe crisis resulting in social upheavals or affecting the human rights of the 
population.156 
 
It is also notable that the invocation of essential security exception may exempt a 
state from obligations including compensation for a treaty breach, while the state is 
still subject to liability for compensation even if it has successfully invoked the 
necessity defence under customary international law.157 Therefore, states that need to 
address national security concerns over SOE investments are strongly advised to 
include a self-judging security exception in investment treaties. 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
In sum, exception clauses are of great importance both to SOE investments and host 
states in the context of international investment law. On the one hand, treaty 
exceptions limit the scope of investment protections for foreign SOEs and SOE 
investments. On the other, treaty exceptions explicitly preserve the freedom of host 
states to pursue policies or regulations in relation to foreign SOE investments.  
 
In recent years, more and more treaties have tended to incorporate exception clauses 
to safeguard a state’s regulatory space, and so it is increasingly likely for states to 
invoke such exceptions to justify their actions against foreign SOE investments in 
international arbitrations and to seek to justify their derogation from international 
investment treaty obligations. However, the scope and flexibility of regulatory 
freedom of a state may vary under different treaty exceptions. In this respect, 
whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances a state can take restrictive 
measures against foreign SOE investments without a breach of its international 
commitments very much depends on the specific language of the applicable 
                                                             
156 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 36. 
157 Sergey Ripinsky, ‘Global Economic Crisis And The Danger Of Protectionism: Does International Law Help?’ 
(2009) 1 (3) Amsterdam Law Forum 11. 
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investment treaty, including the exception clauses.  
 
It is important to address that the situation might be different in pre-establishment 
and post-establishment scenarios. If a host state restricts the entry of a foreign SOE 
for national security considerations, the SOE investor might not be able to challenge 
the state action in the investment arbitration under most IIAs that merely provide 
protections for post-establishment phase. Returning to the Hinkley Point case, if the 
UK government had not approved the deal, the Chinese SOE investor cannot bring a 
case in ICSID anyway because the UK-China BIT does not have a commitment to 
pre-establishment non-discrimination treatment.158  
 
However, if the dispute was brought under a pre-establishment treaty, such as the US 
2012 Model BIT, it might be possible for a SOE investor to challenge the CFIUS 
review decision in an investment tribunal, unless the contracting states have 
explicitly made reservations or exceptions.159 Since the security exception clause is 
in principle applicable to the entire treaty, including both pre-establishment and post-
establishment commitments, it is possible for a state to invoke the security exception 
clause and justify its derogation from the pre-establishment commitment, such as a 
pre-establishment national treatment.160 However, no case to date has tested whether 
an adverse CFIUS review decision could be subject to an investment arbitration, 
                                                             
158 The China-UK BIT only provides post-establishment protections in respect of non-discrimination treatment, 
fair and equitable treatment and expropriation, etc. For example, Article 2 provides: 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions for nationals or companies 
of the other Contracting Party for investment in its territory and, subject to its right to exercise powers 
conferred by its laws, shall admit such investment; (2) Investments of nationals or companies of either 
Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy the most 
constant protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party...  
Article 3 (2) provides that, ‘neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the 
other Contracting Party as regards their management, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to 
treatment less favourable than that which it accords to nationals or companies of any third State…’.  
Article 5 (1) provides: 
[I]nvestments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, 
nationalised or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to expropriations or nationalisation 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’) in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a 
public purpose related to the internal needs of that Contracting Party and against reasonable 
compensation… 
159 For more discussion see Ch 3. 
160 As noted, one may argue that if the security exception clause under the US 2012 Model BIT is ‘broad enough’ 
for CFIUS and the President to review investment transactions considered necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests, see Chow (n 22) 120. 
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leaving the issue unclear and unresolved.161 Furthermore, the security exception 
clause does not automatically preclude the applicability of procedural provisions. 
Hence, investment tribunals are likely to scrutinise a host state’s action against 
foreign SOEs in the pre-establishment phase, including an adverse decision in 
national security reviews. It is notable that the China-Canada BIT explicitly provides 
that the national security review shall not be subject to the dispute settlement 
provisions of the agreement.162  But, most of the IIAs do not include such a 
reservation and thus the risk still exists. 
 
Nevertheless, most investment treaties merely provide post-establishment 
obligations. If such a treaty contained a security exception clause, it would enable 
the host state to take regulatory measures against an established SOE investment and 
justify its derogation from international obligations such as non-discriminatory 
treatment. In the KIO case, for instance, if the Kuwait-UK BIT163 adopted a similar 
exception clause as contained in the UK 2008 model BIT,164 the UK government 
would have the ability to take safeguard measures, including a divestment order, 
against the established KIO investment for the protection of public interests,165 
without a violation of international obligations under the investment treaty. 
Accordingly, it seems of greater importance for host states that need to retain 
flexibility to regulate SOE investment to provide a security exception clause, so that 
the state would be allowed to take safeguard measures against SOE investments and 
justify the derogation from international obligations for the protection of national 
security or other important national interests.  
 
While exception clauses permit host states to take action against SOE investments 
                                                             
161 Gloudeman and Salidjanova (n 23) 25. 
162 Annex D 34 of the China-Canada BIT (2012). 
163 The UK government signed a BIT with Kuwait in 2009, but the Treaty is not in force and the text is not 
published. 
164 Article 7 (1) of the UK 2008 Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments provides:  
The provisions of this Agreement relative to the grant of treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to the nationals or companies of either Contracting Party or of any third State shall not be 
construed so as to preclude the adoption or enforcement by a Contracting Party of measures which are 
necessary to protect national security, public security or public order… 
Similar provisions see e.g., Article 7 (1) of the UK-Ethiopia BIT (2009, not in force); Article IV (1) of the UK-
Columbia BIT (2010).  
165 Brown and Sheppard (n 17) 742. 
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for permissible objectives such as essential security interests, whether the action is 
justifiable under the investment treaty will be evaluated by tribunals. Arbitral 
practice is presently limited and inconsistent here. In the case of self-judging clauses, 
although the state retains considerable discretion on the scope and applicability of 
security exceptions, the tribunal still has the competence to review the action under 
the good faith test. But if the clause is non-self-judging, tribunals may exercise an 
even greater power to conduct a substantive review of the state actions against SOE 
investments. Here the interpretive approaches and conclusions are open to dispute 
and uncertainty.  
Since the scenario in respect of SOE investments has never been tested, how any 
future tribunal will interpret the security exception clause and its justifications for a 
state’s measures against SOE investments remains to be seen. In order to preserve a 
state’s maximum policy discretion over considerations of national security arising 
from foreign SOE investments, it is suggested that such expressions as ‘it considers’ 
be used when drafting a security exception clause, so as to make it explicitly self-
judging. 
 
National security is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it could be invoked by 
states to protect significant interests and critical infrastructure and to justify 
regulations against foreign investors without having to bear responsibility for a 
violation of treaty obligations. But, on the other hand, the abuse of national security 
concerns in market access may result in a discouraging and untrustworthy 
environment for foreign investments.166 Furthermore, the misuse of national security 
considerations by taking restrictive measures after the investment establishes may 
create an unstable legal regime and insecure investment climate in the host state. 
After the delayed decision on the Hinkley nuclear project, for instance, the Chinese 
ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, said that the Hinkley Point project was a test 
of mutual trust between the UK and China, and that the openness of the market 
would be the condition for bilateral co-operation.167 Blocking an investment by a 
particular Chinese SOE might discourage other Chinese SOEs and send a 
                                                             
166 UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (n 1) 17. 
167 Liu Xiaoming, ‘Hinkley Point is a test of mutual trust between UK and China’ Financial Times (8 August 
2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/b8bc62dc-5d74-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95> accessed 12 September 2016. 
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discouraging signal to all Chinese enterprises.  
 
Indeed, national security and security-related concerns about foreign SOEs tend to 
reflect a mix of political and economic considerations. The real motives for taking 
measures on the grounds of national security against SOEs are often complicated and 
ambiguous. States face the dilemma that too open a market might result in a threat to 
national security, whilst over-restrictive security regulations might discourage 
foreign investors. In the end, it is necessary for states to strike the proper balance 
between protecting foreign SOE investors and investments and addressing legitimate 
national security concerns arising from SOE investments. The security exception 
clause should be invoked only as a last resort when other policies are not available to 
eliminate concerns over national security,168 and the state should in principle provide 
an open environment to foreign investors and investments, regardless of their 
ownership structure. 
                                                             
168 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (n 13) 22. 
CHAPTER 5 
230 
 
 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
231 
 
CHAPTER 6: 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW REGIME 
 
This thesis has examined whether and to what extent evolving international 
investment treaties adequately respond to the rapid growth of SOE investments and, 
in particular, to what extent international investment treaties protect SOEs as 
investors and to what extent these protections take into account the twin objectives 
of the preservation of host states’ interests and the promotion of foreign investments.  
 
From the outset, Chapter 1 has shown that the international investment regime has 
been undergoing dramatic changes and has faced uncertainty in recent years where 
the rapid growth of SOE investments and the consequential regulatory responses 
taken by some states at both national and international levels have played a 
prominent role. Significantly, the rapid growth of SOEs as a relatively new type of 
investors has not only complicated the existing various tensions among host and 
home governments and investors, but has also intensified the divergence in 
investment law and policy regimes. After the main tension in international 
investment law has shifted from a ‘North-South’ divide to a ‘Public- Private’ debate, 
I argue that a third dimension of ‘East-West’ contest is now emerging. This 
fundamentally represents a contest between emerging economic powers from the 
East (or the ‘state capitalism’) and the traditional advanced economic powers from 
the West (or the ‘market capitalism’). Consequently, the current IIA regime is facing 
three dimensions at play, where the ‘Public-Private’ conflict between foreign 
investors and host states remains the major tension and theme, while the ‘North-
South’ divide and the ‘East-West’ contest between host and home states lead to 
additional complexity and divergence in the investment rule-making. 
 
These new realities call for a systematic review of key provisions in IIAs to analyse 
whether and to what extent international investment law as it is evolving and 
changing is providing adequate response to all these changing circumstances. As 
such, the substantive chapters focus on the most important issues surrounding SOE 
investments to investigate the evolution of the IIA regime and discuss interactions 
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between SOEs and international investment law. As noted, the IIA regime was not 
created for protecting SOE investments. Hence, the primary challenging issue is 
whether SOEs qualify for international investment protections, with particular focus 
on whether or not SOEs can file claims against host states before arbitral tribunals. 
Chapter 2 has shown that while most IIAs are silent on the standing of SOEs, the 
defintion clauses of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ under most treaties are broad enough 
to include SOEs and SOE investments for international protections. Nonetheless, 
aribtral tribunals would have great discretion to determine whether an SOE acts as a 
(private) investor or exercieses governmental functions as a state if the treaty does 
not explicitly include SOEs. Despite of the disagreement and debate in arbitral 
practice, tribunals are likely to rely on the ‘Broches test’ to determine whether an 
SOE is qualified as ‘a national of the contracting state’ under the ICSID Convention 
thus can bring a case against a host state. In such a case, I argue that the tribunal 
should focus on the specific instance of an SOE investment, rather than exclude an 
SOE from investment protections and ICSID jurisdiction merely due to state 
ownership, whereas it is possible to attribute SOE conduct to host states under both 
customary international law and investment arbitrations. Meanwhile, to prevent SOE 
investors from abusing investment arbitrations against host states, I argue that a 
refined definition of ‘investment’ would help limit the protective scope of 
investment treaties to genuine ‘investments’ that conform to the host state’s laws and 
legislation. Accordingly, policy makers are advised to review and refine the key 
terms in IIAs to clarify the scope of investment protections. Recently, an increasing 
number of IIAs have explicitly provided SOEs and even states as ‘investors’, and 
have included the ‘investment characteristics’ requirement in the definition of 
‘investments’. Nevertheless, with the global expansion of SOEs and increased 
regulatory measures by host states, there will be more SOEs seeking for investment 
treaty protections through investor-state arbitrations. In this regard, host states may 
have to re-evaluate their IIA regimes and consider whether they are prepared to open 
up SOE regulations to arbitral scrutiny, and whether the investment treaties and 
associated mechanisms for dispute settlement need to be adjusted. 
 
While foreign SOEs as an important source of FDI are welcomed in most cases, they 
have also given rise to a wide range of concerns in host states, such as national 
security and competitive neutrality concerns. To minimise the potential political 
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risks and negative effects of SOE investments, some countries have adopted various 
approaches to control or restrict the admission of foreign SOEs, especially including 
tightening mechanisms for FDI screening. As shown in Chapter 3, at the national 
level, SOE investors may face different conditions of admission from private 
investors and in different countries. Internationally, host states retain considerable 
discretion to admit foreign SOEs with a requirement of ‘in accordance with host 
states’ laws’ under most IIAs, including traditional IIAs concluded by European 
countries. By contrast, US treaties typically extend NT and MFN to the pre-
establishment phase of foreign investments where the host state is prohibited from 
placing restrictions or different conditions on admission of foreign investments on 
the basis of nationality. Under such a ‘liberal’ investment regime, any restrictive 
measure by a host state concerning the admission of a foreign SOE may breach 
international obligations on the pre-establishment non-discrimination, except when 
this is done in accordance with relevant exceptions.  
 
More importantly, Chapter 3 has argued that two divergent trends have emerged in 
recent years concerning admission: on the one hand, states tend to tighten the 
screening of foreign investments, including SOEs, at the national level; but on the 
other hand, many countries in their recent treaty practice have accepted obligations 
to provide pre-establishment treaty protections for foreign investors where SOEs will 
also be protected by such commitments. This disparity between national and 
international practice trends, in my opinion, exactly reflects the complexity and 
divergence in the new realities. In respect of liberalisation in the IIA regime, both 
Western countries and emerging economies seek to increase their firms’ access to 
contracting parties’ markets on the basis of non-discriminatory treatment and push 
host states to remove access barriers through investment arbitration. In particular, 
Western countries wish to obtain greater market access and more level playing field 
for their investors in emerging economies. In respect of the restrictive trend at 
national level, Western countries may not be willing to lose their firms’ competitive 
advantages in national and international markets when competing with SOE 
investors, whilst they become increasingly concerned to restrict foreign SOEs on 
grounds of national security or public policy reasons. While the two trends seem 
divergent prima facie, they both demonstrate the investment policies of states, which 
is essentially driven by the state’s political and economic interests. Nevertheless, it 
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remains to be seen whether the future investment policy and law regime will toward 
to more investment liberalisation or return to investment restriction and even 
protectionism. 
 
Although investment treaties differ significantly in investment protections in the pre-
establishment phase, almost all IIAs guarantee to accord foreign investments non-
discriminatory treatment and fair and equitable treatment standard in the post-
establishment phase. Accordingly, SOE investors and their investments are in 
principle entitled to NDT and FET standards of treatment in the territory of the host 
state, while the host state is subject to substantive obligations such that their 
regulatory measures against SOEs may breach protection commitments under 
international investment treaties. As shown in Chapter 4, old investment treaties 
merely focus on investment protections, whilst host states’ regulatory rights are 
constrained by substantive obligations on treatment. However, recent investment 
treaties have struck a balance between protecting SOE investments and preserving 
regulatory space for host states to pursue national interests. Under the new 
generation IIAs, host states’ concerns over SOEs such as competitive neutrality can 
be addressed through clarifying the ‘in like circumstances’ component of the NDT 
obligation, or invoking the ‘public policy’ exception. Nonetheless, arbitral practice 
has shown that tribunals have great discretion in deciding whether a host state’s 
action against foreign SOEs violates any substantive protection obligation. Given the 
disagreement and uncertainty in arbitral practice, policy-makers need to further 
clarify substantive investment protection standards to preserve host states’ national 
interests and to provide more guidance for tribunals in interpreting relevant rules. 
For instance, providing an express reference to ownership considerations in the 
definition of ‘in like circumstances’, explicitly including the ‘competitive neutrality’ 
objective in public policy exception provisions, and providing a circumscribed FET 
with specific components such as due process, denial of justice and manifest 
arbitrariness. 
 
Substantive standards of treatment are of great importance for both investors and 
states. I argue that the evolution of relevant treaty practice demonstrates the struggle 
of states in striking a balance between affording protections to foreign investments 
and preserving regulatory space for pursuing legitimate public policies. In this regard, 
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protecting foreign investments, regardless of their ownership, should be the central 
component of substantive standards of treatment in order to prevent discriminatory 
and arbitral conducts by host states against foreign SOEs. However, some features of 
SOEs, such as the state ownership or competitive advantages obtained from their 
home governments, may generate tricky problems regarding the application scope of 
substantive standards of treatment. As noted in Chapter 4, in the case of NDT of 
SOEs, a question of comparisons may be raised when identifying ‘like 
circumstances’. Also, SOEs may be presumed to have weak legitimate expectations 
under FET, because they are used to higher levels of screening and slightly more 
stringent national regulations. Therefore, policy-makers may have to consider 
whether or not to adjust relevant substantive standards of treatment to SOEs. 
Furthermore, it is pressing for states to rethink and re-evaluate what protection 
guarantees they can afford to foreign SOEs, as current investment treaty obligations 
have the potential to conflict with regulatory measures against foreign SOEs. In the 
last decade, arbitrations against Western countries have prompted them to clarify and 
restrict core terms relating to investment protections, whilst the rise of foreign 
investment from emerging economies has changed their attitude and policies toward 
the IIA regime. As SOE investments will continue to increase in the foreseeable 
future, the reciprocity of investment protections will bear more divergence and 
policy debates between emerging economies and Western states. 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of states tend to include exception clauses in 
IIAs to safeguard vital national interests, including national security interests. 
Accordingly, a host state may derogate from treaty obligations and justify their 
actions against SOE investments by invoking such exceptions. As shown in Chapter 
5, whether, to what extent and under what circumstances a state can take restrictive 
measures against foreign SOEs without a breach of treaty obligations very much 
depend on the specific language of exception clause (e.g., whether is it self-judging 
or non-self-judging) and applicable scope of the treaty (e.g., whether it extends to the 
pre-establishment phase). Nonetheless, whether the state action is justifiable under 
investment treaties will be evaluated by arbitral tribunals. However, Chapter 5 has 
pointed out that although national security exception can be invoked by states to 
protect vital national interests, it may create a discouraging, distrustful and insecure 
climate for foreign investments in the host state. Hence, I argue that states should in 
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principle provide an open environment to foreign investors, regardless of ownership, 
while security exception clause should be invoked only as a last resort when other 
policies are not available to eliminate concerns over national security.  
 
Taken together, the contribution of this thesis, by systematically reviewing and 
analysing the key issues relating to SOE protections under IIAs, represents a useful 
discussion and nuanced understanding of the adaptability of the evolving IIA regime 
to the changing realities in today’s world. In this regard, this thesis offers two 
overarching findings. 
 
The first is that while the old generation IIAs focus on investment protections, the 
new generational IIA do, on the whole, succeed in striking a balance of rights and 
obligations between investors and states. Therefore, on the one hand, SOE investors 
and investments are in principle qualified for investment protections, including 
enjoying substantive standards of treatment in host states and having the right to 
bring arbitration claims against states before international tribunals. As stated in 
Chapter 2 and 3, recent treaty practice tends to explicitly include SOEs as ‘investors’ 
and remove access barriers by extending non-discriminatory treatment to the pre-
establishment stage. On the other hand, new generation IIAs allow host states to 
pursue national interests and public policy objectives in ways that might be 
inconsistent with investment treaty obligations by limiting the applicability of 
substantive treaty obligations and providing various exceptions. As stated in Chapter 
4 and 5, host states may take restrictive measures against foreign SOEs and justify 
these conducts in arbitrations on grounds of national security or other legitimate 
public policies. 
 
Secondly, the current investment regime is providing responses to the changing 
realities in foreign investment, but the policy and objectives are divergent in 
developing and developed countries. As Chapter 3 suggested, divergent trends on 
admission seem to emerge in developed and developing countries at both national 
and international levels. Chapter 4 has also shown that some developed countries 
have clarified and restricted core terms in substantive treaty obligations in order to 
preserve regulatory space and protect national interests, while emerging economies 
tend to embrace the IIA regime to expand protections for outward investments. 
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Essentially, the reason of such divergence is that the role of these countries in 
foreign investment is changing. As SOE investments from emerging economies 
expand, the future investment regime is likely to be subject to more divergence and 
policy debates. Both Western countries and emerging economies need to re-evaluate 
their roles and investment policies, and to rethink to what extent they can afford the 
reciprocity of IIA regime. In this regard, the task of updating old treaties is pressing 
and there is a call for further clarification and recalibration of substantive treaty 
obligations. 
 
Today, it is common for states to be involved in international economic activities as 
‘private’ actors. While some critics and regulators focus on state ownership of SOE 
investments for constructing the regulatory framework, I would argue that under the 
new reality with a rapid growth of SOEs, the central problem of the international 
investment regulation is not whether an investor on the basis of state ownership 
should be included or excluded from the treaty protection, but whether the host state 
has provided adequate protections for investors and are allowed to take regulatory 
measures for public policy objectives. Therefore, the proper and sensible IIA regime 
should not focus on the status of an investor, i.e., whether it is public or private. 
Instead, it should focus on specific behaviours of the investor, e.g., whether an SOE 
acts in a commercial capacity and whether the SOE investment is detrimental to 
national security and competition. In this respect, SOEs investing abroad can be 
considered as same as private investors. In any event, imposing different rules for 
investors or excluding SOEs from the investment regime merely on the basis of state 
ownership may not only undermine the primary purpose of investment protections, 
but also create discriminations against certain SOEs in the name of levelling the 
playing field between private and public investments. 
 
It is notable that while SOE investments have attracted much attention in recent 
years, they only represent one facet of the evolution of international investment. 
Accordingly, the ‘Public-Private’ conflict remains the major issue of the 
international investment law regime, although the ‘East-West’ contest may create 
more divergence between Western countries and emerging economies. Currently, 
some Western countries are beginning to question the investment treaty programs 
designed by themselves. Meanwhile, a retreat from high level of investment 
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protections and a trend of investment protectionism has resurfaced. However, at the 
time of writing, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the rapid growth of 
SOE investments – or the rise of ‘state capitalism’ – will further stimulate the 
evolution of the IIA regime, and whether states’ investment policies will move 
towards more liberal or restrictive. What is clear now is that regulatory responses to 
SOE investments are likely to be subject to closer arbitral scrutiny and extensive 
political debates.  
 
Given the increased volume and significance of SOE investments from emerging 
economies, Western countries’ investment policies may increasingly be driven by 
political backlash against certain countries. Furthermore, the IIA regime may 
become to a product of political games among powerful states - especially 
considering the call for establishing a multinational framework for foreign 
investment. Nonetheless, in light of global effort towards a sustainable FDI, it is 
possible to develop towards a more balanced, non-discriminatory and liberal regime 
of international investment law that can best accommodate needs for investment 
protection, promotion and regulation in investors and (both home and host) states.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that both SOE investments and the evolution of 
international investment regime are complex and controversial topics with many 
issues worth in-depth studies in the future. While this thesis focuses on some of the 
important issues surrounding SOE investments in the context of international 
investment law, questions relating to SOE investors’ obligations such as corporate 
governance and disclosure, and the competitive neutrality of SOEs wait to be 
elaborated and discussed further in future research. As SOE investment continues to 
proliferate, it is beyond doubt that the relevant issues will be subject to extensive 
debates and examinations by scholars, arbitral tribunals and policymakers. It is 
hoped that this thesis contributes to the SOE commentary and provides some useful 
insights and recommendations for designing a more balanced, non-discriminatory 
and liberal international investment regime. 
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